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           Founded on SMTs (Social Movement Theories), the current study aimed at 
analyzing the impact of Arab Spring uprisings on the geopolitical system of the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region. With an overview on the political and 
socioeconomic background of Arab Uprisings, the qualitative study focused on: a) 
determining the economic, political, and social consequences of the uprisings, especially 
aftermaths that have given rise to the notion of geopolitical instability in the region, and 
b) investigating the possible factors that will spread geopolitical instability across the 
MENA region. Given the comprehensiveness and magnitude, the case of the popular 
uprisings in the MENA region is assessed using qualitative analysis.  
           The study indicates that, Arab Spring failed to bring optimistic changes, 
empowered political Islamism, spread religious radicalism, reduced state secularism, and 
led to the emergence of semi-theocratic regimes. It negatively affected public freedoms, 
minorities, rights of women, and democratization. The uprisings resulted in riots, civil 
wars, social militarization and neighborhood interference, empowered Iranian hegemony, 
anarchized petrodollar, created proxy wars, led to the revival of terrorist cells, and 
affected economies.  
           The Arab Uprisings which sprung with dissatisfaction/deprivation among the 
masses against their respective regimes, and created conflicts across the MENA region 
channeled a mass movement on the basis of collective identities and informal networks. 
The study ultimately concluded that social movements have the potential to escalate to a 
 
ii 
full-fledged revolution if not tackled in an appropriate manner. This study proves that 
Arab Uprisings collectively and negatively impacted the political, social, security, 
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            I have done my thesis in six chapters, and each chapter, subchapter, and 
subsection will be outlined in its dedicated division respectively as shown in the table of 
contents and Thesis Structure explained in Chapter One, to ensure the fulfillment of all 
academic aspects for M.L.S scientific research and requirements of Graduate Studies of 
the Department of Political Science at Fort Hays State University. 
           In accordance with scientific study requirements, and in full commitment with the 
academic instructions of FHSU Graduate School‘s Guidelines for Thesis and Field Study 
Handbook (Fall, 2012), and as the most compatible with the guidelines of social and 
humanities sciences, wherefore APA style was adopted by me for all in-text and cited 
literatures (References) of this thesis.  
            I have based, showcased, and developed my thesis‘ suppositions, arguments, and 
discussions on the original thesis statement proposed, submitted, and approved by my 
venerable and distinguished Graduate Committee, and Major Professor, and as stipulated 
in problem statement ―The Arab Spring was negatively affected the regions of Middle 
East and North Africa, and will lead inevitably to instable geopolitical situation results 
because of violent socio-economic and political devastating transformations, and long-
term domestic and interregional conflicts.‖ 
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POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUNDS OF ARAB SPRING‘S 
UPRISINGS, AND STUDY OVERVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
           The radical upheavals that overwhelmed the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region are still immature and incomprehensible to be considered a quantum leap 
in political, economic, and social destiny of the peoples of this region, and therefore the 
term by which that reactionary phenomenon has known mistakenly in political literature 
as ‗Arab Spring‘ is thus proven to be merely an overhasty misnomer (Totten, 2012, p. 
23). Contrarily, Arab Uprisings would be an apt term to describe the mayhem that crept 
across the MENA region.  
           While the term ‗Arab Spring‘ was introduced as expression of optimism, with a 
noble intention of shifting the MENA region‘s political despotism from totalitarianism 
and autocracy towards democracy and modernity, its aftermaths have illuminated fatal 
civil wars. Violent representations by extremist and radical regimes are present on one 
side, and disturbances and insecurity that plagued the Arab States on the other.  These 
two factors have subsequently turned the two regions across the MENA region towards 
high volatility and antagonistic environments. Consequently, the movement cannot be 




and realism, which are used while describing a ‗spring‘. Adding further, the outcomes of 
the popular rebellions have been confiscated by most extreme religious spectrum and 
descended to be "Islamic Nahda" which mean "Islamic awakening", invariably aims to 
overthrow secular regimes, whether military or hereditary, and restore the empire of 
Islamic caliphate which poses ideological hostile to western civilization and its values 
(May, 2012, p. A4). 
       The history of mankind reflects a continuum reverberations in the political, social, 
economic, and security aspects of the civil society. Built on fundamental values of peace 
and harmony, every society since time immemorial has reflected volatility, unrest, and 
outbursts against injustice and exploitation. An inherent want for just and right society 
accompanied with freedom of expression propels every individual to bring forth a 
struggle, the end-result of which makes or breaks numerous stratums of the society. 
While some struggles effectuate profound changes in the political authority and social 
system, others bring forth plausible changes in the political authority and some change in 
the social system. While few others effectuate moderate changes, other struggles virtually 
fail to bring any change to the political or social system of the society (Tanter and 
Midlarsky, 1967). Nevertheless, these struggles otherwise termed as revolutions, have 
played a crucial role in the evolution of civil societies. In simplistic sense, revolution is 
synonymous for change. However, larger definition of revolution, when applied to the 
civic society reflects Marx‘s idea of defining revolution as ―moments in the history of 
class struggle during which a radical, violent change occurs in the class basis of the 
political structure‖ (Finley, 1986, p.47).  Thus, every revolution is characterized by two 
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normative aspects, change that affects the fundamental written or non-written laws and 
change is considered to be illegal by the law that it attempts to abolish (Friedrich, 2009). 
       While the 1700s showcased the essence of revolution through the great French 
and American revolutions, modern times since the 1950s have reflected high level of 
revolution through deaths and time-frame. Revolutions such as the 1959 Cuban 
revolution, 1958 Iraqi revolution, 1957 Columbian revolution, 1955 Argentinian 
revolution, and so on highlight the series of discomfort in the human society towards 
their respective political and socio-economic aspects (Tanter and Midlarsky, 1967). An 
insight to these and recent revolutions highlights many common characteristics: limited 
scope which magnifies incrementally through peoples‘ mind and led without the 
involvement of any government, spiritual or political organization or any singular 
representation, without any targeted end-point or action plan and highly rewarding to 
those people that further the coin of revolution (Quinn, 2014). 
       These attributes are visibly present in the great mayhem that erupted in the 
Middle Eastern and Northern Africa (MENA) region in December 2010. Variedly termed 
as Arab Spring, Arab Revolution, Islamist Spring, and Jasmine Revolution and so on, the 
revolution and revolts that began in Tunisia assumed a mammoth shape in early 2011 and 
spread across the MENA region consuming the political and socio-economic stability of 
the region. A watershed event that took the world by storm, given its perpetual magnitude 
and expansion, the Arab revolution percolated itself into the history of mankind as the 
great Arab awakening channeled by numerous uprisings across the MENA region. Akin 
to any revolution, the Arab Uprisings were a result of series of suppressed political and 
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socio-economic factors, an insight to which shall elucidate the background of its origin 
and rise in the MENA region.  
STUDY BACKGROUNDS 
       An unpredicted event that took the global community by surprise, Arab Uprisings 
can be defined as a powerful and landmark event that has permanently transformed the 
global political setting as well as caused to a seismic change in the socio-political and 
economic contracts, governing the relationship between elite ruling groups of the MENA 
region (military jaunts, monarchies, single-party authoritarian regimes) and their 
respective nations. An insight to the political and socio-economic background of the 
uprisings is essential to discern the need for conducting a study on Arab Uprisings. The 
following sections ensure the fulfillment of this aspect. 
POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
      Regimes in the MENA region have reflected authoritarian and totalitarian 
characteristics for decades (The Economist, 1997). Authoritarian regimes can either 
exhibit communist principles, or can function on one-party leadership. They can also be 
militaristic or dynastic or theocratic in nature and most authoritarian regimes portray 
characteristics such as constitutional restraints, subordination of individual rights, 
forceful obedience of citizens, excessive authority by single person or party, absence of 
free elections, elected assembly, independent judiciary and careful censure or control of 
media (―The Staff‖, 2000). On similar lines, totalitarian regimes exhibit essential 
characteristics or pattern which can be classified into political and socio-economic 
constructs. Politically, they function on a central ideology and are led by a single person 
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or party. Socially, the law or police functions on terror and such regimes exhibit 
militaristic behavior. Media, communication channels and public freedom are curtailed, 
and in totalitarian regimes, the economy is centrally directed by the head of the State 
(Fredrich and Brzezinski, 1956). 
       The political causes or background of the popular Arab Uprisings can be 
attributed to the weakened civil society and political opposition in the MENA region well 
before the origin of Arab Uprisings in 2011 (Yom, 2005). The historical timeline of the 
MENA region and political crisis from an overall perspective and regional perspective 
since the 1980s reflects the above assertion (Figures 1.1 and 1.2 indicate Arab World 
polity score and Arab World Median and Average polity compared to world regions). 
The political background of the Arab Uprisings can be connected with the outcomes of 
World Wars and the Cold War. The outcomes of World Wars and the Cold War led to the 
genesis of complex and varied differences across the social and societal fabric across the 
MENA region. The power of autonomous ruling successfully constrained the society with 
dynastical or familial, military, national parties, and tribes (Gross, 2011).  
       While the States functioned under monarchies or as republics (Gross, 2011), the 
central pillars of the MENA region enriched the authoritarian or totalitarian regimes with 
complex military security and state-controlled economy (Gause, 2011). The regional 
perspective of the MENA region‘s political regimes reflects this aspect. For instance in 
Syria (Paul, 2012) Morocco (Arellano, and Bover, 1995) and Saudi Arabia (Klapper, 
2010), totalitarian rule allowed the President or King to function as the Head of the State. 
The ultimate decisive power vested in the hands of the Head of the State, who: a) 
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appointed the ministers and controlled the legislatures and judiciary powers, b) declared 
war and controlled the executive and judiciary aspects apart from the legislative aspects 
of the State, c) The mastermind of the country in all of political, economic and social 
fields, d) Father of the nation and the commander of the army and biggest philanthropist 
to people, and e) generally rules based on certain religious or political doctrines, 
revolutionary claimed principles, achievements of the coup, royal hereditary right, sole 
charismatic leader of nation, Caliph of Muslims, theocracy or the Sharia law (Klapper, 
2010). 
       The results of such political rule eventually reflected bad governance or lack of 
governance. For instance, Libya under Gaddafi exhibited the most repressive and corrupt 
regime politically and economically in North Africa where failed and isolated state, 
nepotism and complete absence of diversity in political rule with the rule of Gaddafi for 
over four decades. Countries such as Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia, Syria and Algeria 
functioned under Presidents in power for more than 20 years (OECD, 
2011).  Additionally, citizens under such regimes had dormant rights and are exposed to 
political corruption (Table 1.1 elucidates Corruption score and ranking of MENA 
countries 2008). For instance, the rule of Mubarak in Egypt, Gadhafi in Libya, and Ben 
Ali in Tunisia for decades based on intelligence agencies, private security, secret police, 
ascendancy of the ruling party, state of emergency, martial law, arbitrary arrests and 
mock trials, and forced Egyptian, Libyan, and Tunisian economic sectors inclusive of 
tourism, banking and many more to be functioned under the ruling family or its 
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associated members. Thus, oligarchy was vividly present which bred epitomic political 
and economic corruption (Paul, 2012). 
       From a political perspective, the States belonging to the MENA region exhibited 
excessive authority by single person or party through concentration of power, nepotism 
and lack of political pluralism. The constriction of the States by the monarchial or 
military dynasties and monopolistic power-hold on the civil statures of the society, 
eventually forced the Arab populations to demand for a holistic and strong political 
systems which mirror the Arab Congress‘s 1913 Paris agenda of establishing a greater 
rule across the Ottoman Empire and MENA region (Gross, 2011). Additionally, 
curtailment of individual rights and lack of freedom (media, civilians, and economy) 
elaborated in the following section, eventually led to the outbreak of a phenomenal 
phenomenon based on collective social action called as Arab Spring. 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
       While the political background of the Arab Uprisings can be traced back to the 
central characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, the socio-economic 
background of the Arab Uprisings can also be elaborated based on the central 
characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes along with its dynamic effects on 
the social and economic aspects of the MENA region. The following sections collectively 
elaborate the socio-economic background of the Arab Uprisings. 
Impact of the Great Recession or Global Economic Crisis 
       The 2008 economic crisis or the global recession worsened the economic situation 
of the MENA region (―European Commission‖, 2011). Despite the adaption and 
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application of several economic models by the respective regimes, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank‗s (WB), practices and policies, several States 
belonging to the MENA region failed to secure sustainable and effective economies 
(Fawaz, 2012).  High dependence on oil production and exportation of most countries 
across the MENA region undoubtedly secured surplus funds (Abed, 2011); however, 
absence of globalized private sector affected the employment status across the region, 
given the volatility in the oil market. 
        While the nations that engaged in production and exportation of hydrocarbons 
largely benefited, the non-dependent nations suffered tremendously (Rosenberg, 2011). 
The cases of Tunisia and Egypt can be recounted in this regard. The nations forecasted 
and attempted to reach the various macro-economic targets laid by the international 
financial institutions. However, they failed to focus on the social aspects of their 
respective societies (Davis, 2010), resulting in escalated fuel prices accompanied with 
shortage of food supply (The Staff Team, 2010). Thus, the international crisis coupled 
with weakened internal financial system, economic deficit, national debt, political 
impotence, demographic explosion against the poor services and infrastructure, lack of 
jobs, failure of development plans and oil-price volatility affected both the oil-producing 
and non-oil producing countries of the MENA region. 
Inflation, Especially in Food Prices 
       Inflation or rise in prices of commodities plays a crucial role in effecting the 
semblance of political structures of the States (Walton and Seddon, 1994) (Figure 1.7 
elucidates food prices in Arab countries January 2004 – May 2011). Economies of the 
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Arab Spring countries sagged in deficit, and the economic performance in the majority of 
these countries reduced at rates of over 5% per year to perform in negative indicators. 
The budgets suffered a record deficit, and GDP declined sharply (Table 1.2. shows real 
GDP percentages to inflation rate in sample of Arab Spring countries 2020-2013). The 
trade markets devoured by the flames of price rises, while Inflation rates have increased 
in some countries of uprisings by 100% within few years, and public debt increased to 
unprecedented record, and aid from partners, friends, and allies in halting the 
deterioration of these economies did not succeed. Poverty resulting from escalating food 
prices is considered as a major cause for chaos, civil disobedience, riots, and even 
revolutions in many countries (Headey and Fan, 2008). 
       While unrest and riots for food is not new to MENA region (Sadiki, 2000), 
countries such as Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, and Morocco did experience protests between 
2007 and 2008, given the rapid rise in food prices. Given the general effect of the global 
economic crisis coupled with bad economic governance across the MENA region, 
worsened the economic situation. The general mood of the affected citizens gradually 
shifted from bad to worse and a collective outbreak was visible which can be attributed to 
collective economic discontent across the MENA population. Unstable business cycles, 
faltering labor markets, and escalating prices eventually functioned as a paradox of the 
so-called rich and efficient MENA region.  
Demographic Change in the Society 
       Demographic change in the MENA region functions as crucial cause for the 
eruption of the volcano called the Arab Uprisings. Between 1970 and 2010, the MENA 
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region, especially the Arab World experienced humongous change in its population levels 
(Hegasy, 2011) (Figures 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 demonstrate the population explosion in Middle 
East, North Africa and Gulf countries). It was estimated that about 30 percent of the 
population that dwelled were about 20-35 years of age, which clearly indicated the 
presence of high percentage of young population (Perthes, 2011). 
       A youth bulge is visible in the MENA region and it is also estimated that ―over 
the coming decade, approximately 65% of the population of the region will be less than 
24 years old‖ (―NATO‖, 2011).  This projection has relevant social, political, and 
economic implications not only across the MENA region, but also across the globe, given 
the ability of the youth bulge to create geo-strategic effects (Figure 1.6 indicates 
percentage of youth bulge in MENA between ages 0-14 years). Although a concrete 
relationship between young population, chaos, and violence does not exist, socio-
economic factors such as employment, equality, education, and healthcare facilities, and 
governments‘ inclination towards ensuring these amenities to its civilians impacts the 
semblance of the youth. When the educated youth fail to secure employment, when the 
cost of living increases and the rulers fail to provide social and economic security to their 
civilians, aberrations in the society bound to surface (Perthes, 2011).  
Lack of Employment 
       Unemployment history in the MENA region, especially for countries such as 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco narrates the cause for the outbreak of Arab Uprisings. 
Reduced production rates in the States of the MENA region resulted in the increase of 
unemployment rates and youth unemployment eventually led to discontentment across 
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the juvenile population (IMF, 2011; Sika, 2012). The presence of large number of youths 
across the MENA region clearly symbolizes the effect of unemployment on juvenile 
population. Lack of age divide and demographic change in the MENA region created a 
youth bulge and in 2011 ―one in every three people in MENA was between the ages of 10 
and 24‖ (―NATO‖, 2011). Research conducted by CQ Global Researcher (2011) and 
Huffington Post Business (2013) show the correlation between percentage of youth 
population in each MENA country and the level of disruptions. Rather than extracting 
humungous benefits from the youth power, the governments in the MENA region failed 
to create jobs or match the skills of the competent MENA youth (―NATO‖, 2011). 
Eventually political instability and nepotism propelled the young labor force to rebel 
against the growing poverty and scaling inequalities in the societies. 
Poverty and Scaling Inequalities in the Society 
       Failure of economic models and global recession escalated the already failing 
economic conditions of the MENA region to new levels and fundamental deep-rooted 
issues such as increased unemployment rates, nepotism, political corruption and greater 
divide between the rich and the poor deprived the society of its basic structure. These 
aspects further increased the divide between the States and its respective citizens, given 
the lack of ability of the States and its rulers to meet the expectations of common man 
(Noland and Pack, 2007; ―International Bank‖, 2007). For instance, pivotal point for 
Tunisia, where the genesis of Arab Uprisings took place, failed to create jobs for its 
people, especially its local youth, despite its robust economy. Unemployment 
accompanied with escalating food prices created regional inequalities apart from poverty.                               
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           Tunisian unemployment rate in 2011 recorded a new high of 16 percent while Ben 
Ali and his family enjoyed luxurious lifestyle highlighting the ever-present nepotism and 
economic divide between the ruler and his family, and common Tunisian citizens, who 
failed to meet the basic needs of food and shelter, given the rise in inflation 
(―Economist‖, 2011). 
Influence of Young People and Education 
       The inclusion of young people and education as a cause for the Arab Uprisings 
can be explained from two prospects: a) with the help of modernization theory which 
includes the population that receives formal education and b) youth population which 
fails to receive formal education. Modernization broadens human choices and 
encompasses socio-economic resources to enhance the capabilities of people to ensure 
the prevalence of humanistic society (Welzel, 2002). Theorists such as Lerner (1958) and 
Inkeles (1983) highlighted the role of modernization in the process of education and 
developing cognitive ability. Studies conducted in this arena by (UNESCO, 2000) shows 
Illiteracy rate in Arab States is second highest compared to other world regions and 
elucidated the influential role of education and established the relationship between 
formal education and rationality of individuals. Firstly, with the inclusion of formal 
education into the social structure, ―the presence of secular-rational values and self-
expression values increases‖ (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, p. 37). Secondly, it creates the 
need for social and economic stability within the minds of the individuals and breeds 
values of independence, choice and self-expression which clearly reflect modern 
democratic views. When applied to the youth population that received formal education 
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in MENA region, it is clearly visible that education played a crucial role in implanting 
seeds of democratization in the minds of the individuals. 
       Focusing on the second prospect, the prospect relating to individuals who have 
failed to receive education can be clearly established that, lack of education or lower 
educational levels produce less or non-productive workforce which impedes the 
economic development of a nation. When reflected from the MENA regions‘ perspective, 
as per AFP (AFP, 2008), it is evident that, ―three-quarters of the 100 million people 
unable to read or write in the Arab countries are aged between 15 and 45‖ (―NATO‖, 
2011).  Thus, educated youth face discontent given the lack of freedom of choice and 
employment despite their skills, and non-educated are equally discontent given the lack 
of employment and necessary skillset. Education along with modernized connectivity 
access through mediums such as social media reverberated the call for dignity among the 
MENA population. 
Influence of Social Media and Call for Dignity and Social Justice 
       Social media and other forms of media have played a crucial role in the spread of 
Arab Uprisings. Live reports of protests in Egypt and Tunisia (Al-Sharekh, 2011), and 
excessive use of social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter and use of 
technologically advanced devices such as Smartphones and internet to attach the live 
updates and influence the population to act against the oppressive forces and injustice 
meted to the civilians in the hands of the governments across regional and international 
spaces (Figures 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 meant to represent the impact of social media on 
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protests wave), facilitated the effectual growth in the number of protestors ensuring 
collective action and initiating social movement called Arab Spring (Axford, 2011). 
       Social values, human dignity and social justice are fundamental pillars of any 
society. Every individual connects his/her internal micro-cosmic values with the macro-
cosmic values of the society. The Head of the State or the government is a canvas and 
reflective representation of the treatment it provides to its citizens. Degradation of human 
dignity and social injustice often erupts as a volcano and destroys the semblance of the 
social edifice. The rise of uprisings across the MENA region can be connected to this 
(Asseburg, 2011). Lack of human security and governments‘ failures to meet pivotal 
social aspects related to education, healthcare, and security pushed the MENA region 
towards adverse outcomes. Neither did the governments invest in State security, nor did 
they spare any attention towards human security, despite consistent call of the citizens for 
empowerment and human security. The MENA population, especially the Arab youth 
expressed perpetual reference towards human security and dignity across various forums 
such as IMF youth dialogue and the 2009 Arab Human Development Report validates the 
need for security (―United Nations‖, 2009). 
       The increasing public grievances and lack of attention from the respective rulers 
and persistent tyrannies imposed by the autocratic regimes, eventually bred violence in 
the hearts of the general public. A general need for democracy became the outcry of 
thousands of people across the MENA region. 
       In Tunisia, the land that propelled its population to the popular revolt, chanting 
from protestors ―we can live on bread and water alone but not with the RCD - 
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Constitutional Democratic Rally‖ (AFP, 2011), could be vividly heard. Popular Islamist 
figure, Sadok Chourou who was imprisoned for 20 years under Ben Ali‘s rule, exclaimed, 
―the new government does not represent the people and has to fall‖ (AFP, 
2011).  Injustice meted to the public and lack of empathy towards the citizens, is another 
popular cause for the uprisings. In Bahrain, the Shia Muslims revolted against what they 
called ‗repressive regime‘, which humiliated and failed to give them equal treatment from 
its Sunni rulers. On similar lines, the gathering of thousands of Egyptian civilians in 
Tahrir Square, Cairo, with a demand for human dignity (Human Rights Watch, 2012) and 
refuting the oppression, nepotism, and corruption (West, 2011) symbolize the need for 
restoration of human dignity, justice, and values among the general public across the 
MENA region as another social cause for the Arab Uprisings. 
Crucial Movement towards Democracy 
       The political governance across the MENA region reflects totalitarian and 
authoritarian characteristics, which have forced democracy to take a backseat in the 
political scenario of the MENA region. While democracy is highly held across other 
regions of the world, the Arab and North African nations have remained within the 
strong-holds of autocracy and nepotism (Stepan and Robertson, 2003). The MENA 
region has failed to integrate Western policies and governance whose fundamentals lie in 
democracy (Anderson, 2006) and the Arab Uprisings can also be considered as a 
collective movement and call for democratization. While democratization can be 
regarded as a social cause for the uprisings, the trajectory of the Arab Uprisings in each 
16 
 
of the affected States will clearly emphasize whether the States transit towards 
democracy or progress further into chaos and hypocrisy. 
AIM & OBJECTIVES       
       The aim of the research is to observe the political and socioeconomic background 
of Arab Spring and identify the consequences of these factors. To obtain aim of this 
research, the following research objectives are outlined: 
 To determine the economic, political, and social consequences of the Arab 
Uprisings, especially aftermaths of Arab Uprisings that has given rise to the 
notion of geopolitical instability in the region, and: 
 To ascertain the possible factors that will spread geopolitical instability across the 
Arab countries in the MENA region. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
[1] What are the economic, political, and social consequences of the Arab Spring (both 
positive and negative implications) especially aftermaths of Arab Uprisings that have 
given rise to the notion of geopolitical instability in the region? 
[2] What are possible factors that would spread geopolitical instability across the MENA? 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
       The history of mankind is a witness of numerous movements accompanied by 
mass resource mobilization and transformation which invariably represent, ―collective 
challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction 
with elites, opponents, and authorities‖ (Tarrow, 1998, p.4). While several social and 
political movements engage in collective action and focus on creating change in existing 
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systems, the outcomes of such movements generally reflect two possible outcomes: the 
acceptance and emergence of the challenging group as the voice of the society and 
transfer of new advantages to the challenging group and its beneficiaries (Gamson, 1990). 
Apparent changes in the social values (Rochon and Mazmanian, 1993) can also be 
considered as relevant outcome of movements and movements are thus accompanied by 
direct or direct internal and/or external changes (Gurr, 1980). ―The outcomes of social 
and political movements, which originates below from the required to comprehend 
present events in State, for instance disobedience practices in urban areas, than from the 
inclination to make up the shortfall in the social movement literature‖ (Giugni, 1998, 
p.387-388). While social movements are generally non-conducive to the peace and 
stability of the society (Hazen, 2009) and are essential for successful social 
transformations (Offe, 1987), social movements are known to lose their intended goal and 
progress in non-tangible trajectory with discursive and unintended outcomes (Amenta 
and Young, 1999).  While the outcry for reformation cross the MENA region has been 
glorified as a great Arab Awakening, great need exists in identifying the consequences of 
the popular uprisings, apart from just acquiring the political accomplishments of the Arab 
Uprisings. 
SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
       The phenomena of political and social movements across different societies and 
eras reflect prominent political and social transformation and in most cases, reflect 
societal and compound psychological dysfunction and anomies across varied social 
constituencies (Durkheim, 1933). Representing loss of identities, movements are 
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collective phenomenon (Le Bon, 1977) induced by continual grievances (McCarthy and 
Zald, 1977) non-addressed or wrapped under the political and socio-economic policies of 
the State. Thus, with the help of range of resources, resource mobilization (Jenkins, 1983) 
is achieved which collectively act on the single agenda based on the cultural, emotional 
and normative fundamentals of the addressed phenomenon. The outcomes of prominent 
social movements ensure alternating power and effectuating social transformations by the 
empowered citizens (Tilly, 1999). Though, a retroactive study to make comparison 
among numerous social movements will ―elucidate over the causative components 
contribute in processes of social and political transformation‖ (Giugni, 1998, p.389), the 
current study is limited to uprisings in the MENA region, given the eruptions of 
widespread revolt across numerous regions of the world. 
RESEARCH STRUCTURE         
       This research follows the common research structure and pursues the APA 
citation style.  
Chapter One introduces the topic, provides the study background, and outlines the aim 
and objectives, and research questions of the study. It defines the problem statement, 
scope of the research, and outlines the research structure. 
Chapter Two assesses the literature pertinent to the topic. It provides an overview of the 
social and political background of the Arab Spring, and its immediate, and plausible 
implications in the MENA region. 
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Chapter Three elaborates the political, social, security, and interregional effects of the 
Arab Spring. It analyzes the implications of geopolitical instability using relevant 
literatures. 
Chapter Four defines the methodology applied to this research. It outlines the research 
methodology and approach, data collection methods and tools, and data analyses 
procedures used in the study. It touches upon the reliability and validity constructs of the 
study.  
Chapter Five highlights the outcomes from the purposed data collection, analyses, and 
discusses the research findings. 
Chapter Six ultimately concludes the research with relevant interpretations and provides 






 Literature review is ―an extensive reference to related research and theory‖ 
(Ridley, 2012, p.3). It is a ―selection of available documents (both published and 
unpublished) on the topic, which contain information, ideas, data, and evidence written 
from a particular standpoint to fulfill certain aims or express certain views on the nature 
of the topic‖ (Hart, 1998, p.14). Literature review provides substantial theoretical 
background to the research study. It enables the researcher to begin the research article.  
           A good literature review identifies the relevant literatures, structures the reviews, 
uses appropriate tense and tone, identifies critical knowledge gaps in the research subject, 
evaluates the idealism of the research topic, and creates discussions and relevant 
conclusions (Webster & Watson, 2002). Relevant literature identification involves 
diverse review of secondary resources to accumulate relative and complete census 
available literature. In the current study concept-centric approach is applied. Concepts 
related to fundamentals of the so-called ‗Arab Spring‘ uprisings, and the political and 
socioeconomic backgrounds of the uprisings are intricately studied.  This along with 





AIM OF LITERATURE REVIEW  
 The essence of any literature review lies in its ability to provide efficient 
substratum or knowledge base to conduct intricate analysis on a subject. Current 
literature review aims to structure an article/literature, such that, it contributes to the total 
understanding of the research subject, establish relation between one or more literary 
works, authentic and original work admits the numerous theories. Accordingly, this 
literature review contains three-fold objective.  
 Firstly, it attempts to understand the fundamentals of the ‗Arab Spring‘ 
phenomenon. Secondly, it identifies the political and socioeconomic background of the 
‗spring‘. To accomplish this, the political and social movement theory is studied from a 
general perspective. The definition, the characteristics and the phases of the theory are 
subjected to analysis. The purport of the generalized theory is applied to the ‗spring‘.  
 Post this, the literature review progresses into the deeper aspect of the ‗spring‘. 
The review aims to ascertain the origin, progression and the spread of the ‗spring‘. The 
spark of the fire at Tunisia and Libya, peak uprisings in Egypt and Yemen, expansion of 
the disorders in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan and Sudan, and fire fuse of all-out 
war in Middle East given the complications in Syria are studied. The history of the 
‗spring‘, its actors, agencies and the change process are analyzed from a regional 
perspective. Numerous research articles are used, details of which are mentioned in the 
‗references‘ section of the paper. 
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POLITICAL AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY OF ARAB SPRING  
Weber (1969) categorizes social actions in four ways: instrumental rationality, 
value rationality, affectual and traditional (pp.24-25). In instrumental rationality, 
behavior of objects in the environment and other human beings determines the social 
action. Expectations are developed which are used as conditions to achieve actor‘s own 
rationality. In value rationality, individual actor‘s conscious belief shaped by ethical, 
aesthetic, religious, and/or other forms of behavior, irrespective of its success determines 
the social action. Social action is also determined by social actor‘s emotional state-
affectual or by ingrained habituation- traditional (Weber, 1969, pp.24-25).  
Social movement theories (SMT) have been used by numerous researchers and 
academicians to discern the social actions and comprehend the sociology of social 
movements. SMTs investigate the transformative nature of various social movements that 
act as key elements for initiating, propagating and permeating change within the 
societies. Additionally, the theories discern the intricacies involved in the movements. 
They enable the researcher to understand the dynamics- origin, development, successes, 
and failures in a simplistic sense across the ―broader political structures of our society‖ 
(Crossley, 2002, pp.8-9) 
 Numerous social scientists and researchers have attempted to define social 
movements from diverse viewpoints. In order to understand the essence of social 
movements, the definitions of Blumer (1969), Frank and Fuentes (1987) and Della Porta 
and Diani (2006) have been studied and applied in the current paper. Collating the 
definitions of these experts, a working definition for social movements can be outlined.   
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           Social movements can be defined as a collective synthesis of identities and 
actions. The movements are cyclic and inevitable entity of the social process, consisting 
of informal networks of stratified classes, emerging from social/cultural and/or political 
conflictual situations. They exhibit diversity, are independent from outside advice and 
aim at achieving severance from State power, transit towards socialism and bring out 
transformative change.  
Social movements comprise of four distinct stages, which can be termed as 
‗typical lifecycle of social movement‘. Blumer (1951) coins the first stage as the social 
ferment, which exhibits unorganized and unfocused agitation, a movement generally 
based on agitators‘ propaganda. The second stage termed as ‗popular excitement,‘ 
exhibits the fundamental causes of general dissatisfaction and the movement is trending 
towards an organized and objective based operation. The third stage called 
‗formalization,‘ promenades the movement towards a formal organization channeled by 
disciplined participation and strategic coordination to achieve its well-defined objectives. 
In the last stage, ‗institutionalization‘ the movement permeated and embeds itself as an 
inevitable part of the society and gains a concrete structure (p.203). Currently, individual 
state affected by the ‗Arab Spring‘ across the MENA region is either under the 
formalized stage or trending towards the last stage of institutionalization.  
The ‗Arab Spring‘ across the MENA region provides substantial base and 
opportunity for sociological imagination and application of the SMT. It is a paraphernalia 
and expression of socio-cultural and political conflict. It symbolizes the interplay 
between social and economic conflicts, and addresses the opulence of suppressed 
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contextual conflicts in the MENA region. The ‗spring‘ characterized by mobilization of 
rights, Islamic movements and labor struggles (Beinin and Vairel, 2011, pp.19-20) 
addresses ―the relationship between structural change and transformations in patterns of 
social conflict‖ (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.5).  
The underlying social problems in the MENA region instigated the essence of 
collective action. The social actors and agitators identified with the ‗collective we‘ and 
moved towards shared causes and beliefs. Moved by the intense event in Tunisia, regions 
across the ‗Arab World‘ have channelized core values such as ―desire for respect, trust, 
dignity, human and political rights, and economic fairness‖ (Arab Uprisings Symposium, 
2012, p.7) into the conflict. A common human commune of cultural representations 
reflected across the ‗spring‘. The ‗spring‘ highlights ―the role of cultural representations 
in social conflict‖ (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.5). 
Since 1980s demands for human rights and human cause actively propagated in 
the MENA region. Framework of human rights, constituting mainly from international 
organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, subsumed 
professionals with necessary skills and financial security. Their active participation in 
amalgamation with local rights activists periodically petitioned and pleaded for varied 
human rights cases (Beinin and Vairel, 2011, pp.83-84). The periodic demand for 
changes in the social and political stratums of the society, in addition to the harsh and 
humiliating treatment towards the humane causes, laid the seed of agitation towards a 
common cause of dignity, human and political rights. ―Human rights activists in Turkey, 
particularly those working on issues in the heavily Kurdish areas, have been the targets of 
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official harassment and deadly assaults by shadowy vigilante elements having possible 
links to the state‖ (Beinin and Vairel, 2011, pp.84).  
In addition to human rights activists, Islamists movements also introduced major 
methodological insight and acted as normal social actors. Equipped with resources, 
strategies, and practices, the Islamic movements aimed to rehabilitate political Islamism 
(Behr and Aaltola, 2011, p.9). For instance, Egypt‘s Jama‘a al-Islamiyya and Lebanon‘s 
Islamist group Hezbollah, acted as social actors in promoting moral and pious cause of 
human and political radicalism (Beinin and Vairel, 2011, p.161). They exhibited a 
symphony of collectivism and behavior. Apart from socio-cultural conflicts, economic 
causes such as fiscal consolidations with frequent budget cuts, inflation and shortage of 
jobs, resulted in labor struggles and ―well-educated population all coalesced to produce 
an atmosphere of humiliation and injustice‖ (Arab Uprisings Symposium, 2012, p.6). 
Thus, an ―economic deficit‖, a ―freedom deficit‖ and a ―dignity deficit‖‖ (Behr and 
Aaltola, 2011, p.4) created core values and provided the necessary conflictual foundation 
to the edifice called ‗Arab Spring.  
The ‗spring‘ generally consisted of urban lower middle-class youth and contained 
distinct socio-economic and political grievances. The development of informal social 
networks enhanced the strength of the collective values. It embedded individual 
participation and cultural orientation with the general ideology of the movement and 
perpetually developed a web of social interactions (Diani and Mcadam, 2003, p.23). 
Additionally, they built necessary symbols, rituals and/or narratives that solidified the 
identities and shaped the actors. A collective symposium towards the networks was 
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established. The ‗spring‘ propelled the youth to take the streets, and the huge masses of 
people engulfed the streets from Morocco to Bahrain. The general public utilized 
revolutionary trajectories of ICT (Information and Communications Technology) 
networks and turned into the collective causes of the protest. ―It is argued, ICTs served as 
these ‗tools of connection‘, providing a means by which protest was organized and 
resistance was mobilized‖ (Lawson, 2012, p. 15). A collective action ensued. The 
‗spring‘ demonstrates ―the process through which values, interests, and ideas get turned 
into collective action‖ (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.5). 
While social conflicts provided substantial ground for the development of a 
movement, the crux of the ‗spring‘ rested in political radicalism of the power-holders. 
The autocratic regimes across the MENA region, the political corruption and kleptocracy 
of the rulers, instigated a generalized protest and propelled the peaceful masses towards 
violent measures. The military entourage directed under the State rulers eventually 
enhanced the fissures between the State power and the protestors, ―eventual ousting of 
the incumbent leadership by the armed forces‖ (Behr and Aaltola, 2011, p.4). Given the 
growing violence across the MENA region, the intrusion of militia groups exposes the 
region and the world to terrorism and geopolitical instability. The ‗spring‘ illustrates 
―how a certain social, political, and/or cultural context affects social movements‘ chances 
of success and the forms they take‖ (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.6). 
 By addressing the four core questions of social movement analysis, ‗Arab Spring‘ 
is a definitive case for SMT analysis. ‗Arab Spring‘ exhibits collective behavior and 
action, represents relative dissatisfaction/deprivation and conflicts. Mobilizations are 
27 
 
channeled by collective identities and informal networks. A regional analysis of the same 
shall identify the crux of the extent and intensity of socio-political and economic 
predicaments that expedited the reposed yet concocting causes of the ‗spring‘.  
SPARK OF FIRE: TUNISIA AND LIBYA  
 The Arab Uprisings sparked across the MENA region with the self-immolation of 
Tunisian citizen Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor in the city of Sidi Bouzid on 
December 17, 2010 (Beaumont, 2011). Following his death, the Tunisian population 
comprising of ―the local government office, students, teachers, lawyers, journalists, 
human rights activists, trade unionists, and opposition politicians‖ (Alexander, 2011), 
captured the streets and violent demonstrations produced social and political unrest 
across Tunisia. The Tunisian police and security forces‘ attempt to control the protestors 
intensified the objective demonstrations, which targeted the ousting of the then Tunisian 
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (Borger, 2010; Alexander, 2011). ―Police in Tunis 
opened fire and shot tear gas in the air as stone-throwing youths breached a curfew and 
surrounded government buildings‖ (Spencer, 2011). However, the protests dramatically 
grew in number, owing to government intervention.  
 The protests eventually forced Ben Ali to resign from his 23 year reign, and he 
was forced to flee to Saudi Arabia (BBC, 2011; Takver, 2011). Ben Ali dissolved his 
government and parliament, and the Tunisia‘s political structure was indefinitely shaken. 
The state of emergency was declared across the nation, which banned the gatherings of 
three or more people and enforced nigh-time curfew (BBC, 2011). Following the exile of 
Ben Ali, the then Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi took over the reins of governing 
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the nation. The political governance was divided amongst Constitutional Democratic 
Rally (RCD) and ministers belonging to Ben Ali‘s opposition parties. However, the 
coalition failed due to continued protests and Ghannouchi, tried to stabilize the 
government by adding and subtracting members from the RCD (Tong, 2011). On 
February 6th, the ruling party was suspended and it was subsequently dissolved on March 
9th (Bouazza 2011).   
 Rigorous public protests eventually led to the resignation of Ghannouchi on 
February 27 and Beji Caid el Sebsi succeeded as the Prime Minister (Dobbie, 2011). 
Sebsi‘s interim regime ended in December 2011, when the elected Islamist party 
Ennahda won 37 percent of the votes, and President Moncef Marzouki appointed Hamadi 
Jebali as the Prime Minister (Mzioudet, 2011). Since 2013, Ali Laarayedh succeeded as 
the Prime Minister of Tunisia (Byrne, 2013). However, the government is constantly 
threatened by extremist Salafists and other terror groups. While the common Tunisian 
population participated in the revolution during its initial stages, the extremist Salafists 
gradually influenced the revolution, which is an obvious concern (Wright, 2012).  
―In Tunisia, Salafis started the Reform Front Party in May and led protests, 
including in Sidi Bouzid. They‘ve repeatedly attacked symbols of the new 
freedom of speech, ransacking an art gallery and blocking Sufi musicians and 
political comedians from performing‖ (Wright, 2012). 
Tunisia also faces internal security threats from groups such as the Salafis, which leave 
no room for peace and harmony. Since Ghannouchi‘s dismissal, Tunisia‘s political 
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system witnessed dual Prime Minister, replacements. The Tunisian revolution which 
sparked the Arab Uprisings connoted political, economic, and social instability 
characterized by continuous distress and chaos. 
 The social movement in Tunisia was an expression of conflicts raging in the 
minds of Tunisian population. The violent protests were an expression of bottled 
frustration at the sublime level of the Tunisian population. It was an expression of three 
decades of political, economic, and social oppression by the ruler (Alexander, 2011). 
Characterized by authoritarian regime, soaring unemployment rates of 30 percent for 
population ageing between 15 and 29 years, inflation in food prices and corruption 
(Alexander, 2011; Borger, 2011) Tunisia‘s conflict demanded structural change in the 
political, social, and economic system.   
 Death of Bouazizi, who burned himself due to unbearable harassment by the 
hands of Tunisian authorities (Beaumont, 2011) created a ‗collective we‘ in the minds 
and hearts of Tunisian population. Bouazizi became a symbol of Tunisian protest and 
protests that captivated a generation that actively followed online networking tools such 
as Twitter and Facebook (Thorne, 2011). ―Protesters sang nationalist songs and held up 
signs with "RCD Out!", referring to Ben Ali's former ruling party, as they rallied on 
central Avenue Bourguiba‖ (Boston, 2011). The values for the protests originated from 
the symbolic corruption and the regime‘s unresponsiveness to popular grievances of the 
general public (Borger, 2010). Despite the violent efforts by the police and security 
forces, and threats issued by Ben Ali, the protestors actively participated in the 
movement, causing an uprising, well remembered as the ‗Arab Spring‘.  
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 Tunisian revolution is a symbolic evidence of the success of social movements, 
with the power of ‗collective we‘, which have indefinite potential to overthrow corrupt 
political regimes and create chaos and disrupt across the society.  
 While the 2011 Tunisian revolution showcased the active synthesis of common 
Tunisian population to overthrow a corrupt regime, chaos and disrupt is still present 
across Tunisia even today. Popular political parties which hold position in Tunisia is 
constantly threatened by the radical Salafists and other terrorist groups, and the Tunisian 
ministry is criticized ―for failing to rein in political violence by hardline Salafists and 
other groups‖ (Levinson, 2013). The political, social, and economic arena has yet to 
receive stability. Another poverty-stricken man set himself on fire in 2013. Leftist 
opposition leader, Chokri Belaid was assassinated in broad day-light on February 6th (The 
Telegraph, 2013), and instances of violence across Tunisia are still evident. ―Hardline 
Islamists threw stones and bottles at young women in a student hostel in Tunis to stop 
them staging a performance of dance and music‖ (Amara, 2013). Social and political 
difficulties still rage the nation. Political and social chaos is evident. The chaos and 
disrupt which triggered the nation, eventually spread across the neighboring countries, 
and Libya and Egypt were invariably affected by the uprisings. The Tunisian revolution 
caused geopolitical instability across the MENA region. 
 On similar lines, Libya witnessed anti-government protests on February 15th, 
2011 in Benghazi. Termed as Libyan revolution, it was fueled with severe armed clashes 
between the political ruler Muammar al-Gaddafi‘s elite and militant troops, and Libyan 
rebels who demanded a democratic regime and sought to overthrow his power (The 
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Guardian, 2011). The security forces open-fired on the crowd in Benghazi and about 
―100 to 110 people were killed, and the city of Bayda to the east, where 59 to 64 were 
killed‖ (Cockburn, 2011).  
 Despite the number of mounting deaths, the number of protests against Gaddafi‘s 
regime grew rapidly and by February 20th, protests progressed into the capital Tripoli 
(Black, 2011). Gaddafi‘s bloody lockdown with automatic gunfire on unarmed protestors 
killed nearly 230 people and attracted international attention and condemnation from 
human rights forums from across the world (Black, 2011). The continuous unrest and 
chaos disrupted civilian lives, where reports of women being raped mercilessly surfaced 
during media observations (Cockburn, 2011).  
 Eventually, the United Nations intervention through the Security Council 
Resolution 1973 established a no-flying zone over Libya and necessary measures were 
adopted to protect the civilian life (Security Council, 2011). A three-nation coalition 
force (France, United Kingdom, and United States) troops bombed against the Gaddafi 
troops, and another coalition of 27 European, and Middle Eastern troops intervened in 
Libya (Ria Novosti, 2011). Soon the nation entered into a civil war, where the fight 
between Brega, government controlled troops, and Ajdabiya, rebel controlled group, 
mercilessly continued to fight to oust one another (Chulov, 2011). 
 Although Gaddafi tried to regain his power from the conquering rebels and 
declared Sirte as the new capital of Libya (Robertson et al, 2011), he was brutally shot 
near his head and heart by the rebels in October 2011. ―The 69-year-old Qaddafi is the 
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first leader to be killed in the ‗Arab Spring‘ wave of popular uprisings that swept the 
MENA, demanding the end of autocratic rulers and greater democracy‖ (CBS, 2011).  
PEAK OF UPRISINGS: EGYPT AND YEMEN  
 The Tunisian revolution which sparked the Arab Uprisings rapidly peaked in 
Egypt and Yemen. In Egypt protestors got down to the streets on January 25th, 2011 
(Fahim, 2011), and thousands in number marched to Cairo‘s Tahrir Square on February 
8th, 2011. The crowds were dispersed by ―firing rubber bullets, tear gas, and concussion 
grenades, and the police finally drove groups of demonstrators from the square, as the sit-
in was transformed into a spreading battle involving thousands of people and little 
restraint‖ (Fahim, 2011). They revolted against the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak‘s 
authoritarian and corrupt 30-years regime. With an intention to curb the growing protests, 
Mubarak ordered security forces against the protestors and killed nearly 846 people, and 
injured nearly 6400 civilians participating in the protest (BBC, 2011b). 
 This sparked further protests and more people from different social and political 
background joined the revolution. Cairo became the war zone and protestors seldom 
cared for the government imposed curfew and military troops were appointed by 
Mubarak to restrain the crowds.  Egypt saw demonstrations across the country, which 
continued despite a 13-hour military curfew which began at 6 p.m. local time. It initially 
covered the cities of Cairo, Suez and Alexandria, but was later extended to cover all 
cities‖ (NBCNews, 2011). Instability and chaos marred the peaceful nation, and 
geopolitical instability spread across neighboring countries.  
33 
 
 Efforts by Mubarak and various political leaders such as Vice President Omar 
Suleiman, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik, and Essam Sharaf 
became ineffective (Cutler, 2012), and an Islamic group named Muslim Brotherhood 
eventually rose to power in Egypt (Johnson, 2012). While the revolution started with an 
intention of pacifying the social, political, and economic issues, it became an opportunity 
for groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood to utilize the chaos for their personal gain. 
Muslim Brotherhood is accused of having ties with terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda 
(Johnson, 2012). 
 The control of Egypt‘s political relations by organizations such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood not only threatens Egypt‘s internal security, but also international security. 
It imposes as a greater threat to nations that have bilateral and multi-lateral ties with 
Egypt. Another greater threat that Egypt faces is the possibility of a rule under the strict 
Sharia law, which proclaims Jihad and is accused of condemning the basis human rights 
and rights of women.  Muslim Brotherhood is a strong campaigner for the Sharia law and 
Jihad, and vesting the political power of Egypt in the hands of such an organization will 
affect Egypt‘s public safety and international security (Hessler, 2012).  
 The revolution in Egypt was the direct result of legal and political grievances. 
Oppression, loss of freedom of expression, unemployment, inflation in food prices 
(Zayan, 2011; The New Age, 2011), collectively propelled the Egyptian civilians to 
embark on an anti-Mubarak campaign. Although the forces tried to oppress the civilians, 
it became highly impossible to restore the political and social semblance of the society, 
despite the numerous political modifications and measures. While triggering international 
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intervention, the Egyptian revolution, risked the international security, where possibility 
of Mubarak‘s forces joining hands with other tyrant regimes was high.  
 Revolution in Yemen was simultaneous with the Egyptian revolution. Social and 
economic factors such as unemployment, corruption and inflation (BBC, 2011c; Reuters, 
2011), forced the people to demonstrate against the rule of Yemeni President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh. Demonstrations with large number of people (nearly 16,000) occurred in 
Yemen‘s capital on January 27th, 2011 (Yemen, 2013). Series of protests was widely 
present across Yemen since then, and a distinction between pro-government forces and 
anti-government forces was widely present. 
 Government forces fired against the protestors, killing nearly 52 people and 
mutiny against the government intensified. Constant demands for the resignation of the 
President were held, and the rebels resorted to violent activities. While the President was 
still debating his resignation, bombing on the President‘s compound, forced Saleh to fly 
to Saudi Arabia for treatment (Jamjoom and Almasmari, 2011). Post this, the Saleh 
government was overthrown and Yemen witnessed democratic elections (Mounassar, 
2012). While the revolution ended the President 33-years regime, it created chaos and 
disrupt across Yemen and other neighboring countries. It attracted terrorist organizations 
such as the Al-Qaeda, who intervened and bombed against Yemeni soldiers to express 
their support towards the rebels. General unrest was widely present across Northern 
Western of Yemen when sectarian violence known as "Houthi rebellion" broke out in 
four Yemeni governorates (Amran, Hajjah, Al Jawf and Sa'dah) with predominantly 
Shiite population backed by Iran and Hezbollah (Hammond, 2012). 
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 Yemen never achieved a general calm. Sectarian conflict and military clashes still 
persist; general apprehension of the rebirth of revolution is still evident. The present 
government maintains vigil to prevent interference from terror and militant groups, and 
maintain peace across the nation. Thus, the Arab Uprisings which began in Tunisia 
eventually reached its peak with Egypt and Yemen, and attracted international attention 
and intervention.    
EXPANSION OF DISORDER: SAUDI ARABIA, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, JORDAN, 
AND SUDAN  
 The protests eventually impacted the neighboring regions and the disorder 
eventually expanded to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and Sudan. Escalated 
scales of protests were visible across the MENA region. Saudi Arabian protests began 
with the self-immolation in Samtah (Jizan Province) in January 2011 (BBC, 2011d). The 
rebels demanded equal rights for men, women, and the Shia Muslims, women suffrage 
(Abu-Nasr, 2011), and similar to other revolts they revolted against corruption. Not too 
long, upheavals embarked in Eastern Region which contains most of the oil reserves and 
populated by Shiites majority influenced by Iran. Protests were suppressed with an iron 
fist; many Shiite mullahs were detained and tortured, and many activists were thrown in 
prison for treason and spying for Iran after mock trials. An ongoing revolution, the revolt 
in Saudi, has brought about changes in the political regime; however it is characterized 
by killings and death of protestors. Repression and other activities were carried out by the 




 On similar lines, situation in Bahrain intensified and is an on-going revolution 
alike Saudi Arabia. While the protests started in 2011 (Coll, 2011), government and GCC 
(Gulf Cooperation Council) intervention allowed the government to curb the protests 
with a three-month state emergency. Thousands of arrests and deaths of dozens of 
protestors were visible during the early days. Even today, Bahrain witnesses protests and 
violent activities, owing to extended support it receives from the opposition parties.  
 The Kuwaiti uprising which began in February 2011, witnessed the dismissal and 
dissolution of the Parliament. And when freedom of voting allowed for people, the 
candidates of Shiite minority won their biggest tally ever in any legislature elections, 17 
of the 50 parliamentary seats of "Majlis Al-Umma" the National Assembly of Kuwait. 
Protests in Jordan are on-going. The civilian protestors are seldom happy with the 
political regime and the King Abdullah III appointed three Prime Ministers in a period of 
two years. Demonstrations raged because of the abolition of government subsidies for 
fuel and rising food prices four doubles. This is mainly caused by that Jordan is a country 
with extreme poverty and its economy is heavily dependent on aid from the Gulf oil 
states based on political loyalty and sectarian ties (Spindle, 2012).  Revolution in Sudan 
is on-going and the rebels‘ demands for political and social changes are heard by the 
government. But despite of the public dissatisfaction on Sudanese President 
monopolizing of power, the secession of South Sudan after a general referendum of 
January 2011 gave Al-Bashir more public sympathy and agitated national emotion in 
favor of him as he presented himself as the guarantor of the independence and integrity of 
the rest of the Sudan. While the revolution has not seen deaths of civilians alike the 
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Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan revolutions, its intensity and action symbolized the 
potential of social movement influence and geopolitical instability triggered and spread 
by movements across nations such as Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi, and Bahrain 
(Tadros, 2012). 
 The revolution in these nations is on-going. The governments in these regions are 
taking precautionary measures to curb the rapidly moving social movements. Demands 
from the general public have been heard by the respective governments; however, 
political and social instability is widely visible. The chances of these regions influencing 
their counter and neighboring nations are relatively high. Geopolitical instability is 
encompassing the MENA region and the world at the wake of each day.  
SYRIA’S COMPLICATIONS: FIRE FUSE OF ALL-OUT WAR IN MIDDLE 
EAST  
 Arab Uprising fused out across Syria, owing to the arrest and torture of 15 
teenagers in Daraa, who wrote slogans against the Baathist regime in March 2011 
(Fahim, 2011). While the Arab Uprisings affected Syria and protests were visible in 
January 2011, this event necessitated the birth and growth of collective consciousness. 
Syrian protestors collectively gathered across various regions and the government 
security forces resorted to violence to curb the growth and spread of the revolution.  
 Series of events marred the nation and Syria became a stage for widespread revolt 
and protest. Syrian army tanks killed people in July, August, and November, and a full-
scale civil war between the government forces and anti-government forces broke out an 
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all-out war in the MENA region. The death toll in Syria reached more than 100,000, and 
the political and social arena of Syria is a playground for power-hunger organizations, 
which seek to gain control over the civilians (Fantz, 2013). ―The violent crackdown by 
Al-Assad's security forces against the opposition has garnered worldwide condemnation 
from the European Union, the Arab League, and Turkey in addition to the United States‖ 
(CNN Wire Staff, 2011). ―Tens of thousands of people have been killed, hundreds of 
thousands have fled the country, and the idea of the nation itself is disappearing amid 
cycles of sectarian bloodshed‖ (Fahim, 2013). As chaotic as it can be, Syrian uprising is 
an on-going conflict, and the life of civilians is characterized by violence and disruption.  
 The conflict in Syria turned into a sectarian conflict between Sunni militant 
groups and Shiite dominated authority threatens to disintegration of country into sectarian 
and ethnic states. The armed groups are mostly Jihadist and affiliated with Al-Qaeda, the 
most violent is "Jabhat al-Nusra" founded in late 2011, and designated terrorist 
organization by United States and European Union earlier in Dec, 2012 (Hof, 2013). 
 Syrian crisis escalated into more complexity when regional interferences 
exacerbated to a proxy war, fueled with support of Iran for Al-Assad while in return 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other Gulf States arming and funding Sunni Arab fighters and 
Jihadists, a situation threatens to turn Syrian civil war to regional Sunni-Shiite all-out 
wide-ranging war could destabilize the region countries, including fragile Lebanon, 
Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Gulf States (Sharp Jeremy and Christopher Blanchard, 2013, p 
10), with high probability to widen the sectarian fight into interregional wars as in case if 
conflict exported to Caucasus, Central Asia, and Sub-Sahara as we witnessed in Mali 
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when U.N. warned that weapons from Libya spread at an alarming rate, fuel the war in 
Mali, Syria, and other countries and promote the arsenals of the extremists in the region 
(United Nations Security Council, March, 2013, p. 15) 
SUMMARY 
 The Arab Uprisings or what euphemistically and euphorically known as ‗Arab 
Spring‘ across the MENA region began with the Tunisian revolution, which spread 
across Libya. It reached its zenith across Egypt and Yemen. The uprisings expanded 
across Gulf region. Ultimately, the ‗spring‘ broke out with Syria‘s complications. 
Political and social movement theory can be applied to the events that shaped the Arab 
Uprisings. It can be invariably deduced that Arab Uprisings was an expression of political 
and social oppression, and corrupt practices by the respective governments of the 
countries. Rulers who ruled with autocratic regimes failed to respond to the public 
grievances, and events such as self-immolation of citizens and assault by police officers, 
triggered the nations to rise against decades of oppression. A ‗collective we‘ was evident 
among the protestors, who during the initial stages were characterized by common 
population and youth, and symbolized the power of technology (social networking sites).  
 While the protestors were successful in over-throwing or bringing about changes 
in the political regimes, with the objective of stability, nations affected by the Arab 
Uprisings are yet to witness peace and harmony. Militant groups with the intention of 
establishing radical State threaten the presence of democracy, and political and social 





CAUSATIVES AND IMPLICATIONS OF ARAB UPRISINGS 
INTRODUCTION 
 From the literature review, the causes and crucial reasons that led to the rise of 
Arab Uprisings can be collectively indicated. Ultimately, it can be comprehended that the 
uprisings have invariably caused geopolitical instability in the MENA region. The 
causatives and implications of geopolitical instability are categorized into political 
effects, social effects, security effects and interregional effects. To obtain a collective 
insight on the causatives and implications of the uprisings, a systematic approach is 
followed to analyze the current literature. The simplistic definition of each factor under 
the categories is provided. The characteristics of each factor and its negative implications 
follow the definition. Post this, factual data associated with the uprisings is provided and 
inter-connected to the generic implications outlined for each factor. Each of these 
categories is discussed in the following sections.  
POLITICAL EFFECT 
 Arab Uprising‘s political effects can be segregated into four categories. The 
impact of the uprisings on empowerment of political Islamism, spread of religious 
radicalism, fade of State secularism and emergence of semi-theocratic regimes clarifies 






Empowerment of Political Islamism 
 The Arab Uprisings have empowered political Islamism. Political Islamism as 
construed by policy makers, academicians, researchers, and media personals is 
synonymous to ―Islamic regeneration, Islamic conservatism, neo-Islamism, and Islamic 
revivalism‖ (Mansouri and  Akbarzadeh, 2006, p.3). From an analytical perspective, 
Denoeux‘s definition can be included in this section. Denoeux (2002) defines Islamism as 
an indicative ―instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups, and organizations that 
pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today‘s societal challenges 
by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented 
concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition‖ (p.61).  
 While political Islamism is a typical ideology of sectorial divisionism between 
followers of political Islamism and non-followers (Political Islamism, 2014), the 
activities of the hardline radicals in the recent decades, has gravitated fundamentalist 
religious factions as a perpetuator of instability, conflicts, and violence across the globe 
(Mansouri and Akbarzadeh, 2006). Political Islamism can be distinctly validated by the 
groups‘ affinity towards rigidity in Islamic doctrines and Islamist parties can be 
categorized into two groups, the ‗right‘ and the ‗left‘ groups. While the right group are 
the modern Islamists or moderate Muslim Brotherhood, and the left are the Salafists who 
are rigid in their affinity towards Islamic doctrines. While the Islamic regime from 
Brotherhood can be tolerated to a certain extent, history indicates that the Brotherhood‘s 
flexible political views are forged into alliance with the Salafists principles (Sader, 2012).  
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 The claim that Arab Uprisings has empowered political Islamism is validated by 
numerous authors (Haqqani, 2013; Sader, 2012) and can be invariably measured by the 
rise of religious political parties in the MENA region and the amount or extent of 
instability, conflicts, and violence caused by the political parties. Several Islamist 
formations across the MENA region reaped the benefits of the uprisings and entered into 
their respective region‘s political structure. The political aspirations of these groups 
coupled with their fundamental religious beliefs have empowered Islamism hereby 
creating a new wave of political Islamism across the MENA region (Mneimneh, 2011). 
Apart from Egypt‘s Muslim Brotherhood, Islamist parties adorned the role of political 
players across Tunisia and Libya, Syria and Yemen, and won electoral votes in Kuwait 
and Morocco (Lynch, 2012). The Ennhada Movement in Tunisia, the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, and Turkey‘s AKP serve as classic examples for the same.  
 The elections results post the protests in the MENA region, led to emergence of 
Islamist parties, who were forced to interact with other crucial players of the State. The 
Ennhada Movement rose to power in Tunisia after the 2011 elections. The rise of the 
movement can be critically viewed as the resurgence of religious politics crafted the idea 
of Islamic Constitution; however, the movement was forced to enter into an alliance with 
the Congress of Republic (CPR) party. This alliance and public demonstrations against an 
Islamic Constitution, eventually forced Ennhada to take a back seat from creating a 
radical theocratic State in Tunisia. On similar lines, Islamist party PJD must govern 
within the monarchic system of Morocco, the Muslim Brotherhood is forced to co-exist 
with the military forces of Egypt and Libya‘s NTC is a co-existence between Islamists 
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and Secularists (Sader, 2012). While the forges and alliances were meant to strengthen 
the State and establish stability, they have spread of religious radicalism, killed State 
secularism and led to the emergence of semi-theocratic regimes, and caused instability 
across the States.  
Spread of Religious Radicalism 
 Max Weber defined radicalism as a phenomenon ―differing in one crucial aspect 
from the socially sanctioned outlook of common sense‖ (Bittner, 1963, p.928). 
Radicalism is often viewed as a phenomenon with characteristic negative and positive 
implications, and its application is popularly associated with the context under which it is 
applied. For instance, radicalism is negatively associated as a synonym to extremism, 
revolution, and utopianism. Radicalism-extremism is a repulsive phenomenon, where a 
particular ideal assumes an extremist form and induces violence and terror in the society. 
Revolutionary-radicalism is an injunctive embellishment of an ideal, which in most cases 
is accompanied with extremism and revolutionary changes. Utopian-radicalism is the 
amalgamation of fantastic and illusionary ideals, which result in extremism and 
revolution. While the negative radical implications are inter-connected with extremism 
and changes, depending on the context and application, revolutionary- radicalism is 
associated with positive attributes such as progress, adequacy and innovation 
(McLaughlin, 2012). Radicalism is directly associated with societal change; however, 
given its repulsiveness and ability to create distorts and chaos across the society, negative 
attributes of radicalism are considered in this study.  
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 Religious radicalism is popularly defined as ―extreme violent acts in the name of 
religion‖ (Zaben, 2012). Religious radicalism arises with an idea or ideology and with the 
injection of three crucial constituencies, the messengers, the message content and the 
context in which it is presented; the idea manifests itself from its subtle form to gross 
reality (Gladwell, 2002). Theories of violence in the human history highlight imbalances 
in social structure as causes for social unrest. However, ambiguity arises when the 
messengers manipulate the dissonance present in the structural imbalance. Political 
entrepreneurs (Gupta, 2008) can be defined as shapers of any social movement. They act 
as connectors and communicate their message to large number of people or as mavens 
and lead the followers towards a particular idea or as salesmen and persuade the idea into 
the followers systems (Gladwell, 2002).  
 The political entrepreneurs artistically manipulate the offended groups‘ emotions 
and present the message content in a compelling storyline (Heath and Heath, 2002). An 
action plan is outlined and the idea assumes a radical activism form. The Arab Uprisings 
symbolized these characteristic features and it can be evidently proved that Arab 
Uprisings have spread religious radicalism. The rise of extremist and hardline political 
groups across the MENA region can justify this assumption. While the groups‘ express 
moderate values and pragmatic political principles towards power and responsibility, 
their fundamental and ideological commitment towards fundamental principles remains 
(Rynhold, 2011). This assertion can be validated by understanding the activities of 
extremist groups that have risen from the Arab Uprisings.   
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 With the Arab Uprisings, the extremists groups have exploited the sectarian and 
social divisions (supporters of the regime and anti-regime supporters), and power 
vacuums, and created civil wars to expand their power and prominence not only in the 
affected regions, but also across the globe (Philips, 2012). These organizations with their 
undemocratic intentions focus on religious symbols and achieving totalitarian radical 
goals and have killed thousands of civilians in their wake. The rise of Islamist political 
parties with radical agendas indicates the spread of religious radicalism across the MENA 
region. While the political parties‘ exhibit democratic agendas, they divulge their duties 
with the intention of subduing democracy and encouraging the hardline Sharia Law 
(Philips, 2012). This theocratic or strict Sharia Law has killed secularism, the details of 
which are discussed in the following section. The uprisings have thus exhibit negative 
implications of radicalism and popularize extremism, revolution, and utopianism.  
Fade of State Secularism 
 Secularism is an intractable paradox (Agrama, 2012) and functions as a 
constructive element. It is an important constituent of national identity. The definition of 
secularism has been synchronized across different subjects related to social sciences and 
politics. Nevertheless, secularism in its simplistic sense is defined in relation to religion. 
While Charles Taylor attributed secularism to modernism, Jawaharlal Nehru defined 
secularism as a pillar of modernity. Nehru described secularism through two ideal 
concepts: tolerant social attitudes and ―ideas undergirding the state‘s laws and egalitarian 
political processes that were untainted with preferences for one group over another‖ 
(Calhoun, Juergensmeyer and VanAntwerpen, 2011, p.7). Sociologists and theorists 
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belonging to International Relations recognize secularism as a compelling force 
(Casanova, 2009 and Kuru, 2007) since it functions as form of power by not only 
influencing the masses directly, but also the politics of the state and government.  
 When a state fails to oblige secular principles, religious dominance is vastly 
present. A basic conflict between religious entities and the constituents of secularism ―to 
promote the domination of religion and law‖ (Berkes, 1964, p.6) is evident. The religious 
entities that emphasize on dominance have their roots in religious traditions (Berkes, 
1964), and with the rise of Islamist parties and extremist factions across the MENA 
region, the Arab Uprisings have killed State secularism. The roots of the Islamist parties 
and radical groups are deeply embedded in their historical traditions, which even 
camouflaged with democratic principles will fade secularism. ―Islamists have a strong 
sense of history; their political behavior cannot be easily comprehended or predicted 
without taking history into account‖ (Haqqani, 2013, p.7), and the history of hardline 
Islamists reflects strong affliction towards traditional radical ideas, which fail to 
recognize secularism as an essentiality of human identity (Agrama, 2012).  
 The traditions of religious parties emphasize on Islamism, and with Islamism the 
Sharia Law has come into force or is waiting for its full-fledged revival across the MENA 
region. Sharia law can be comprehended as "Islamic code of laws, drawn up by Muslim 
scholars and Jurists to provide Muslims with a practical guide to daily life" (Stallings, 
2011). It consists of the Quran and Hadith, and the law acts as the code of guidance for 
all people at all times. It sets the foundation for the theocratic law (Krawietz and Reifeld, 
2008). While the law acts as a practical guide for the followers of the Islamic faith, many 
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writers believe it consists of numerous controversial codes on human rights, rights of 
women, and personal freedom (Philips, 2012; Warner, 2010; Arlandson, 2005). By 
imposing wrong form of Sharia, it can be concluded that the political and radical groups 
will lead a State towards divisions and sectarianism, and uproot the principles of 
secularism and democracy from the MENA region (Jadallah, 2013). 
 Evidences of these assertions are already visible in subtle manners across the 
MENA region dominated by Islamist parties. The Arab Uprisings which began with a call 
for secularism and global freedom for religious practice has emerged as a delusion. For 
instance, the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia proposed a bill to prohibit its people from 
blasphemy which included insults, derogatory defaming, and profanity. Blasphemy laws 
are upheld by Islamist scholars and most often they are used to persecute the liberal elites 
in the region. Such anti- blasphemy laws provide ―huge amounts of power to the religious 
authorities and with a depressing inevitability, very soon a full-blown theocracy follows‖ 
(Sanderson, 2012). In Turkey the Islamist Justice and Development Party, while 
propagating democratic views silently imposed Islamic theocratic principles on its 
citizens. Headscarves and all-enveloping Burka were visible across Istanbul and Ankara 
in greater numbers compared to the other regimes. Thus, Turkey visibly represented the 
assertion that Turkey handed over to undercover hardline Islamists and ―will soon seek to 
reinforce their power by gently, bit-by-bit‖ (Sanderson, 2012).  
Emergence of Semi-Theocratic Regimes 
 Theocracy is a situation where government entities of a State, including 
―leadership, are held by members adhering to a particular theology‖ (Douglas, 2009, 
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p.181). It is a governing function grounded in religious ideologies and in its purest form; 
theocracy‘s governing guidelines are run by religious organization and a government by 
God (Douglas, 2009).  Thus, theocracy can be comprehended as ―exercise of political 
power by the clergy of a particular religion, usually (although not necessarily) claiming to 
be acting primarily on behalf of a divinity and governing according to its principles and 
requirements‖ (Megoran, 2009).  
 Post-modern intellectuals consider theocracy as an opposing concept of 
democracy and the term ‗theocracy‘ is in adjunction with ‗fundamental‘ ideologies and ―a 
finger points with moral indignation at countries manifesting forms of theocratic rule‖ 
(Ward, 2009, p.296).  Islamic rule idolizes on an Islamic State, and the activities of the 
government are concentrated towards achieving an Islamic city, parallel to the ideal 
Medina or commonly known as ‗city‘. Professor Sidek Baba, a Malaysian scholar and 
professor at the International Islamic University-Malaysia, divulges into the subject of 
Medina and regards it as a city that reckons religious communities and religious values. 
Additionally, he claims that, Medina is not just any city; it ―symbolizes a city that is 
exemplar to other communities and societies in the Arabian Peninsula‖ (Ad‘ha Aljunied 
2011). An Islamic state is governed in accordance to the principal elements of Medina. 
The elements that govern an Islamic state are social justice (adalah) and Islamic Law 
(sharia). Social justice is achieved by forgiveness (ihsan) and forbearance/tolerance 
(hilm), which embodies the highest level of faith (iman). These elements are ensured by a 
leader (amir) or king (sultan) (Ad‘ha Aljunied 2011).  
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 According to the religious testimony, the Muslims are governed by their rules and 
principles under the Sharia, derived from the Quran and the Sunnah. The Sharia deals 
with religious percepts related to civil, family, inheritance, customary, educational 
matters, and penal codes. In order to ensure the prevalence of security and legitimacy, the 
early caliphs introduced the rule of law (Ad‘ha Aljunied 2011). However, with changing 
times, the ideologies of that law were applied for personal privileges and controversies 
based on Sharia can be evidently found across the world. The misunderstanding of 
ensuring the provenance of Sharia has spread religious radicalism across the globe. Fiqh 
and the Sharia law are extremely interpreted and radical activists used religion doctrines 
and texts as weapons to dissipate their movements. The call for holy war (jihad), blind 
obedience, and extremism are prevalent at a global level. The idea of fighting un-Islamic 
conditions has given rise to Jihadi organizations such as, Al-Jihad, Al-Qaeda 
(Afghanistan), Hamas (Palestine), Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (Kashmir), and 
the Lashkar-e-Toiba (Kashmir) (Venkataraman 2007). Theocracy under religious 
orthodoxies thus exhibits totalitarian theologies and ideologies.  
 While the Arab Uprisings opposed their respective theocratic regimes, uprisings 
have led to the emergence of semi-theocratic regimes. The Arab Uprisings have been 
corrupted with radical theocracy (Cline, 2013). Governed by the Sharia law, the political 
parties that exercise the Islamic law overpowers the lifestyle of Caliphs era and their 
early followers, and commands the ―individual‘s life of righteous successors from times 
of dawah, from their diet to the number of times a day they must demonstrate fealty to 
Allah, to how they may lawfully treat their wives and children‖ (Cline, 2013). 
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 While the religious and spiritual tendencies of the individual are governed by the 
sharia law, the law also governs the social and economic life of the individual. Thus, 
obsessed with power, the political Islamist parties that come into power will forge 
alliance with other parties or popular forces of the State and establish semi-theocratic 
regimes. As discussed in the first section, the alliances between the Ennhada Movement 
and CPR in Tunisia, Islamist party PJD and the monarchic system of Morocco, Muslim 
Brotherhood and military forces of Egypt, and Libya‘s NTC and Islamists and Secularists 
(Sader, 2012) serves as a classic example for the same. While the political parties upheld 
democratic views and outcry against theocracy, their respective alliances with Islamist 
factions is a definitive indication of political Islamism, which on a gradual basis will 
emerge as semi-theocratic regimes and ultimately turn as theocratic regimes. A 
battleground between the Islamic factions will increase and the rebellions, and the social 
effects of such a rule will gnaw into the minds of common man, until he submits into the 
culture or religious faith ―only with different faces, mobs, slogans, and weapons‖ (Cline, 
2013).  
SOCIAL EFFECT 
 Arab Uprising‘s social effects can be segregated into four categories. The decline 
of public freedoms, persecution of minorities, adverse impact on women and their rights, 




Decline of Public Freedoms 
 Public freedoms can be comprehended as fundamental human rights of the 
general public and according to the universal declaration of human rights (UDHR) 
freedom encompasses multiple dimensions of human life. Accordingly, each individual 
has: a) the freedom of movement and residence within the borders of his/her respective 
State, b) freedom of thought, religion, and conscience and ―freedom to change his 
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his/her religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and 
observance‖ (UDHR, 2014), c) freedom of expression and opinion, and d) freedom to 
peacefully assemble and associate themselves. Thus, public freedom guarantees religious 
freedom, freedom to express individual views and peaceful assembly or association to 
voice the opinions or propagate individual/group notions.  
 Religious freedom ensures every individual to live in accordance with his/her own 
conscience or belief (Hassan, 2005). It ensures dignity, stabilizes inherent reason and 
upholds individuality of the general public. Moreover, religion as a concept is relational 
and true freedom protects the right of individuals from political authorities or communal 
aspiration (Novak, 2009). Religious freedom thus ensures resurgence of faith across the 
globe (Toft, Philpott and Shah, 2011) and places peace as the epitome of human 
civilization. However, radical ideology followed by some Islamist political parties does 
not guarantee religious freedom (Keshavjee, 2013). Thus as totalitarian ideologies, 
radical religious powers fails to value an individual, and ―minorities are not tolerated. 
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Expressing one‘s opinion or changing one‘s religion, the act of apostasy, is punishable by 
death‖ (Warraq, 2005, p.13). 
 Freedom of speech and expression in relation to the 21st century can be defined as 
freedom towards ideas of individuals expressed through ―word, plays, films, videos, 
photographs, cartoons, paintings and so on‖ (Warburton, 2009, p.5). Freedom to 
assemble peacefully is an important human right and functions as an extension of 
freedom of expression. Freedom of expression and freedom to assemble on moral 
grounds are crucial since it ensures effective pursuit of knowledge, effective 
participation, prudent decision making, life-shaping choices and maintenance of valued 
relationships (Macleod, 2010).  Right to assemble peacefully and peaceful protest allows 
exchange of ideas and knowledge to make effective decisions about the respective 
governance (Potter, 2010). In this study, media freedom is considered synonymous with 
freedom of speech and expression. As per Denis McQuail‘s normative theory paradigms, 
Islamic media model can be understood using McQuail‘s five mass media models, 
liberal-pluralist, social responsibility, administrative, critical negotiated and cultural 
negotiated models (McQuail, 2005). The Islamic media model is highly compatible with 
McQuail‘s critical model since the media are seen as ―hegemonic and repressive tools of 
those in power, usually political power‖ (Rane, 2010, p.161).  
 The Arab Uprisings have resulted in the decline of public freedoms. A survey by 
the United Nations for the past years, ―ranked the Middle East at the bottom of an 
international score card of media freedom‖ (Morris, 2013). In Syria, around 110 reporters 
and 153 citizen journalists have been killed since 2011, and Syrian rebel groups, Al 
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Nusra Front, an extension of the Al- Qaeda, and other radical rebel groups are considered 
as predators of media freedom. They are accused of singling out members that went 
against the Muslim Brotherhood and ―for harassing and physically attacking independent 
media and journalists critical of the party‖ (Morris, 2013). 
 Apart from media freedom, religious freedom did not increase during the Arab 
Uprisings. A contrary effect was observed. A survey by the Pew Research Centre in 2011 
noted that when the Arab Uprisings were beginning in few areas and was at its peak in 
2011, there was an increase in religious social hostilities since the government restriction 
on religion is relatively high. Egypt placed most restrictions on religion in 2011. 
Religious freedom is crucial to achieve economic prosperity within secure confinements 
(Brown, 2013). Additionally, the revival of radical religious parties and extremist factions 
will ensure political or radical religious wave and negate the fundamental human aspects 
such as religious freedom, media freedom, and freedom to assemble given their affinity 
towards conditional and traditional radical roots.  
 Apart from media freedom and religious freedom, the United Nations urged UAE 
to respect human rights of its citizens, since it observed serious trends of human rights 
violation by UAE. The nation imprisoned peaceful demonstrators across several areas 
and aimed towards persecuting human rights defenders and people expressing their 
opinions peacefully, including online activists. Thus, UN called UAE not to violate 
fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression and freedom to assemble (―Cairo 
Institute‖, 2013). In Qatar, a country that financed rebels in Libya and Syria to overthrow 
their regimes, a poet was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2012 for criticizing Emir of 
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Qatar in his poetry (Alpert, 2012). In Kuwait, many political and social activists jailed for 
insulting Emir in their tweets and posts on their personal blogs (BBC, 2013). Considering 
this, the Arab Uprisings have hindered the public freedom by affecting the media, 
freedom to assemble and religious freedom of the affected countries.   
Persecution of Minorities 
 The term minority is comprehensive in nature and lacks universal definition 
(Capotorti, 1991), given its inherent vagueness and impreciseness (Rehman, 2000). 
Resultantly, multiple factors and/or criteria can be considered while implying any 
particular group as minority. Factors such as numerical inferiority, non-dominant 
position, nationality, distinguishing ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics, and 
collective will (Khan and Rahman, 2012), are used to identify minorities in any region or 
constituency. Minorities in any region or constituency experience self-identification 
crisis, and two distinct types of minorities can be visibly identified: minorities by will and 
minorities by force (Laponce, 1960). Minorities by will are group of individuals who 
voluntarily disassociate themselves from the general population to maintain their identity 
and transmit their special essence to future generations and minorities by force are groups 
of individuals that are created for negative purposes. Their disassociation is involuntary 
in nature and such groups on usual basis are subjected to persecution by the majority 
(Whitley, 2002; Pecker, 1999).  
 An Islamic State distinguishes between Muslims and non-Muslims, and among 
the four Islamic schools of jurisprudence, Maliki, Hanbali, Shafi‘i, and Hanifi, non-
Muslims are equally given special status based on the Islamic principles derived from the 
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Quran, Hadith, Al-Sirah, teachings of Sahabah, and Ahl Al-Bayt. Additionally, non-
Muslims are classified as: the people of the dhimma (Dhimma) in Arabic literally means 
‗people who are obligated to pay taxes because they are non-Muslims living under 
Islamic rule), and these are Christians, Jews, and other non-Muslim people those who live 
in any state conquered by Muslims and are taxed (jizyah) for their stay even if they were 
the original people of conquered land, those who live in Muslim State and are taxed 
(jizyah) for their stay, and people of (hudna) those who signed peace treaty with Muslims 
when they are defeated in a war, and Mustamin (protected) those who approach or visit 
Islamic State to learn about Islam (Shahid, 2005). The presence of jizyah, legal 
restrictions, and punishable codes for the dhimmis clearly indicate that Islamic States is 
questioned on its methods of dealing with non-Muslims in their provinces, because 
minorities are thus treated unfairly on various grounds. The egregious evidences of this 
was most recently when terrorist group of Jabhat Al-Nusra after controlling Deir ez-Zor 
(governorate located East of Syria) ordered the Christians to pay tax to Al-Mujahedeen 
(fighters for Allah), also when the terrorist group of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ISIS 
besieged Al-Raqqa city Northern Syria and gave Christians three choices: convert to 
radicalism and submit, death by sword, or pay Gold tax (jizyah) (Spencer, 2014, Gilbert, 
2014, Al Monitor, 2014). 
 The Arab Uprisings have mercilessly persecuted the minorities across the MENA 
region. In Syria Shia/Alwaites, Assyrians, Kurds, and Palestinians are continuously 
targeted. In Yemen, Zaydi Shia, Akdam, and Southerners are persecuted and continuous 
targets against black Libyans, sub-Saharan migrants, Tebu, and Berbers is increased in 
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Libya (―Minority Rights‖, 2013). The casualties of Christians (minorities in the Middle 
East), demonstrates the above assertion. Christians in Egypt, are always treated as 
minorities and their dependency on the government for protection is relatively high (Fisk, 
2011). In Egypt, the declaration of majority‘s voice or rule in the country, questions the 
position of minorities. The minorities that live in majority dominated Muslim nations, 
live in unprecedented fear and exodus given the number of attacks on the churches and 
clergymen.  
 ―In Syria, over 300,000 Christians have already fled in fear as foreign Jihadists 
intimidated the 'infidels' in pursuit of a Salafist State‖ (Wakim, 2013). ―In Iraq, Christian 
minorities have existed in the region for two millennia. Yet, the violence gripping the 
country means that they face a terrible choice of either leaving the country or getting 
killed. Another stark choice is to convert to radical ideologies‖ (Cilia, 2012). In Turkey, 
the governing party, which upholds democratic principles, turned a blind eye towards 
Christian persecution and the uprisings have resulted in democratic degeneration across 
the MENA region (Cilia, 2012). Christians are disappearing in the Middle Eastern 
countries Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan due to persecutions, displacing, threatening, and 
bombing Churches. Systematic persecution by extremist militias against Christians in 
Middle East had escalated after Arab Uprisings (Malnick, 2012). Iraqi and Syrian 
Christians are on danger of potential extinction (Newman, 2013). Research by Daniel 
Pipes Center shows the decline of Christian population in Middle Eastern countries 
during last decades (Pipes, 2001, DanielPipes.org). 
57 
 
           The Prince of Wales, Charles Philip, condemned the "organized persecution" of 
Christians in Middle East by fundamentalists which will lead that Christianity will 
disappear in its original birthplace (Bingham, 2013).  
           But one of the most recent and biggest ethnic cleansing against Christians of 
Middle East had taken place in Northern Iraqi city of Mosul after it was seized by Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on Jun 10th, 2014. The terrorist group declared caliphate 
and Islamic Sharia law, and soon Assyrian Christians forced to choose either to convert 
to radical ideology or leave the city no later than Saturday July 5th, 2014 at 12 p.m. and 
by then the city has emptied from its indigenous Assyrian Christians population, ending 
over than 6,000 years of their existence in Nineveh, the imperial city of their Assyrian 
ancestors (Dahl, 2014). As a result, the rise of Islamist political parties and radicalism has 
a crucial impact on the secularism of the State and the minority persecution is an 
unquestionable effect.  
Women and Their Rights on the Stake 
 Women‘s rights is a serious issue at a global level and women from different 
regions of the world, and depending on the political and cultural climatic changes, 
women all over the world have demanded for fundamental rights, termed as women‘s 
rights. From a political and legal perspective, women‘s right encompasses suffrage, civil 
rights and property ownership and inheritance rights and access to education. From 
social, employment, and economic rights statutes, women‘s right encompasses rights 
towards equality in wages and opposes gender discrimination, sexual harassment, child 
care, independent credit, and enrollment in the military. From family health and sexuality 
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perspective, women‘s rights can be defined as fundamental human rights, access to 
medical care, self-determined reproductive rights and access to contraceptives, surrogate 
motherhood, abortion rights, and opposition to female genital mutilation. Rights of 
women against, violence women in any form, physical or verbal are also considered as a 
crucial right (Thomsen, 2007; Emerton, Adams, Brynes and Connors, 2005). Concepts of 
gender discrimination across various social, political, and economic perspectives are 
visible across the world and women have been treated as minority in certain religious 
theologies.  
           While the Arab Spring showcased women marching and protesting for their rights 
on the streets of their respective autocratic nations, Arab Spring has not been effective in 
upholding the rights of women. Contrarily, it has taken a detrimental stance. In Egypt, 
Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen, radical Islamists have been flexing their political muscles 
and fighting against women's rights (CBC News, 2013). While the Arab Spring allowed 
the women to express their voice and opinions, the uprisings proposed challenges to 
female revolutionaries, journalists, and protestors attracted brutal elements from the 
society. The women faced rape, sexual assault, verbal, and physical attacks not only from 
the regimes, but also from their co-protestors and supporters. People who reported 
demonstrations were sexually and physically attacked, and states such as Egypt and 
Tunisia abused the rights of women on a massive scale (Arshad, 2013).  
 Considering the rise in the number of abuses on women, the United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) claims that instances of 
early marriage are reported considering the lack of security in the society. With a belief 
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that the women will be protected from rape and other physical abuses, practices such as 
early marriages, abandonment by family due to pregnancies by rape, and prostitution of 
rape victims have returned to the societies affected by the Arab Spring (OHCHR, 2014).  
Farewell to MENA Democratization Myth 
 The principle concepts of democracy can be attributed to the eighteenth-century 
philosophy of democracy, which defines democracy as ―institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people 
itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble to carry out its 
will‖ (Schumpeter, 1950). Most countries across the globe have realized the need for 
democracy. Democracy reduces the risk of conflict across regions that embrace it 
(Russett and Oneal, 2001) and ensures peace and development, unlike authoritarian or 
semi-authoritarian regimes. However, the MENA region has lagged behind embracing 
democracy and call for democracy across the MENA region was one of the primary 
causes for the emergence of the Arab Spring. 
 However, the countries in the MENA region have meted with great challenges 
towards democratization. The Arab Spring has forced democracy to take a backseat given 
the rise in the Islamist political parties and the failure of people to embrace democracy. 
Democracy from this perspective can be viewed as a competition for political leadership. 
For electoral gains the parties verbally attach themselves to democratic principles of 
public welfare and create brands to sell their respective agendas. However, this takes a 
dangerous turn when all the party members or party successor fail to adapt/adopt to the 
democratic principles outlined in the party agenda and instead gun towards gaining 
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political power (Schumpeter, 1950).  On similar lines, rather than encouraging 
democracy, the Arab Spring has created disorder and chaos in the society. The rise of 
religious parties has encouraged religious radicalism, killed secularism, and created semi-
theocratic regimes. At a transitory phase, the religious parties with different tastes of 
power may encourage groups that believe that ―democracy leads nowhere, and that only 
through violence can the theocratic utopia be achieved‖ (Hardy, 2013). 
 A rise in sectarianisms and intolerance among the groups within the society, 
groups that support the regimes and group that rebel against the current regimes prove 
that the Arab Spring uprisings are incapable of creating a democratic situation across the 
MENA region. Countries such as Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya, bloodshed and mass 
killings have questioned the essence of the uprising itself. ―In societies long suppressed, 
democratic movements - tolerant, pluralistic, committed to human rights - were never 
likely to emerge, fully formed, overnight‖ (Hardy, 2013). These aspects clearly indicate 
that the democratic outcome of the Arab Uprisings, if any, will fall under defective 
democracy paradigm, since it will fail to meet the four essentialities of embedded 
democracy- political rights, civil rights, division of powers, and horizontal accountability 
(Merkel, 2004). Thus, countries affected by the uprisings will either fall under exclusive 
democracy (if one or more groups are excluded from voting), or domain democracy 
(military or elite group removes the exiting governing body from its position), or illiberal 
democracy (lack of constitutional norms or principles), or delegative democracy (ruling 
power is vested in the hands of military or elite group). Still in chaotic state, lack of fixed 
pattern in the Arab Spring, poses as an issue, hence there is no appropriate outcome for 
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the uprising itself. Whether uprooting of the current dictatorship/regime or installing 
democracy is not clear among the participants of the uprising, which has created a myth 
around democracy in the MENA region (Hardy, 2013).  
SECURITY EFFECT 
 Arab Uprising‘s security effects can be segregated into four categories. The 
continuous unrests, riots, and lawlessness, rise of civil wars, internal conflicts 
catastrophe, rule of military juntas, and society militarization, and neighboring 
interference by paramilitary, guerrillas, and cross-borders violence, clarify its impact on 
the States‘ political systems.   
Continuous Unrests, Riots, and Lawlessness 
 Global history since the 16th century pinpoints social revolutions in States and 
societies. The French revolution in late 1700s, the Russian revolution from 1917 till the 
1930s, and Chinese revolution from 1911 till the 1960s reflect ―rapid, basic 
transformations of a society‘s state and class structure, accompanied and in part 
accomplished through popular revolts from below‖ (Skocpol, 1994, p.4). Revolts in this 
manner, while questioning the socio-political and economic order of the society, have 
characteristically induced chaos accompanied by disorder termed as civil disorder 
(Hunsicker, 2011; Mace, 2012). Chaos in simplistic sense is ―absence of order‖ (Smith, 
1998, p.1) and occurs when aberrations arise in the initial conditions of any given state 
within the confinement of certain outlined boundaries. Exhibiting high sensitivity, any 
miniscule alteration in the initial conditions, induces disturbance through various 
trajectories and can assume a mammoth form across indefinite locations (Smith, 1998).   
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 When applied to the State and its societies, chaos creates public disturbance or 
civil disorder or civil unrest, which can be defined as ―one or more forms of disturbance 
caused by a group of people‖ (Hunsicker, 2011, p. 39). Civil unrest arises for a numerous 
reasons commonly revolving on ethnic differences, economic and social injustice, and 
religious motivated factional disorder. They exhibit certain characteristic features such as, 
three or more people (number of people), common purpose, intent of exhibition, and use 
of force which can assume an unlawful form. The logic of group dynamics can be applied 
to understand the intricacies of civil unrest. A group with common purpose assembles 
itself and breaches the civic order of the State, termed as public disorder. The disturbance 
can either culminate at this point or proceed to cause turmoil, where the group begins to 
chant, yell or portray this collective opinion on top of the disruption. This is termed as 
public disturbance. Ultimately, the disturbance and turmoil can turn violet not only to 
other individuals but also to State property and create extreme volatile environment. 
Lawlessness if vividly present and the unlawful assembly of people otherwise termed as 
riots occur, which tumultuously disturb the peace and harmony of the State (Hunsicker, 
2011).  
 Causing disruptions to political and social stability, civil unrest exposes the 
society to social trauma and affects the psychological semblance of political, economic, 
and social mix of the State. While exhibiting collective action, civil unrest promotes 
public fear and intimidate, lasting individual and social traumas. These disruptions affect 
the stability and normal functionalities of the society, and generally reach the stage of 
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riots when inconsistent communication between the crowds and concerned parties is low. 
Civil unrest and disorder thus assumes the shape of riots and lawlessness (Mace, 2012).  
 The Arab Uprisings began with a call for democratic regimes and the need for 
peace and harmony in the State. This created a ―civil unrest in the Arab world, which has 
come to be known as Arab Spring‖ (Shields, 2012). While the Arab Spring highlighted 
the need for socio-political and economic reforms, Russian State Duma Committee on 
International Affairs Alexei Pushkov claims that, ―the recent events in Egypt prove that 
the "Arab Spring" did lead not to a democratic renewal, but to chaos‖ (Voice of Russia, 
2013). A survey done on the Arab Youth in 2012 asserts that the Arab Spring civil unrest 
and lack of democracy are biggest obstacles facing the region (―ASDA‘A‖, 2014).  
 Continuous riots disrupt the security and balance of the State. An overview of 
each State affected by the Arab Spring validates the assertion.  The revolt against Ben 
Ali, the then ruler of Tunisia, killed around 300 people and since July 2013, the 
assassination of two leftist politicians created stand-off between the Ennhada political 
movement and its rivals. Other violent activities by the Salafists in the region have 
created civil unrest in the region. In Egypt, popular revolts against Hosni Mubarak killed 
around 846 people during the uprising led to the emergence of Muslim Brotherhood as 
the ruling party. However, the party was dethroned by the military forces and led to a 
stand-off between supporters of Muslim Brotherhood and supporters of military forces. 
Political stand-off resulted in the State of Libya between forces of Muammar Gadhafi and 
rebel forces, which killed thousands of people and led to the emergence of 300 
revolutionary militias. General lawlessness and instability is highly prevalent across these 
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regions.  On similar lines, clashes between security forces of Yemen‘s President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh and rebel forces killed around 2,000 people. While the President stepped 
down and allowed elections in 2012, the southern sections of Yemen are plagued with 
insurgents led by al-Qaeda and northern sections by Zaidi Shia rebels (BBC, 2013).  
 Oman witnessed protests against Sultan Qaboos bin Said in February 2011; 
however, the security forces‘ crackdown on the demonstrations quieted the revolutionary 
spirit and created instability in the State. In 2011, Kuwaitis demanded the resignation of 
Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed Al Sabah through State-wide protests. 
Despite the replacement of Prime Minister and the rise of Islamist-led opposition party, 
state of unrest and instability still rests in Kuwait (BBC, 2013). 
 In Syria, the protest against President Bashar-al-Assad‘s took a violent turn and 
―evolved into a brutal and increasingly sectarian armed conflict‖ (BBC, 2013) killing 
100,000 people in its wake. An ongoing strife, continuous unrests, riots, and lawlessness 
is prevalent in Syria. Since 2011, unrests in Bahrain against King Hamad al-Khalifa‘s 
discriminatory regime against the Shia Muslim community, led to the arrest of around 
3,000 people. Lack of any breakthrough has forced the Shia youth to resort to violent 
activities and have killed around 45 people in the ongoing clashes. On similar lines, 
protests against the ruling Sunni community headed by King Abdullah Al Saud have 
been quieted through monetary compensations and forces. Security personnel have been 
asked to detain and obstruct the activities of the demonstrators and general disturbance is 
still present in the State (BBC, 2013).  A general rise in the number of riots and physical 
abuses are observed and this has decapitated the stability of the States. The call for 
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democracy has resulted in violent activities and divided the States into segments, creating 
disharmony and civil wars.  
Civil Wars and Internal Conflicts Catastrophe  
 Civil wars can be defined as ―armed conflict between two or more parties within 
the boundaries of a single state‖ (Kastfelt, 2005, p.2). They represent an unusual level of 
violence involving more than 200 battle-related deaths every year (Regan, 2000). The 
causes of civil war are multitudinous. Demographic factors such as population and 
population density, ethnic dominance and ethnic heterogeneity, geographical factors such 
as large area and mountains, neighbor at war, resource concentration, diamonds and oil 
exports, environmental factors such as drought and soil degradation, history and presence 
of insecurity factors such as new state, refugees and rivalry and interstate war, and regime 
instability give rise to civil wars (Dixon, 2009). While the duration for civil wars are 
unpredictable and depend on the extent of intervention and mitigation measures (Walter, 
2002), civil wars exhibit two primary characteristics: violence and death of citizens, and 
people involved in the war. Chaos and instability is highly prevalent in the regions 
affected by the civil wars.  
 The Arab Spring has invoked severe unrest and unlawfulness across the MENA 
region. In countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Syria, the uprising has already resulted as, 
is resulting in or is on the verge of a full-throttle civil war between the pro-supporters of a 
government/leader and anti-supporters of a government/leader. For instance, in Egypt, 
pro-and anti-Morsi demonstrators are leaving the nation at the potential risk of a civil 
war. Despite democratic elections and the win of Muslim Brotherhood‘s elected leader 
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Mohammed Morsi as the President of Egypt, the Egyptian civilians recently clammed in 
Tahrir Square with anti- Morsi slogans. This resulted in the army‘s measure of 
overthrowing the President, and has paved way for the inevitable civil-war in Egypt. On 
July 6, fresh violence between Brotherhood supporters and anti- Morsi supporters were 
reported, killing four people. The security of Egypt falls under a sensitive zone (BBC, 
2013). 
 On similar lines, Libya‘s six-month civil war in 2011 killed at least 30,000 people 
and wounded around 50,000 (Laub, 2011) causing wide-spread violence across the State. 
Libya‘s civil war was the clash between pro-Gadhafi fighters and anti-Gadhafi rebels. 
Libya‘s then ruler, Muammar Gadhafi employed army to curb the rising protests, which 
killed around 9,000 troops and killed thousands of civilians in the process. Civil war in 
Libya channeled mass-violence on the civilians, protestors and the national army, 
injuring thousands and killing the others. Libya‘s State security was invariably affected.  
  The case of Syria is similar to that of Libya. The mounting tension in the region 
has attracted criticisms from world organizations and governments, given its incessant 
reports on violence. Syria‘s civil war has turned into a holy crusade, where Sunni Muslim 
supporters are fighting against the regime of the President Bashar al-Assad and Lebanese 
Hezbollah in the region. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the Egyptian theologian, the world's most 
influential Sunni cleric, has called Sunni Muslims from the world to fight against Assad 
and Hezbollah's regime in Syria the allies of Shiite regime in Iran. It is reported that 
about 3,000 Sunni fighters from more than 60 different countries have joined the civil 
war (Hegghammer and Zelin, 2013), reducing the uprising in Syria into a sectarian 
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conflict, which has hampered and will indefinitely hamper the security of the State.  
Thus, civil wars in Egypt, Libya, and Syria are characterized by rise in the number of 
wars over a period of time and consistent killings among the groups or mass genocide.  
 Civil wars have a catastrophic effect on a State‘s security. It represents, ―large-
scale violence between two or more groups holding sovereignty within a recognized 
state‖ (Licklider, 1995, 9). Civil war is thus, a war of conquest, where one group tries to 
hold supreme sovereignty of the other, with violence as the instrument of reality.  Civil 
war is the meeting point of local and supra-local motives and ―leads to joint violence that 
straddles the divide between the political and the private, the collective and the 
individual‖ (Kalyvas, 2006, 387). With an insurgency of violence across the individual 
and national actors of the State, the security of the State is adversely affected. 
Rule of Military Juntas and Society Militarization 
 Military juntas are ―boards or committees that assume power and rule by decree 
following the removal of a regime by force‖ (Johnson, 1964, p. 114). Ideologically, the 
juntas represent heightened and unified efforts of various branches of the military forces 
and are in civilian favor. However, they lay down the terms for successor government, 
and symbolize the decline of individuality and represent esprit de corps or group 
identification (Johnson, 1964) as the characteristic feature of State governance. Military 
juntas are trained to restore and maintain peace through force rather than democratic 
means. In most circumstances, governance under the military juntas result in violation of 
human rights and use coup as a strategy to overthrow their respective regimes, and 
society militarization is a usual companion of military juntas (Smeulers and Grünfeld, 
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2011). Society militarization can be comprehended as the percolation of military values 
and idiosyncrasies on the cognitive synchronization of the society‘s socio-political, 
economic and external affairs (Vledder, 2005, 10). Violence is one of the by-products of 
militarization. It affects the State‘s internal security and adversely affects the external and 
international relations of countries associated with the State; given the exhibition of 
military behavior from the civic-end of the nation. 
 The Arab World lacked democratic rulers and consisted of rulers either through 
monarchy or through military juntas who forcefully assumed power, ―whose only 
ambition in life was to rule and to count the subjects as dust‖ (Israeli, 2013). While the 
Arab Spring demanded democracy, the revival of rule by military juntas and spread of 
society militarization, assert the progression of the uprising in a negative trajectory. For 
instance, in Egypt, the military junta dissolved the elected parliament and unilaterally 
amended the constitution to prevent the new President from exercising powers and run 
the State (Husain, 2012). Such events in the Arab Spring, symbolize the revival of 
tyranny and death of democracy in the MENA region.  
           Since the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stepped down and the 
situation in Egypt has slanted toward instability and disorder.  The may-June 2012 
election has brought the Muslims Brotherhood to the power and these begun to adopt a 
religious hard-line approach to convert the country to theocracy. By July 3, 2013 the 
elected President Muhammad Morsi had been overthrown by junta which was explicitly 
supported by tens of millions of Egyptians seculars both Muslims and Christian Copts. 
Pressured by violence fled up by Muslim Brotherhood, the junta announced a road map 
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to restore law including a set of legal measures targeted to tightening stranglehold on 
Brotherhood's activities included anti-protest law, shut down official newspaper, freeze 
assets, close headquarters, and then Brotherhood was banned by Egyptian Supreme Court 
and designated terrorist organization. Those developments retrieved the notorious 
emergency status which was imposed along 30-years of Mubarak presidency. 
Nevertheless and despite the fact that these events were all in favor of restoration of the 
civil state rather than the theocratic regime that was Muslim Brotherhood proving its 
foundations by violating the personal freedoms and rights, but on the other hand it brings 
to light the fact that protests and bloodshed of Arab Spring witnessed by many MENA 
countries have ended up with military rule that was seen by peoples to be the only 
guarantee of civil and free State (Shafick, 2014, Ashour, 2013, El-Hasan 2014). 
 Recent events in Egypt and Libya also demonstrate society militarization, and 
highlight the mounting use of weaponry not only by certain sectarian groups, but also by 
common civilians that are either pro-supporters or anti-supporters (Michael, El Deeb and 
Keath, 2013). ―More than two years after the fall of President Hosni Mubarak, the 
proliferation of weapons and a spate of vigilante killings, violence and sexual attacks are 
eclipsing the hope born from the revolt‖ (El-Tablawy, Fam amd El Wardany, 2013). In 
2011, the number of explosive violence across Libya created a devastating impact. It 
resulted in severe civilian casualties and was a result of both shelling and aerial bombing 
by both Libyan and rebel forces. It was observed that civilians or rebels obtained access 
to ―explosive weapons including mortars, surface-to-air missiles, artillery and RPGs‖ 
(Action on Armed Violence, 2011, 1) and used it against the government forces. The 
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armed-weapon conflict in Syria has shown no signs of abating (Sharp and Blanchard, 
2013, 3), and the demand for weapon in Syria has invariably increased. Thus, society 
militarization in Egypt, Libya, and Syria are characterized by the rise in number of 
rebellious groups or groups that cause social-unrest, increased use of armed-weapons 
across the civilian population, and increased access and use of advanced weapon 
technology across the State‘s civilian population. 
Neighboring Interference by Paramilitary, Guerrillas, and Cross-Borders Violence  
 External interference is a salient aspect in conflicts that have escalated to 
international levels. While neighboring countries and countries associated with the states 
in conflict, intend to prevent conflict and aim to establish peace, external intervention can 
escalate conflict. External interference on common basis, aid one of the conflict parties to 
exercise their presence or escalate their locus of control and can upgrade the level of 
conflict by supplying weapons to instigating paramilitary and guerrilla forces in the 
vicinity (Rubin, 2004). With respect to the Arab Spring, external interference can be 
attributed to neighboring interference and interference of Gulf Cooperation Council states 
(GCC) in particular led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar (Cafiero, 2012; Colombo, 2012).  
 With an interest to expand their geopolitical interests, two petro-monarchies of the 
GCC, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have taken the opportunity through Arab Spring uprisings 
to influence political transformations across the MENA region. Harboring rivalry 
between the two nations accompanied with bolstering need to drive Islamism, Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar have interfered in the uprisings across Tunisia and Egypt (Cafiero, 
2012), Syria (Ghabra, 2012), and Libya (Ragab, 2012). The Saudi regime led by King 
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Abdullah offered to bankroll Mubarak‘s regime in Egypt, Qatari regime championed the 
revolution against Mubarak. While the Saudi monarchy opposed the activities of Muslim 
Brotherhood, Qatari regime has ―fostered a congenial alliance with the Muslim 
Brotherhood‖ (Cafiero, 2012). While Qatar supported the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia 
and infused its petro-dollars, Saudi Arabia offered political asylum to Bin Ali, the then 
dictator of Tunisia. A general divide between the two nations pertinent to their 
interventions is clearly visible (Cafiero, 2012). However, the GCC on a general level 
have sided with the Syrian and Libyan rebellions (Ghabra, 2012; Ragab, 2012). Whether 
the interference of GCC lies only in the political arena or whether the GCC have 
instigated armed rebellions in the affected countries is yet to be openly confirmed.  
 In relation to international law, cross-border violence occurs when  the 
―international law of armed conflict (ILAC), international human rights law (IHRL), 
international criminal law (ICL), the law relating to the protection of internally and 
internationally displaced persons‖ (Gilbert and Sandoval, 2011, 20) face violations. 
While many authors outline various cross-border issues such as human-rights, criminal 
law, and law for displaced persons, my study will focus on armed-conflict and cross-
border violation. Armed-conflict violation involves cross-border armed attacks, breach of 
ceasefire line, and cross-border violent intrusion, on a rough scale. Characterized by 
bombings, killings, and use of weaponry, cross-border violations affect the security of the 
State. 
 An Egypt-brokered truce-deal between Israel and Palestine has been violated with 
the outbreak of cross-border violence. With Egypt pre-occupied with its internal affairs, 
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reports indicate that cross-border violation issues between Israel and Palestine is expected 
to increase. Israel resorted to an air-strike and killed a Palestinian militant in the Gaza 
strip. Two rockets were fired in central Gaza, which on a fortunate basis did not result in 
civilian casualties (Fisher-Ilan, 2012). However, it has resulted in creating security 
imbalance across the sensitive Israel, Palestine, and Gaza strip.  
 Libya‘s rocket attacks across Tunisian borders, with efforts to control its rebels, 
resulted in cross-border intrusion and breached the Libyan-Tunisian cross-border norms. 
While the Libyan rebels rely on border-crossing to refuel their food and medical 
amenities, cross-border intrusion invariably affected Tunisian securities. In this case, 
Libya proved as a threat to Tunisia‘s security. ―Tunisia threatened to report Libya to the 
U.N. Security Council if it fired into Tunisian border areas again, and a hospital doctor in 
rebel-held Misrata said seven people died in fighting there‖ (Amara and Logan, 2011).  
          On June 10, 2014 fighters and Jihadists of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
known as most prominent group conducting insurgency and terrorist activities against 
Syrian Army and Al-Assad regime and known for their loyalty to Al-Qaeda, succeeded to 
cross the Syrians borders and seize Iraqi Nineveh governorate and its administrative 
capital the city of Mosul, the second largest Iraqi city (Figure 3.1 illustrates 
geographically ISIS controlling areas across borders in Iraq and Syria, and route to Mosul 
seizure). The governorate was captured without shooting or resistance by three brigades 
of Iraqi army who composed from 85,000 soldiers, soon Sharia and Islamic Law was 
imposed, and local authorities removed. In fact, the seizure of Mosul proved that Jihadist 
and extremist groups are intend, and capable to, extend their influence cross-border not 
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merely for smuggling weapons and fighters but controlling on ground, and defeating 
armies and achieve strategic gains by controlling this bordering province and use it as an 
open corridor to support other Jihadi and terrorist groups and radical rebels in Syria, 
taking into consideration that (ISIS) has established and been active in Syria but 
originally grown on the ruins of "Al-Qaeda" in Iraq ideologically and administratively 
(Lewis and Ali, 2014). 
 Syrian grounds have become a place for incessant bombings and armed-conflict. 
Four rockets hit village near the Syrian border badly wounded a woman who was sitting 
under an olive tree in her house yard and such incidents usually occur (Barnard and 
Mourtada, 2013). While the Syrian rebels are invariably held responsible for the source 
of the attacks, the residents consider Arsal, a Lebanese town as the source since Lebanese 
borders considered to be fragile and volatile access points opened for crossing weapons 
and fighter to supports both Syrian rebels (by Sunni Lebanese and other Gulf States), and 
to Bashar Al Assad regime (by Hezbollah and Iran), which led the Syrian army carried 
out many aerial bombardments on Lebanese border town were suspected to be a loophole 
for fighters to get into Syria lands. Similarly, Turkey was always accused of smuggling 
the Jihadists and weapons into the neighboring Syria in an attempt to weakening the 
Syrian regime the ally of Iran, Turkey‘s regional competitor.  On the same extent, Iraq 
was accused of sending recruited members of Mahdi Army (Shiite militia belongs to 
Shiite religious leader Muqtada Al-Sadr) to fight beside Bashar Al-Assad and protect the 
Shiite Shrines in Damascus, while Jordan was seen to facilitate the passage of Salafist 
fighter to back Syrians rebels and global radical groups (Barnard and Mourtada, 2013, 
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Higgins, and Kaszera, 2014).  Thus, Arab Spring in the name of revolution, has affected 
the cross-border norms of the States involved and also the neighboring States. It can also 
be comprehended that, cross-border armed attacks, breach of ceasefire line, and cross-
border violent intrusion, affect the security of the States involved in the conflict.  
INTERREGIONAL EFFECT 
 Arab Spring‘s interregional effects can be segregated into two categories. The rise 
of Muslim Brotherhood as De Facto Power, and anarchy of petrodollar and the 
geopolitical sectarian balance, while geostrategic effects are Saudi-Turkish-Iranian proxy 
wars, and Iranian hegemony and security of Israel and Gulf region. War against terrorism 
effects are: dormant terrorist cells revival and rising activities of Al-Qaeda, and fighters 
for paradise: suicide-bombers, mercenaries, and jihadists. Each of these attributes is 
discussed in the following sections. 
Muslim Brotherhood as De Facto Power 
 In order to understand the definition of de facto power in reference to political 
authority, understanding the definition of de jure government is essential. A distinction 
between the two terms, de jure and de facto will highlight the meaning and characteristics 
involved in de facto political power. The legal and legitimate government of the State 
which is recognized by other governments and States is considered as de jure 
government. Contrarily, a de facto government ―is in actual possession of authority and 
control of the State‖ (USLegal, 2014), and has risen to power due to upsurge or a 
revolutionary government.  
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 Accordingly, the characteristics of de facto political government can be outlined 
using the de facto doctrine. A de facto doctrine justifies the authority of governments: a) 
that have come to force by usurping the sovereign authority of the State, b) though 
illegally established protects the State from collateral attacks and exercise law and 
authority as regularly created bodies, and c) entrusts power to officers with adequate 
power to exercise lawful duties in the State. While de facto power guarantees supremacy 
of law, peace, and harmony in the State, it culminates in anarchy. Any insubordination to 
the authority or challenge to the existing authority would promote disorders of the worst 
kind (Constantineau, 1910).  
 The Arab Uprisings have led to the emergence of political Islamism and has 
encouraged the activities of Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist revolutionary organization 
to assume the garb of political leadership. An insight to Muslim Brotherhood‘s origin, 
ideology, presence and activities will clarify ‗how Muslim Brotherhood will emerge as de 
facto power‘ through the Arab Spring. Hassan Al-Banna, an Islamic preacher and a 
school teacher established a Muslim society called Jama‘iya Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun in 
the year 1928 on the west banks of the Suez Canal, in the colonial town of Ismailia, 
Egypt. Popularly referred as Muslim Brotherhood or Ikhwan (Scott, 2011), the historical 
essence of Brotherhood lies in its rebelling outlook.  A social and religious movement, in 
its inceptive days, the movement opposed the British occupation of Egypt. The British 
colonial rule was regarded as a symbol of Egypt‘s humiliation, the leader Banna upheld 
the essence of reawakening the Muslim World. He considered and lamented over the 
Muslim World‘s declining and weakening cause. Banna called the Muslim population 
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and its leaders to reintroduce the Islamic Law against the westernization of the colonial 
Egypt ―emphasizing that Islam was a "complete system" applicable for economics and 
law, and not just for personal spirituality‖ (Scott, 2011, p.1). A system and movement 
that upheld the Islamic principles called Muslim Brotherhood was thus born and brought 
into being.  
 Mohammad Mahdi Akef and Mohammad Habib presumed the role of key leaders 
(International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, 2005), and the 
Brotherhood is primarily based in Egypt. Nevertheless, their activities and alliances have 
spread across the regional quarters of the Muslim World across the MENA region, and 
also across the Muslim fraternities in the West, including Europe and the U.S. The 
activities and functionalities of the Brotherhood is believed to be invariably funded by the 
oil rich Arab nations, especially Qatar and Saudi Wahhabis (ISCTRC, 2005), and the 
organization claims to have branches across 80 countries (Barsky, 2011). While the 
Brotherhood refrains from acknowledging any direct and conspicuous connection with 
terrorist organizations, evidences showcase otherwise. 
―Ayman Al-Zawahiri started out as a Brotherhood activist and then created the 
terrorist organization Egyptian Islamic Jihad‖ (Barsky, 2011).  Brotherhood has impudent 
connection with organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad Hamas, Islamic 
Action Front, AKP, and Islamic Party. Connections with these organizations showcase 
Brotherhood‘s apparent presence in the socio-political activities across the Arab nations. 
―Hamas, for example, is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Tunisia‘s 
Al- Ennahda Movement, led by Rashid Al-Ghanushi, is the Muslim Brotherhood branch 
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in that country. Turkey‘s AKP originated in the Muslim Brotherhood, and similarly, the 
Islamic Action Front in Jordan, and the Iraqi Islamic Party are branches of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in their respective countries‖ (ISCTRC, 2005). 
 A known fundamentalist, Brotherhood‘s very slogan aims at creating an Islamic 
State. Its fundamental philosophies thus lie in the Islamic Sharia law (ISCTRC, 2005). 
The slogan of Muslim Brotherhood claims: 
―Allah is our objective; 
The Prophet is our leader; 
Quran is our law; 
Jihad is our way; 
Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope‖ (Barsky, 2011). 
 The activities and influences of the Brotherhood across the MENA region and the 
world clearly indicate a paradigm shift alike other political organizations. The 
organization‘s inceptive ideologies defied the Western rule and revolved around 
extremist forms of religion to eliminate Western moral and cultural influences across 
Egypt. Prominent government officials and other elite Egyptian social members were 
accused by Al-Banna, the founder, for abandoning the fundamental principles of Islam 
and embracing western culture. He accused them of their corrosive behavior and upheld 
their behavior as perpetual malaise to the Egyptian society. The founder thus insisted and 
strongly prompted for reviving Muslim States and Islam to its original military, history 
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and cultural glory. ―He pointed to the Caliphate, the historic Islamic empire and the most 
celebrated period of Islamic history, as the template for his vision of an Islamic State‖ 
(ISCTRC, 2005). Study by (Schwartz, 2014) comprising maps and figures show Islamic 
Caliphate State claimed by Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS and its flag. 
In this manner, Al-Banna‘s principles laid the substratum for the edifice called 
Muslim Brotherhood with his eternally politicized and idiosyncratic ideology. He 
emphasized the need and essence of an organization called Muslim Brotherhood and 
claimed that the Brotherhood was not a benevolent society or political party/organization 
with limited ambitions. He established its eternal idealism towards religion and claimed:  
―We are voices for right and for peace in which we dearly believe, and of which 
we are proud. If you rise against us or stand in the path of our message, then we 
are permitted by God to defend ourselves against your injustice‖ (ISCTRC, 2005). 
Alike any radical religious organization, the Brotherhood entered into a prejudiced realm 
towards religion and worship and considered all non-Muslims as idol worshippers and 
exhibited its indefinite possessiveness towards Islamic principles. It forced Muslims 
across the world to unite and fight against enemies or non-worshippers of Islam. It would 
be apt to claim that the founding principles of Jihad originated from the Brotherhood‘s 
fixation towards the extreme religious dogmatic principles. The religious doctrines of the 
Brotherhood thus revolved around safeguarding the Muslims Islamic principles, idolize 
on the mission of safeguarding Islam, and implementing the supreme of truth and justice 
of Islamism across mankind. The very symbol of Brotherhood symbolizes its affinity 
towards spreading Islam and negating other religions or practices. A circular green 
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background signifying Islam exists, which is superimposed by the holy book, Quran, 
which represents the eternal teachings of Islam. Two swords are crossed below it, 
denoting Jihad, which is followed by the Arabic word ‘wa‘aduwa,‘ meaning ‗make 
ready‘ or ‗prepare yourselves‘ (ISCTRC, 2005).   
 While the ideals of Brotherhood can be ignored as a personal attribute or 
affliction, its adoption of philosophy of defensive Jihad (offering violent resistance only 
to protect its ideologies), has created a wave of tension across the world. The 
Brotherhood still advocates Jihad against foreign occupiers (Scott, 2011), and its belief of 
considering ‗Islam as the solution‘ and spreading this belief has perpetually turned into 
subtle yet self-obsessed actions.  Along with driving away foreign influences 
Brotherhood‘s initial teachings emphasized on integrating Islamic religious teachings 
with the civil government. Currently, this ideology is the central theme of numerous 
contemporary religious political parties and organizations.  
 The want to propagate Islamic religious teachings across the world has transposed 
Brotherhood‘s activities in the course of time. To comprehend the comprehensiveness of 
the activities, the Brotherhood‘s propositions under Al-Banna, the Egyptian regimes, and 
its activities in the recent years require intricate analysis. An overview of the same is 
provided in the following sections. Under the founder‘s direction, Brotherhood‘s priority 
lied in grosser Jihad and finer Jihad. While the grosser Jihad emphasized on spiritual and 
moral struggle for Muslims and urged them to become better Muslims, finer Jihad 
consisted of armed struggle against foreign occupiers. In order to achieve the mission of 
finer Jihad, Al-Banna created a paramilitary wing called ‗Special Apparatus‘. The special 
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force carried out attacks on the British in the late 1940s, and the foreigners were 
subjugated to a violent campaign of bombings and assassinations (Scott, 2011; Barsky, 
2011). 
 Attack on the British gradually shifted towards the Egyptian Jews in the later 
years. Regular and violent attacks on Egyptian Jews which incited violence against the 
community and the Brotherhood upheld violence to maintain the radical stance in Egypt. 
The torching of Alexandria (Eliyahu Hanavi) synagogue emphasizes the above assertion. 
―On the international level, Al-Banna supported Haj Amin Al- Husseini, the Mufti of 
Jerusalem who worked for the Nazis to recruit international Arab support for Germany‖ 
(Barsky 2011). While the activity of the Brotherhood symbolized its extremist nature, it 
also emphasized the dependence of the organization on foreign funding. The Nazis 
provided subsidies to the Brotherhood, which enabled them to purchase armed weapons 
from a portion of the funds.  
 Apart from supporting Germany, Brotherhood engaged itself in the 1948 Israeli 
war. The organization is also accused of assassinating Egyptian Prime Minister 
Muhammad Al-Nuqrashi. This action of the Brotherhood received worldwide 
condemnation. Brotherhood tested the patience of peace and harmony, and its consistent 
violent activities reached a threshold. Brotherhood received ‗illegal‘ status across Egypt 
and international community (Barsky, 2011). The Brotherhood received strong hostile 
from certain regimes in Egypt such as Anwar El Sadat‘s rule. El Sadat‘s rule never 
entrusted the Brotherhood waged war against their privileges to engage in Jihadi 
activities, then El Sadat himself was assassinated by Brotherhood on October 1981. 
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However, Hosni Mubarak tightened the reign of Brotherhood. ―Mubarak's regime 
intermittently tried to make it more difficult for the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in 
the political process, claiming it was connected to militant groups‖  (Scott, 2011, p.2).  
 Mubarak enforced the Emergency Law in 1981 and arrested about 14,000 
Brotherhood activists. The President forced the Brotherhood to give up its radical 
Islamist totalitarian beliefs and accept either secular or pro-western or doctorial regime. 
Given Mubarak‘s non-supportive nature, the Brotherhood has consistently tried to 
overthrow Mubarak‘s regime to regain its hold over Egyptian social and political affairs. 
The latest revolution in Egypt symbolizes this. Ahmad Moussali, a professor of Islamic 
and Western Political Thought, claims that Egypt is ―witnessing uprisings, not 
revolutions; a change in the balance of power, but nothing new in terms of ideologies or 
ideas‖ (Arab Uprisings Symposium, 2012). As an active measure to engage in the civil 
government of the States, the Brotherhood adopted tactile means to engage in the 
Egyptian affairs.  The extremist organization camouflaged its radical views and 
participated in the Egyptian politics. In the 2005 Egyptian elections Brotherhood rose to 
its popularity. It secured 88 seats out of 454 and gained 20 percent of the total votes 
against the popular bloc (Scott, 2011).  
 With the Arab Spring, Egypt is under chaos and riots since 2011. While the 
uprising with the successful intervention of Muslim Brotherhood ousted Hosni 
Mubarak‘s regime, it emerged as a powerhouse in Egypt‘s 2011-2012 parliamentary 
elections. Muslim Brotherhood gained strong dominion over Egypt‘s politics. Muslim 
Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi won a majority in Egypt (Laub, 2014). With 
82 
 
Brotherhood‘s strong political power, religion oriented parties extracted the power of 
ballot over bullet. Al-Banna‘s principles are in the process of restoration. Muhammad 
Badie, the General guide of Brotherhood in his 2010 sermon upheld Quran‘s prominence 
as the constitution of the State and Muslim‘s duty to enact Islamic law. Muslims from 
across the world were called to rise against U.S. and Israel, and start the process of 
liberating Arab occupied lands such as Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Barsky, 2011).  
 Only few months in power, the Brotherhood led by Morsi declared itself as the 
Shura council (Egyptian upper house of parliament) and constituent assembly from a 
judicial perspective. ―Morsi argued that the judiciary and much of the bureaucracy were 
dominated by fellows or remnants of the Mubarak regime eager to impede the 
revolution's goals‖ (Laub, 2014). However, forces opposing Morsi asserted this move as 
an invariable showcase of political power, and created ripples of disharmony across the 
already chaotic Egyptian politics.  With a new lease on political climate, the 
Brotherhood‘s addendum towards Salafist principles and Jihadi motivations emerged as a 
cause for deep concern, not only for Egyptians, but also for nations and global observers 
connected with Egypt (Barsky, 2011). ―Opponents were concerned about the role of 
religion as the basis of law, feared insufficient protections for women's rights, freedoms 
of speech and worship, and distrusted the broad power accorded to the presidency‖ 
(Laub, 2014). Considering the Brotherhood‘s fundamental ideology rooted in the radical 
law, opposing forces feared the restoration of radical theocracy across Egypt.  
 With military as de facto power in Egypt, on July 3, 2013 the party was 
suspended by General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and this military backed interim government 
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termed the so called political party as a terrorist group. On account of general distrust 
among the masses and deadly suicide bombings which targeted police headquarters in 
Nile delta cities and killed nearly 16 people and injured more than 100, Muslim 
Brotherhood was declared as a terrorist group. All its activities were criminalized and 
banned (Associated Press, 2013), and the organization functions as an outlaw countering 
the government forces (Fahim, 2014). While the Brotherhood tried to wield its political 
power across Egypt, its failure has incited civil crisis. A general demarcation between 
Morsi supporters and anti-Brotherhood is visible across Egypt. A similar picture that 
encompassed Egypt during the inceptive stages of the Arab Spring, where the Egyptian 
society was divided between pro-Mubarak regime and anti-Mubarak regime is present.  
  Muslim Brotherhood now functions as a silent movement waiting to wield its 
power again. Irrespective of its failure in Egypt‘s politics, the permeation of the 
Brotherhood into the politics of the States and the rise of Muslim Brotherhood party in 
Egypt stands as a classic example for the rise of Muslim Brotherhood as the De Facto 
power in the MENA region. ―Although leaders of the group say they remain committed 
to protests to express their activism, some members said that many of its sympathizers 
were increasingly talking of violence‖ (Fahim, 2014). The party sometimes uses the 
ballot or bullet to exercise its power. Al-Banna‘s principles are strongly embedded in 
Muslim Brotherhood and the organization waits to rise into power, either as a political 
party or as an extremist group.  
 Muslim Brotherhood‘s influence on the socio-political stratums of the State can 
be viewed from dual angles. Firstly, violent Jihadi organizations such as the Al-Qaeda, in 
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the name of Sharia law will have the potential to inject their violent Jihadist principles to 
the Muslim Brotherhood. The elements of interaction, mind, individual, and societal 
perceptions will be overtly influenced by the strict Islamic ideology. A psychological 
sync between violent Jihadi organizations‘ psyche and Brotherhood‘s principles will be 
established. The influence of dominant beliefs and large number of Jihadi activists and 
constant communication could result as a fatal combination towards Brotherhood‘s 
political regime across the States. Brotherhood will solely function as a legitimate 
campaigner for Jihad and Jihadist principles.  
           Secondly, the rise of Brotherhood and its associates as political parties in the 
MENA region will necessarily guarantee legitimate power of State in its hands. 
Brotherhood under the influence of Islamism will actively promote the Islamic law, 
irrespective to the degenerative principles possessed by radicalism. Brotherhood‘s 
dominant beliefs and principles, its role as the political power of States, its 
communication access to the large number of masses, increases the chances of greater 
and faster impact on the population in and around the MENA region. Muslim 
Brotherhood‘s activities since 1948 are mentioned in figure 3.2 Data from ISCTRC 
(ISCTRC, 2005) and Jewish Virtual Library (Jewish Virtual Library, 2013) is used to 
identify the activities of Brotherhood since 1948.   
Anarchy of Petrodollar and the Geopolitical Sectarian Balance  
 In simplistic sense petrodollar can be defined as ―money earned from the sale of 
oil‖ (Investopedia, 2014). In order to understand the anarchy of petrodollar an overview 
of MENA region‘s oil sector is important. The MENA region is rich with natural energy 
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resources. In 2012, earnings from oil and gas constituted about 73% of the total exports 
and 78% of the budget revenues across the MENA oil exporting countries, the six GCC 
(Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), and net oil importing 
countries (Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia). 70% of the 
world‘s oil reserves and 50% of gas reserves lie in the MENA region and the countries 
constituting the MENA region play a crucial role in controlling the world energy market 
(Institute of International Finance (IIF), 2014). Therefore, understanding the anarchy of 
petrodollar and the geopolitical sectarian imbalance it creates is crucial. This aspect can 
be comprehended through intrinsic analysis: a) the diversion of petrodollar to create 
geopolitical imbalance, b) the emergence of oil war vulnerability, and c) petrodollar 
hegemony on global economy. Each of these aspects is discussed below.  
 The diversion of petrodollar to create geopolitical imbalance can be 
comprehended by understanding the role of oil-rich MENA region nations‘ support 
towards promoting radical religious ideologies. In this context, social and economic 
aspects of the States are intertwined. Countries belonging to the MENA region exhibit 
radical ideologies, in a direct and/or indirect manner. Their underlying principles reside 
in the radical law. On an imbalanced level, radical ideologies or extreme inclination 
towards radical principles creates/promotes religious terrorism. ―Radical groups 
commands offensive, and aggressive and unjust Jihad,‖ (Arlandson, 2005) and acts as a 
substratum for terrorist activities in the name of Jihad.  
 Religious finance, generally followed by religious organization, provides charity 
for supporters, with no-charity towards any non-follower of specific ideologies is biased 
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and strengthens strict ideologies conversions and bureaucracy.  It also supports Al-Qaeda 
and other Jihadists, and ―includes money to the families of ―suicide bombers‖ or any 
other Jihadists who are killed‖ (Warner, 2010, p.39). With intense aggressiveness Jihad 
which is propagated through financial support or sponsorship is coercive and excessive. 
Jihadi activities include, ―forgery of documents, document fraud, burglary and robbery 
and – to a lesser degree – drugs trafficking and production, and credit card fraud‖ (De 
Poot, Sonnenschein, Soudijn, Bijen and Verkuylen, 2011, p.126), support the extremist 
groups with their incessant funds, and free movement of persons and goods across 
borders.  
 For instance, the 2011 Arab Spring led to the rise of Salafism across the MENA 
region. While the oil rich nations upheld Salafism, Saudi Arabia in particular is accused 
of funding extremist groups. Before divulging into the subject of petrodollar anarchy 
through diversion of petrodollar in encouraging Jihadi activities, defining and 
understanding Salafism is crucial. Salafism is a puritanical branch of Islam and advocates 
strict adherence towards Islamic doctrines and ―return to the practices of the ―Salaf‖ (the 
predecessors), as the Caliphs and their righteous disciples are known‖ (Daou, 2012). 
Considering that Saudi Arabians view themselves as guardians of Islamic doctrine, they 
have utilized the Arab Spring uprisings and have encouraged Salafism across the MENA 
region. While not all Salafists accept or indulge in violent behavior, the Arab Spring has 
attracted violent clusters of Salafists (Daou, 2012; Lavizzari, 2013).  
 An export version of Wahhabism, ―a conservative branch of Sunni Islam actively 
promoted and practiced by Saudi Arabia‘s ruling family‖ (Lavizzari, 2013), Salafism 
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anchored by petrodollar is on the rise. Additionally, Qatar and Saudi Arabia ―have 
provided a combined $9 billion of financial aid to Egypt since its revolution in early 
2011‖ (Torchia, 2013). Whether the money created economic development or supported 
the ruler to suppress the uprisings remains as a question. Thus, Saudi Arabia‘s funding 
has triggered violent Salafism across the MENA region and has created petrodollar 
anarchy.    
           The emergence of oil war vulnerability can be comprehended by understanding the 
historical implications of petrodollar warfare across the globe. The rise in world oil 
consumption in the past century, especially since the 1980s, has provoked several 
countries to establish strong hold on the oil-rich countries and exercise their incessant and 
direct control on the oil reserves. This need for direct control and the diminishing oil 
reserves has created petrodollar warfare and several rationales have been used by such 
countries to validate their use of physical force to gain access to the oil reserves from the 
oil-rich nations (Clark, 2005). The activities of Western countries can be recounted in this 
regard. 
 Western influence has always placated the socio-political and economic activities 
of the MENA region. Since 1945 the currency for global oil transactions is U.S. Dollar. 
As a de facto international reserve President Nixon‘s 1971 proclamation ensured U.S. 
dollar‘s monopolistic and immense monetary power over other currencies across the 
globe. Secret agreements between U.S. and Saudi Arabia ensured U.S. Dollars of its 
rightful position as the de facto power and petrodollar recycling finances U.S. trade 
deficits. Elaborating further, all oil transactions across the globe were carried and still in 
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most cases are accomplished through U.S. dollars, which are ―then recycled through 
OPEC back into the U.S. through Treasury Bills or other Dollar-dominated assets. This in 
turn creates capital-accounts surplus for the U.S. economy which finances the U.S. trade 
deficit‖ (Wong, 2012). Thus, the U.S. has been successful in maintaining its monopolistic 
control over the oil reserves through monetary or economic interventions.  
 Other form of interventions such as use of military force by Western countries can 
be highlighted in this scenario. For instance, when Saddam Hussein, the then Iraqi 
regime-head, with the approval from the UN, changed the Iraqi oil-transactions from U.S. 
dollars to Euro currency in 2000, U.S. Dollar depreciated steadily against the Euro. 
However, the U.S. intervened and attacked Iraq in the pretext of humanitarian 
intervention captured the oil reserves and in 2003, all Iraqi oil transactions were changed 
to U.S. Dollars instead of Euro currency. On similar lines, France‘s interest in Libya, and 
China‘s interest in Iran project possibilities of interventions to control and maintain 
consistent oil production and supply to their respective nations (Wong, 2012). Such 
interventions and interests have led to new form of politics called pipeline politics which 
is discussed in the following section.  
 Pipeline politics can be defined as subtle and cold warfare between countries 
garnering for oil production and consistent oil supply from oil rich nations. The case of 
Syria can be taken into account. Syria functions as a key transit route to Europe, which 
makes it lucrative to numerous countries that seek to dominate the oil market. 
Additionally, the discovery of gas fields in the city of Homs in 2011, adds to its lucrative 
value and Syria is proposed as a site for constructing massive underground pipeline 
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connecting Iran‘s South Pars field and Europe. A joint alliance between Iran and Iraq, the 
materialization of such a pipeline (Islamic pipeline), would undercut U.S. allies Qatar and 
Turkey‘s significance in the oil market, and benefit Russia and Iran. ―Russia has 
reportedly built up its naval presence along the major Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus‖ 
(Klein, 2013). Thus, Russia‘s non-interference in Syrian internal conflict and Turkey‘s 
hidden interference in supplying arms to the rebellions forces against Assad‘s rule (Klein, 
2013) indicates the presence and violence of petrodollar in the form of pipeline politics. 
Petrodollar warfare can be synchronized and comprehended as dominance established by 
certain countries in three ways: monetary interventions, military interventions, and 
pipeline politics.  
 Petrodollar hegemony on global economy can be elaborated by outlining the 
dependence of modern economy on oil and natural gas supply. The Middle East is the 
main supplier of oil resources to the global market. The world is thus highly dependent 
on Saudi Arabia to fill the supply gap. Considering the already existing instability in the 
oil market, given the global economic crisis, the tenuous political situation created by the 
Arab Spring in the MENA region, created a much more volatile situation in the global oil 
market. This in additional to the fear that terrorism accompanied by the Arab Spring 
could block international water channels led to the rise of ‗fear premium‘. ―Fear premium 
is basically a rise in the price of a commodity, such as oil, that is based on the expectation 
that a certain event will happen that would significantly impact the market in a negative 
way‖ (Halime, 2013).  
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 Fear premium creates uncertainty which not only affects the international price of 
oil, but also gives artificial hike to oil prices and commodity markets inter-connected 
with the oil prices. The anarchy of petrodollar is thus clearly visible. This bestows power 
to certain sections or States to control the oil production and supply, thereby impacting 
the markets that are directly or indirectly connected to it. A volatile market is clearly 
evident (Halime, 2013). While the Arab Spring did not create significant impact on the 
fundamentals of the oil market as projected, fear premium accompanied with anxiety 
―injected significant risk-related volatility into the international oil market‖ (Dargin, 
2012).  Great reverberations regarding volatility in the oil production and export created 
structural increase in demand from emerging markets (Asia-Pacific region). Thus, risks 
of military conflicts in the MENA region created fluctuations in the global energy price 
and still acts as a driver for creating market disruptions in energy sector (Dargin, 2012).   
GEOSTARTEGIC EFFECT  
Saudi-Turkish-Iranian Proxy Wars 
 Proxy wars can be comprehended as unannounced and indirect engagement and 
intervention by local agents (Khan, 2010; Mumford, 2013). From the definition, the 
characteristic features of proxy wars require elaboration. Proxy wars are characterized by 
indirect intervention as opposed to direct intervention. In this regard, understanding the 
difference between the two intervention types is essential. Direct intervention or 
interference can be defined as third-party interference, in which, the State that functions 
as third-part interference and is ready to engage its troops in harm‘s way. Contrastingly, 
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in a proxy war, ―a surrogate force on behalf of a non-intervening conduit‖ (Mumford, 
2013) is evidently present.  
 Avoidance of nuclear warfare, yet an indefinite need to achieve the strategic aim 
in a cost-effective and minimal risk setting are two important theoretical aspects of proxy 
wars. With these intentions, the benefactor can either supply manpower, material, 
financial aid, and non-military assistance to the proxy groups engaged in proxy wars. 
While manpower plays a crucial role, the benefactor can provide weapons, ammunitions, 
and financial aid to the insurgent group/s that fight the proxy wars. This, indirect 
intervention can also be conducted covertly and the dynamicity of proxy wars is 
essentially high (Mumford, 2013).  
 The groups involved in proxy wars either seize the opportunity on request for 
their personal gains rather than achieving mutual strategic aim (Mumford, 2013). My 
enemy‘s enemy (Hughes, 2012) principle holds true in proxy wars, and proxy wars have 
the ability to turn into fully-blown war. Another crucial dynamicity of proxy wars is its 
fluid nature. Given that, proxy wars are based on the relationship between the benefactor 
and the proxy group/s, change in strategic plans of the benefactor or slight variation in the 
strategic aim and scope of intervention can convert proxy wars into a large-scale conflict 
(Mumford, 2013). Thus, the cause and effect of proxy war lie in this dynamicity. Personal 
gain for proxy group, which connect to the concept of my enemy‘s enemy and strategic 
aim for the benefactor that wield indirect or covert interference, along with political 
instability (Klare, 2001) can be considered as causes for proxy wars and fully-blown war 
can be considered as the ultimate effect of proxy wars. 
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 The Arab Spring has recalibrated the regional system by ―ushering in a tri-axial 
Middle East composed of: a Turkey-Kurdish-Muslim Brotherhood (MB) axis, an Iran-
Shiite axis, and a Saudi Arabia-pro-Sunnis and pro-status quo monarchies axis‖ 
(Cagaptay and Khanna, 2013). The borders of this region will thus be transcended by 
these axis creating disruption and conflicts. Iran‘s supporting forces that enunciate 
foreign policy alignment with the West and Middle Eastern countries and Shiite powers 
loyal to Velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists and Ayatollah Supreme 
Leader of Iran) which is the theocratic Shiite Islamic regime ruling Iran and this theory 
holds that Islam entrusted Al-faqih the custodianship and rule over all Muslims, Turkey‘s 
pro-Muslim Brotherhood alignment whose longing to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire 
and Saudi‘s inclination to maintain its monarchial and religious stance over Sunnis in the 
MENA region, will relatively create sectarianism imbalance in the name of achieving 
realist intentions (Cagaptay and Khanna, 2013). 
 The proxy wars that result out of this will not only create conflicts and tensions 
across the three axes, but also spread as geopolitical instability across the MENA region. 
Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia oppose each other in shifting alliances, vying to set a new 
regional order (Cagaptay and Khanna, 2013). The three nations strategic interest in Syria 
can be elaborated to emphasize the above assertion. Shiite interests span from Western 
Afghanistan to the Mediterranean. The Syrian Awaite (one of Shiite branches and the 
religious affiliation of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and his family), and pro-Iran 
regime serves as a bridge between Tehran and the Shiite interests. Qassem Suleimani, 
commander of the deadly Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF), 
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stressed the importance of interfering in Syria‘s political affairs and opposing the U.S. led 
Israeli resistance towards Syria. Iran hints at adverse support towards the Syrian rebels 
and highlights the importance of supporting Syrian regime against the Sunni Arab States, 
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, with a central aim to prevent the 
emergence of ‗Shiite Crescent‘, in the MENA region (Alfoneh, 2013). Iran holds the 
transfer of Shiite militiamen from Iraq, Syria, and other Arab countries such as Lebanon 
to Iranian military bases for urban and Guerrilla warfare training and receive guidance 
from the clergy in Iran before sending them to Syria to support Al-Assad army to 
suppress the Sunni rebellion supported by Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, and Turkey. ―As the 
challenges to Al-Assad regime have mounted, Iran has also mobilized the Lebanese 
Hezbollah, a proxy funded and trained by Iran, along with organized Iraqi Shiite 
volunteers, and even IRGC Ground Forces when deemed necessary‖ (Alfoneh, 2013).  
 Saudi Arabia has resorted to escalating Syria‘s turmoil by arming and funding 
Syria‘s rebels against the regime. ―In late 2012, the Saudi government financed a major 
transfer of infantry weapons from Croatia to the rebels‖ (Alfoneh, 2013). These weapons 
are invariably used by Jihadi groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and other 
militant Islamists. Saudi Arabia considers itself as the regional Islamic power and a 
benefactor of Sunni Muslims. It aims to weaken Iranian power in the MENA region and 
in the recent years, Saudi has gained large support from dominated Sunni regions in 
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. Saudi Arabia also sent troops to 
Bahrain to support against the demonstrators, who represent the country's Shiite majority, 
which seeks to topple the Sunni ruling royal family.  Saudi Arabia urged the U.S. to 
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demolish Iran‘s nuclear program, based on which the U.S. began to interfere into the 
weaponry division of Iran. The nation aims to weaken Al-Assad‘s influence in Syria, 
Muslim Brotherhood‘s influence in the MENA region and ultimately Iran‘s rising power 
in the Middle East (Weinberg, 2013).  
 Turkey aims to function as an effective broker between the West and MENA 
region. Considering this, its foreign policies aim at maintaining zero problems with its 
neighbors. But PM Erdogan announced the change in Turkish foreign policy in a his 
speech before the Turkish Parliament at the beginning of February 2011, in what was 
considered a qualitative shift in Turkish policy toward direct intervention in the internal 
affairs of other countries, indirectly linked to the national security of Turkey. This 
approach was precedent in relations among the major powers in the region. It aimed to 
establish the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Syria and Egypt, and provide international 
respect and status for the Brotherhood. However, Brotherhood‘s failure in Egypt, forced 
Turkey to interfere in Syria‘s armed conflict. ―By the spring of 2012, the Turkish 
government began providing support for the armed struggle in Syria and Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoglu officially recognized the Syrian rebels as the government of Syria‖ 
(Alfoneh, 2013). While Turkey‘s support has failed to tinker Al-Assad‘s regime in Syria, 
Turkey is at an observational stand-point right now. If the autonomous Kurdish zones 
emerge post Syria‘s break-up, then Turkey‘s political, social, and economic gaining 
stability will sink into a state of misery. While Turkey opposes Al-Assad‘s regime and 
supports the militant rebels, it invariably acts as a competitor or benefactor in channeling 
rebellious groups and creating proxy wars against Syria‘s regime.  
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 In this manner, engaging in proxy wars due to its low cost and low risk features 
has made it a lucrative weapon for nations to indirectly and covertly use their alliances to 
achieve their respective strategic aims. The paradox of using proxy warfare as a logical 
weapon can be clearly demonstrated by the Middle East‘s key nations Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, and Iran. The political interplay of these nations in the Arab Spring uprisings and 
their ploy to gain strategic significance has created a new Middle East, which will 
instigate ethnic, civil, religious, and social conflicts and unrest across the MENA region.  
Iranian Hegemony and Security of Israel and Gulf Region  
 With the Arab Spring the balance of power in the MENA region is witnessing a 
general shift. The U.S. led security policy in the MENA region is witnessing a slow 
decline and the Iranian hegemony is on the rise. A dramatic shift of power away from the 
U.S. is observed, and Iran and its allies question the security of Israel and the Gulf region. 
The U.S. dominance in the region protected Israel; however, Iranian hegemony in the 
MENA region has lifted the general co-existing peaceful stance between the Arabs and 
Israel (Leverett, 2014).  
 Iran‘s want for hegemony dates back to its historic times. A nation once referred 
as Persia, Iran witnessed the rules of Assyrians, Greeks, Romans, Seleucids, Parthians, 
Arabs, Turks, Mongols, and Sassanid. However, in the 16th century, Iran was captured by 
the Muslims of Safavid dynasty that belonged to the Shiite branch of Islam, and since 
then the nation is ruled by the Shiite Muslims. With a sincere want gain world power, 
Iran‘s strategic agenda is akin with any world power seeking nation: strength of the 
economy and army, and nuclear weaponry. While the first two is achieved on the central 
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strength of a nation, the last agenda, nuclear weaponry creates outcry from international 
communities and neighboring countries, given its potency to destroy the entire Gulf 
region (IranIntelligence, 2014).  
 With the nuclear bombs Iran aims to protect itself from any attacks and ensure the 
spread of Shiite Islam across the MENA region and ultimately the world. Resultantly, 
Iran‘s blatant agenda poses as a threat to its immediate neighbors and its long-time rivals. 
An observation on the recent events validates this aspect. Iran has interfered in the affairs 
of Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. Most Bahrainis are of Iranian 
origin, and Shiite religious groups are exercising control over the schools in Qom (Iran‘s 
most holiest city), Mashhad and Tehran regions. On similar lines the Shiite religious 
groups are on the rise across Kuwait, and Iran has extended its support to the rebellious 
―Houthis in the North and Al-Harak in the South‖ of Yemen (Mokhtar, 2013) (For more 
maps on distribution of Sunnis and Shiites in Middle East countries see (NSBC 
International, 2013). In Syria, Iran supports Al-Assad‘s regime and as a meddling relative 
―Iran has been Lebanon kingmaker through Syria‖. Syria is a cornerstone of Iranian 
influence in the Middle East and the Arab world. Iran considers Syria its outlet to the 
Mediterranean and then to Europe. For Iranian strategists and politicians, Syria in fact is 
not merely a state governed by a regime belongs religiously to Shiites, but is a 
dominating state in the Middle East region and the state enjoys a unique location close to 
Western Europe and only a few miles from its neighbor Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea, 
as same as it is close to Iran‘s competitor for control in the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia. 
Furthermore, the closeness of Syria and Israel allowing Iran a chance of free movement 
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in Tel Aviv and its neighbors Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian territories, and Egypt 
(Mokhtar, 2013). This not only threatens Israel‘s security, but also threatens the security 
of the MENA region in particular oil States in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and other moderate 
regimes in the region like Jordan and Egypt that have strategic location as crossroad 
between Asia and Africa.  
 While the fight between the Sunni-led Saudi Arabia and Shiite-led Iran is an 
obvious fact, Iran‘s strong influence in the oil production and supply and possession of 
nuclear power can create fear in Kuwait, Bahrain, and UAE. This fear-creation has forced 
U.S. and its allies to assume the path of peace-talks and has prompted the Gulf States, 
especially Saudis to think about possessing a nuclear weapon of its own. While Saudi 
Arabia has denied any outright claims due to fear from international condemnation, it has 
called for international attack on Iran in this regard (IranIntelligence, 2014).    
 Additionally, Iran has supported proxy warfare by positing its militant group 
Hezbollah in Lebanon through, by supplying incessant weaponry. Iran leads an alliance 
or bloc includes all the countries, groups, militias, and powers that are politically outside 
the U.S. hegemony or who do not wish to be under the imposed domination of the United 
States. The goal is to dominate Iraq, Syria, and Gulf States and create attacks on Israel 
and maintain a base in Southern Lebanon, Gaza, and Bahrain, and possess all those 
countries as its own sphere of influence and backyards (IranIntelligence, 2014).  
           The basic principles that form the geopolitical and geostrategic theory of Iran and 
its role in the world are three: Iran as a unified society by identity and culture, Shia Islam 
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strength, and Persia as a source of national and historical pride. Iranian leaders of all 
tendencies, whether Islamists conservatives or Persian nationalists, and regardless of the 
differing attitudes and political visions, however, brought together by a common vision of 
the nature of the security threats that threaten Iran and the actions to be taken to protect 
the interests of the Iranian nation. Iran‘s hegemony is thus based on fear creation and 
geostatic interference and its target is centered on Israel. Time and again various leaders 
associated with Iran‘s political power, have emphasized the elimination of Israel. Iran‘s 
former presidents such as Ahmadinejad, Mohammad Khatami, Former President and  
Head of the Expediency Council Ayatollah  Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, General Yahya Rahim Safavi, and General Mohammad-Ali 
Jafari are few such leaders that have expressed intent of eliminating Israel  (Teitelbaum 
and Segall, 2012). Statements of these leaders can be directly quoted in this regard. 
Adopted from Teitelbaum and Segall‘s (2012) collection, these statements reflect death 
and elimination of Israel as a Jewish and Hebrew State: 
―Jerusalem occupying region (Israel), must be erased from the face of earth‖ – 
Ahmadinejad in ‗World without Zionism‘ conference held in Tehran in 2005.  
―Elimination of Israel from the region‖, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in ‗International 
Conference for Support of the Intifada (Palestinian Uprising) held in 2001.  
―Confront and kill the Zionist regime and its fabricated entity named Israel, and 
all coward countries in the region who signed peace treaties with them‖ 
Mohammad Khatami in 2000. 
99 
 
―Wiping Israel off the face of the earth is neither unreasonable nor impossible but 
possible with faith in Allah and Mujahedeen‖ Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 2000. 
―Death for the occupying Zionist regimen‖, General Yahya Rahim Safavi in 2008. 
―Israel is cancerous microbe in Islamic nations‖, General Mohammad-Ali Jafari 
in2008. 
 These periodic outright intentions validate the intensified and historic aversion Iran 
possesses towards Israel. Additionally, in an international anti-drug conference held at 
Tehran, Iran‘s then vice-president, Mohammad-Reza Rahimi attributed Talmud, central 
text of Judaism as the main cause for spreading illegal drugs across the world. Negating 
the existence of Israel, the vice-president called for the world population to oppose the 
Jews or Zionists since their central text asserts them to destroy anyone who opposes their 
religion. Mr. Rahimi further asserted that, lack of Zionist drugs users indicates their 
implicit involvement in drug trade. The vice-president criticized the Zionists for killing 
black babies and starting the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 (Erdbrink, 2012). While the 
vice-president‘s views shocked the forum, it clearly indicated Iran‘s historic aversion 
towards Israel and Jews in Israel and worldwide. Thus, the antagonistic views of Iranian 
leaders towards Israel, invariably threatens Israel‘s stand as a nation in the MENA region.  
 Iran‘s aversion towards Israel, its interest in possessing nuclear power has 
attracted wide condemnation from several global bodies including UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon (Reuters, 2012) and Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General 
Martin Dempsey (The Tower, 2013). World powers, especially the U.S. and its allies 
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imposed sanctions on Iran, for its alleged nuclear programs (Clawson and Khalaji, 2013). 
Iran has intensified its claim of using nuclear power for peaceful purposes (Charbonneau, 
2014). Contrarily, Iran threatened the world by claiming that, ―the countries that impose 
sanctions on Iran will not find the Iranian nation‘s response ―pleasant‖ (Pourmohammadi, 
2012), and Iran would be forced to achieve its ultimate goals. Iran has never staked claim 
to have any nuclear ambitions. Thus, such sanctions would only be considered as non-
justifiable and Iran has gained good will from international community and northern 
American public. Thus, the U.S. and its other powerful nations and their allies cannot 
conduct any strike on Iran. Secondly, Iran‘s exerts a greater control over world‘s oil and 
gas supply, which controls the American and global economy. Any unthoughtful strike or 
careless strike on Iran, will eventually result in the downturn of the American and global 
economy. Lastly, Iran‘s potential military power consists of 80 million-people, who are 
against any form of imperialism (Cunningham, 2013).  
―Any strike from the U.S. or its allies would result in a region-wide war that 
would pull down the very pillars of Western geopolitical architecture, including 
the collapse of the Israeli state and the overthrow of the House of Saud and the 
other the Persian Gulf oil dictatorships‖  (Cunningham, 2013). 
Iran‘s ballistic missile strength is exceptional and many U.S. intelligence reports 
highlighted Iran‘s current and potential ballistic missiles and their estimated range that 
capable to reach any regional enemy of Iran in the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia and U.S. 
military bases in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and U.A.E) or perhaps even Turkey and Israel 
(for maps and illustrative figures on Iran‘s current and potential ballistic missiles and 
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their estimated range refer to (Federation of American Scientists (FAS), 2008). These 
aspects signify the military, political, spiritual, nuclear, and geostrategic powerful stance 
of Iran as an essential regional player in the MENA region, and as Arab Spring resulted 
to weak, disjointed and fragile countries socially and politically therefore the Arab Spring 
outcomes have provided the power-hunger nation with a wide berth to wield its powerful 
sword against the democratic views of secularism and world-peace.  
 Despite persistent pressure by numerous foreign bodies to secure a nuclear deal 
from Iran, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif claimed to have entered a 
very difficult zone to reach a common accord with the ―P5+1 world powers, the United 
States, Britain, France, China, Russia, and Germany‖ (Charbonneau, 2014). In a recent 
interview, Iranian Naval Commander Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, a member of Iran‘s elite 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), claimed to be prepared for any clash with 
the U.S. exercising their faith in martyrdom and unique speedboats, Iran appears to be 
prepared to keep the West, especially the U.S. in bay (Kredo, 2014).  
            Iran‘s intentions to achieve hegemony, domination under sectarian pretext 
(Velayat-e faqi of Ayatollah Supreme Leader of Iran) and anti-Western propaganda (Axis 
of resistance made up all Shiites in Middle East, Iran‘s allied regimes and militant groups 
like Iraq, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah), and its possessiveness towards nuclear power 
possession have forced it to interfere in the affairs of its neighboring countries and 
fueling religious conflicts. It has indefinitely provided it with relevant means to achieve 
hegemony and threaten the security of Israel and the Gulf region (Eman, 2014). 
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WAR AGAINST TERRORISM EFFECT  
Dormant Terrorist Cells Revival and Rising Activities of Al-Qaeda       
 A ‗cell organization‘ can be defined as an integral division or component of a 
greater organization. The greater organization divides itself into multi-person groups and 
supplies necessary information to each cell, with an intention of survival, if any one of its 
component is compromised (Explainer, 2001). Accordingly, a terrorist cell can be 
comprehended as an integral division of a greater organization, whose main purpose is to 
spread terror across their targeted regions. The history of cell organization can be dated 
back to the 1880s, when anarchists and revolutionaries across Russia, France, Germany, 
Ireland, and Switzerland formed cells against their respective regimes. On similar lines, 
in 19th century, communist movement formed cells to overthrow the existing 
governments, given their non-penetrable ability (Explainer, 2001).  
 From the above paragraph, it is a clear indication that each and every cell 
organization contains a central goal or motivation which propels itself as a group 
motivation. Accordingly, terrorist cells idolize on the rational belief of spreading 
terrorism and terrorism can be defined as, ―premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, 
mayhem, and threatening of the innocent to create fear and intimidation in order to gain a 
political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience‖ (Poland, 1988, p.11). 
Thus, the goals of terrorists are centered on causing disruption to one or multiple aspects 
related to social, political, security, and economic semblance of the social stratums.  
 From social and security perspectives, the goal of the terrorists can be attributed 
to causing injuries and fatalities, and damaging the critical infrastructure of the targeted 
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region or nation. On a political level, the goal of terrorism can be connected with creating 
weakness or embarrassing the government. From an economic perspective, the goal can 
be attributed to disruption of the economy and discouraging tourism while spreading 
chaos, fear, and insecurity across the targeted regions (Bennett, 2007). Thus, the goal or 
intention of terrorism is diverse and alike cancer, terrorism has established its roots across 
the world through various organizations.  While the following organizations are well 
known for their terrorist activities, certain other organizations function on small scale or 
are less known in the history of terrorism.  
           Among the various well-known terrorist organizations, Al-Qaeda has secured 
itself as a radical group with its lethal objectives. Established in 1998, under the 
leadership of Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda is not merely a terrorist organization, but an 
ideology that supports several radicals across the globe. Derived from the Arabic 
language, Qaeda refers to ―base of operation or foundation, or alternatively as a precept 
or method‖ (Burke, 2004, p.18). 
           Osama bin Laden undoubtedly established the terrorist group and idolized the 
thought-process behind Al-Qaeda. However, the seed for such a movement was planted 
by Abdullah Azzam in 1987, who called for Al-Qaeda Al sulbah (firm foundation), 
which can be simply translated as vanguard of the strong base. The main purpose of such 
a call was to set an example for all extremist followers across the globe to fight against its 
oppressors. While the call envisaged the hardliners and radicals to set up and propel such 
a vanguard, it targeted the umma (global followers of Islam) to establish the caliphate 
(single Islamic State) (Burke, 2004).  
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 In lieu with the above mentioned objective Al-Qaeda has established its 
provincial base and presence primarily in Afghanistan and progressed towards the 
Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Islamic Maghreb. Its activities across these regions highlight 
the lethal activities and its ability to create wars and terror across the MENA region. Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attacked foreigners in Yemen and attempted to 
assassinate Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayif in August 2009. Their 3000 land mines 
across the towns of Zinjibar and Jaar killed 72 residents and suicide car bombings killed 
26 Yemeni soldiers. Another suicide bombing by AQAP killed 96 people in Sana‘a, 
whose actual target was Yemeni military brass (US Department of State, 2014). 
 Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) opposed Israel‘s position in the global map and Western 
powers since its foundation on December 17, 2004. However, since 2011, its targets and 
activities have shifted towards the Syrian conflict. Its alias Al-Nusrah Front portrayed 
itself as legitimate Syrian opposition and has taken responsibility for nearly 600 attacks 
across cities such as Damascus, Hama, Daraa, Homs, Aleppo, Idlib, and Deir ez-Zor.    
Apart from small arms, suicide attacks are the favored tool used by the terrorist group for 
causing mayhem. The group conducted series of attacks in March, July, August, and 
November on pilgrims, civilians, and policemen across Iraq killing hundreds of people 
(US Department of State, 2014).  
           Following the Jihadi principles, Al-Qaeda Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) conducted 
series of bombings on UN headquarters in Algiers and Algerian government building 
killing nearly 60 people in 2007. In 2011 and 2012, the group used the rising unrest in 
northern African regions and conducted series of attacks. It targeted Mauritanian 
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President Muhammad Abdel Aziz and conducted series of suicide bombings against the 
military, police, and civilians. Affiliates with the group also killed U.S. Ambassador to 
Libya Christopher Stevens. Continuous attacks on tourists, civilians, and military, and 
kidnapping people for ransoms, apart from suicide bombings have enabled the group to 
establish firm base in northeastern Algeria, northern Mali, Niger, and Mauritania (US 
Department of State, 2014).    
 In this manner, Al-Qaeda under bin Laden was very effective in creating fear and 
terror in the hearts and minds of the people across the MENA region. Bin Laden‘s 
organization comprising of various cells were ad hoc in function. Planning or support 
cells, sleeper or submarine cells, execution cells and operation commanders were the 
divisions or cells of the organization called Al-Qaeda. The planning cell comprised of 10 
members, usually of radical origin and residents. The main functionality of these 
members was to supply materials such as driver‘s licenses, boarding and lodging, and 
cash or credit cards. While fund-rising was the main agenda of the planning cell, it was 
responsible for the maintenance of the execution cells (Explainer, 2001).  
 While planning and execution cells were activity oriented, unique type of cells 
called sleeper or submarine cells lived in the target region or country without any 
activity, until requested otherwise. The members of the sleeper cells live in the target 
country for many years and on a usual basis lack any prior police or FBI record. 
However, when bin Laden decided to strike any region or induce his terrorist activity, the 
execution cells and operation commanders played a crucial role. Utilizing the resources 
supplied by other cells, the members of the execution cells were brought in during the 
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final stages of the attack. The operation commanders came in only during the last 
moment of the attack and were the bridge between the local cells and the greater 
organization that shielded the activities of the cells. In some cases they came into the 
forefront, while in most cases they escaped the regions and countries under attack, post 
the terrorist activities (Explainer, 2001).  
 With the death of bin Laden on May 2, 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan in the hands 
of U.S. forces, Al-Qaeda‘s influence in South Asia has degraded to a great extent. 
However, Al- Qaeda still functions as a source of inspiration for numerous affiliated and 
non-affiliated groups with its impeccable ideologies (US Department of State, 2014). Al-
Qaeda‘s ideologies revolve around its main objectives which can be outlined as: a) 
revolting against the West and its aggressive ideas which began during the Crusades and 
colonial period, and protecting Islam against the humiliation and denigration from the 
aggressive West and b) establish a single Islamic State, which in the current world would 
comprise of the ―Middle East, the Maghreb (North Africa bordering the Mediterranean), 
Andalusia in southern Spain, Central Asia, parts of the Balkans, and possibly some 
Islamic territories in the Far East‖ (Burke, 2004, p.19). With these objectives, Al-Qaeda‘s 
central strategy focuses on striking the Western sponsors of Arab regimes to improve the 
local conditions and create a perfect society in accord with the Islamic holy texts (Burke, 
2004).  
 With its potential to empower political theocratic powers and spread religious 
radicalism, Arab Spring has paved way for numerous radical militants to revive 
themselves by either affiliating themselves with the Al-Qaeda or functional 
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independently. Although redundant during the initial phases of the Arab Spring, Al-
Qaeda has reshaped itself to extract maximum opportunities from the Arab Spring 
through its various affiliates. 
―Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), Al-Qaida in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabaab– and other extremist groups, including 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkar i Jhangvi, 
Harakat ul-Mujahadin, Jemaah Islamiya. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, and the 
Haqqani Network also have ties to Al-Qaida‖ (US Department of State, 2014). 
Investigators claim that, ―political transitions and unrest in the region have provided 
opportunities for terrorists to mount attacks‖ (Goodenough, 2013). The fall of Al-Qaeda‘s 
prominent rival Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the flow of foreign insurgents to Syria 
with Jihadi agenda have strengthened Al-Qaeda‘s position in the mainstream terror 
activities (Lynch, 2013). Apart from Yemen and Iraq, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) is closely associated with Libyan International Fighting Group (LIFG). LIFG 
played a crucial role in escalating the conflict against the Libyan government (For 
rojected tidal wave of Libyan Islamic fighting group in the MENA region (Cartalucci, 
2012). While the NATO supplied arms and funds to fight against the government, the 
uprooting of Muammar Qaddafi changed the vision of this terrorist organization towards 
personal agenda to spreading Jihad and terror across the MENA region. LIFG is now 
emerged as a predicament for Libya, given its consistent agenda to invade different parts 
and create racial conflict across the region, rather than political and democratic stability 
(Cartalucci, 2014).  
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          The Al-Qaeda leadership and affiliates continue to issue communiqués to the Arab 
publics and try to present strategic guidelines to reconstruct the affected regions, to 
pursue their terrorist operations (Holbrook, 2012, 17). The Arab Uprisings invariably led 
to the rise of prisoner releases, dawa opportunities and resurgence of Jihadi charity 
networks (Gartenstein-Ross, 2014). These aspects coupled with political and security 
disruption across the MENA region has led to the emergence of religious, social, and 
security chaos.  
Fighters for Paradise: Suicide-Bombers, Mercenaries, and Jihadists        
           Democratic vacuum has been filled by the sheikhs and mullahs. In Saudi Arabia 
there are the senior scientists, a religious authority that compensates Parliament. There is 
correlation between economic and political interests, and the religious discourse, for 
instance, Qatar has entered the political and religious rivalry with Saudi Arabia, and war 
of fatwas broke out clearly between Qatari-supported sheikhs and Saudi-supported 
sheikhs on fighting in Syria or Iraq and sexual Jihad (Gabeau, 2011). 
          A wave of fighters for paradise in varied forms, suicide bombers, mercenaries, and 
Jihadists, has emerged as the grim side of Arab Spring, (Cartalucci, 2012) explained 
many routes taken by fighters from country of origin to Iraq via Syria. While a very thin 
line exists between these varied forms of fighters, the underlying causes of their 
motivations range from personal to communal objectives or aspirations. The central 
objective of the fighters of paradise can be connected with the founding principle of 
Jihad, whose meaning and principle lies in the roots of Islam (Gerges, 2010; Phares, 
2007). Based on Koranic interpretations, Jihad is viewed as a defensive religious war, 
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which calls for fighting actions against Muslim apostates and foreign infidels 
(Boussamoui, 2007). As an important religious duty, Jihad is not only an individual 
responsibility, but also a collective function by entities forged within a State/s to spread 
religious ideologies in a combat manner.  
           The ultimate goal of Jihadists is to recreate the enlightened regime of Islamic 
Caliphate and its successors, and urges the Islamic followers to emotively and spiritually 
envision Hakimiya (God‘s sovereignty) on Earth. The Medina Surahs urge for unabated 
confrontations and strengthen the theoretical foundation, and impulse for valor into Islam 
followers‘ formative grounding (Karsh, 2006). Thus, Jihadists follow decrees or fatwas 
that effectuate religious fighting not only against apostates or non-believers or enemies of 
specific ideology but in some cases also across ideology followers with non-radical 
ideals. Chaos of fatwas and misusing of religious doctrines have led to collective takfir 
(anathematize and declaring others unbelievers), and brutal activities to slaughter 
innocents civilians and elites. As an extension of the fighting tactics, Mujahidin incept 
and encourage in martyrdom activities or suicide missions, giving rise to suicide 
bombings, mercenaries, killing civilians, and targets alike (Hafez, 2010). 
 Mercenaries can either be viewed as individual volunteers that move across the 
globe with an intention to achieve Jihad or collective primary military companies which 
the States use to achieve their militant purposes (Rzayev, 2005). While a central 
definition to understand mercenaries is difficult to obtain, a mercenary believes in the 
principle of ―a devotion to war for its own sake‖ (Mockler, 1985) and can be better 
defined by their activities rather than the reason behind these activities. Irrespective of the 
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definition, mercenaries are composed of militant ideals alike the suicide bombers.  
Individuals engaged in suicide bombings aim to achieving multiple purposes from 
satisfying individual missions such as revenge, altruism and humiliation to communal 
obligations and responsibilities (Hassan, 2009).  
 The Arab Spring has intensified the core ideals of the fighters of paradise. It has 
opened the lid of foreign insurgents belonging to various militant factions into the 
destabilized civic society. ―The borders that had been enforced by powerful governments 
became more porous, there was greater freedom for various groups — whether rebels, 
Jihadists or criminals — to join up and make common cause‖ (Worth, 2013). For 
instance, Libya‘s deteriorating and instable conditions have added value to the Jihadist 
cause, for various camps that prepare militants for suicide missions have been put into 
operation (Gartenstein-Ross, 2014). On similar lines, Syria‘s internal conflict triggered 
due to the Arab Uprisings have progressed into crucial in-flow of foreign fighters into the 
nation (Table 3.1 intended work of foreign fighter in Iraq by nationality). 
―The International Center for the Study of Radicalization estimates the total 
number (including returnees and fatalities) as 8,500-11,000 (some 10 percent of 
the total number of opposition fighters). They originate from 74 different 
countries – 70% from the Middle East and 18% from Western Europe, 
presumably children of radical immigrants. The largest number (over 2,000) came 
from neighboring Jordan, followed by Saudi Arabia (over 1,000), Tunisia (970), 
Lebanon (890), and Libya (556)‖ (Maddy-Weitzman, 2014). 
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In this manner, fueled by adherent and violent radical principles, fighters of paradise have 
emerged as crucial elements that that have unsettled the socio-political and economic 
semblance of the nations affected by the Arab Spring. The invariable impact of Arab 
Spring on the economy and financial aspects of the States are outlined in the following 
section.  
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL EFFECT 
           Arab Spring‘s economic and financial effects can be comprehended from short and 
medium term outlook, and by analyzing the paradigm change in the proper political, 
economic and social (PES) mix. Each of these categories is discussed in the following 
sections. 
Short and Medium Term Outlook  
 Socio-political uprisings create economic risk across the nation. An overview of 
the MENA region‘s economic and financial status validates this assertion. Accordingly, 
this section assesses a) the short-term history of MENA region‘s economic activity. In 
this regard, selected macroeconomic indicators are used to assess the historical economic 
data between 2009 and 2011, b) recent economic history of the MENA region; various 
reports are used to identify the economic risks in the MENA region between 2012 and 
2013, c) short-term economic outlook using 2014 reports and d) medium term outlook 
using the economic projection for 2015 onwards.  
 Economic data between 2009 and 2011 highlight crucial information regarding 
the MENA region. While the global economic crisis in 2010 affected various developed 
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and developing countries, regional economic status across the MENA region exhibited 
volatility. For instance, the year on year (YOY) percentage change of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) net inflows for Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, West 
Bank and Gaza, and Yemen for 2010 in comparison with 2009 was -39%, -5%, 20%, -
13%, -32%, -59%, -11%, 30%, 17%, -37%, -24%, -43%, -20%, 10%, -43%, -13%, 37%, -
49%, and -172%. However, in 2011 the FDI net inflows for Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Malta, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen respectively 
dipped by 108%,  11%, 18%, 100%, 38%, 31%, 102%, 44%, 57%, 100%, 68%, and 
664% in comparison with the year 2010. The following figure emphasizes the same data 
(refer to Figure 3.3 FDI net inflows (YOY Percentage Change) for countries in MENA 
region for 2010 in comparison with 2009). 
 FDI net inflows (Balance of Payments BOP, current US$) can be defined as, ―net 
inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of 
voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is 
the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-
term capital as shown in the balance of payments‖ (The World Bank, 2009, p.366). 
Higher the net inflows, indicates greater ease of doing business in the regions and greater 
economic progress for the nation. Given that, the Arab Spring began and escalated in 
these regions, it clearly andantes that socio-political uprisings create economic risk across 
the nation. What the economic crisis across the world could not achieve, the Arab 
Spring‘s uprisings in the MENA region achieved!  
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           Other crucial factors that can be used to validate this are Gross domestic savings 
(YOY Percentage Change), total reserves (YOY Percentage Change), and net migration 
(YOY Percentage Change). Gross domestic savings percentage of GDP can be defined 
as, ―gross domestic product minus total consumption, etc. (or gross domestic investment 
plus the resource balance)‖ (CIESIN, 2014). 
 Total reserves minus gold can be defined as ―comprise special drawing rights, 
reserves of International Monetary Fund IMF members held by the IMF, and holdings of 
foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities. Gold holdings are excluded. 
Data are in current U.S. dollars‖ (Nation Master, 2014).   
 World bank data indicates that, the year on year (YOY) percentage change of 
gross domestic savings (percentage of GDP) for Bahrain, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Malta, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian, Tunisia, and Yemen for 2010 in 
comparison with 2009 respectively was -35%, 6%, 7%, -20%, 30%, -4%, 2%, 44%, 19%, 
42%, -40%, -4%, and 133%. However, in 2011 Gross domestic savings for Algeria, 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia dipped by 3%, 14%, 21%, 9%, and 22% in 
comparison with the year 2010. World Bank data also indicates that, (YOY) percentage 
change of total reserves for United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Malta, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, 
Tunisia, and Yemen was respectively 26%, 32%, 6%, 14%, 12%, 8%, 14%, 25%, 2%, 
0%, 0%, 7%, 66%, 9%, -5%, 13%, -14%, and -15%. However, in 2011 (YOY) 
percentage change of total reserves for Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Malta, Qatar, 
Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen respectively dipped by 10%, 50%, 11%, 13%, 5%, 46%, 
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81%, 20%, and 24%. Higher Gross savings and total reserves indicate high economic 
stability and growth of nation. Contrary is true otherwise. Following figures graphically 
represent the two parameters (Figure 1.4 Total Reserves (YOY Percentage Change) for 
countries in MENA region for 2010 in comparison with 2009 and 2011 in comparison 
with 2010) and (Figure 3.5 Gross Savings Percentage of GDP (YOY Percentage Change) 
for countries in MENA region for 2010 in comparison with 2009 and 2011 in comparison 
with 2010). 
           Net migration can be defined as ―net total of migrants during the period, that is, 
the total number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both 
citizens and noncitizens. Data are five-year estimates‖ (The World Bank, 2009, p.367). 
World Bank data also indicates that, (YOY) percentage change of net migration for UAE, 
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Malta, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Syria, and West Bank and Gaza for 2012 in comparison with 2007 was -87%, -
92%, -38%, -11%, -33%, 173%, -28%, -33%, 3063%, -42%, 91%, 60%, -231%, and -
51% respectively. 
 Positive figures indicate the percentage of people entering the nation and negative 
figures percentage of people leaving the nation. Thus, it can be deduced that, citizens and 
non-citizens from UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Malta, Qatar, Syria, 
and West Bank and Gaza left these nations and higher percentage of people entered 
Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. Higher migratory number indicates high 
social and political instability in the region. The following figure represents the YOY 
percentage change in net migration in the MENA region for 2012 in comparison with 
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2007 (refer to Figure 3.6 YOY percentage change in net migration in the MENA region 
for 2012 in comparison with 2007). 
           Arab Spring caused negative effects so far, above all, in all the countries of the 
Arab Spring economic growth has stop. The unrests broke down some of the sectors that 
have sold its products in the local markets in particular." This is due to a decline in 
purchasing power and consumption in these countries. The concerns about the 
development of future and developments play a major role in this. This concern also 
intimidates foreign investors, and moreover, there is only a weak ability to compete. 
Wages in many cases slightly exceeding the poverty level, the rising costs of loans and 
lifting of subsidized prices to a large extent on energy and food, labor productivity in 
these countries is significantly lower than in most countries of East Asia, many workers 
did not receive adequate education, acceptable working conditions and training (Becker 
and Zigulo, 2012). 
           Focusing on the recent economic history of the MENA region; various reports are 
used to identify the economic risks in the MENA region between 2012 and 2013. From a 
short term perspective, the Arab Spring created serious economic instability across the 
MENA region. Macroeconomic instability was seriously witnessed, and medium-term 
challenges in areas related to economic diversification, job creation and growth 
perspective was observed. Oil-exporting companies created petrodollar instability across 
the globe and the nation‘s tourism, FDI inflows, outflows, and GDP was invariably 
affected. ―Downside risks, arising from slower global growth, domestic political 
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uncertainties, and geopolitical risks in the region, continue to weigh‖ (REO Update, 
2013) across the MENA region as short-term challenges. 
 Regional GDP in the MENA region remained flat in 2013. FDI flows have 
declined during the 2011-2013 period. Weaker revenues, slow growth and increasing 
public expenditure spending on wages, food, and fuel due to the Arab Spring‘s uprisings, 
have increased debt servicing charges and created deficits from banking sectors and 
grants from GCC countries (See Table 3.3. International capital flows to developing 
countries). Apart from financial deficits, Arab Spring has created banking sector risks 
given the rise in domestic credit quality and government financing needs. Thus, instable 
political conditions in Egypt, escalating civil war crisis in Syria and its spillover effects to 
Lebanon and Jordan, security setbacks, infrastructure problems, and negative 
international relations of Iran have adversely affected the oil exporting countries in the 
MENA region (World Bank, 2013).  
 Next focus can be laid on the short-term economic outlook using 2014 Doing 
Business Report and Global Economic Prospects Reports. Doing Business Report 2014 
and Global Economic Prospects 2014 indicates that economies of the MENA region still 
remain in turmoil and nascent recovery projects have faltered, given the periodic social 
and political tensions. Industrial activity in the MENA region is weak, given the unsettled 
political conditions among oil importers and production setbacks across oil exporters and 
importers in the region. While exports are beginning to reach a state of stability in certain 
regions, tourism activities are still low. The baseline forecast for social and political 
tensions in this region are assumed to persist along with their detrimental economic 
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consequences. Regional GDP is estimated to be flat in 2013and is projected to rise by 
2.8% in 2014, and 3.6% in 2016 given the rate of social and political tensions in the 
region. Accordingly, growth in the MENA region is expected to remain weak. Aggregate 
growth in oil importers is estimated to be weak and below potential and the economic 
recovery in the MENA will remain challenging since it exhibits downside internal risks 
(The World Bank, 2014).  
 From a business perspective, Doing Business Report 2014 indicates that Libya is 
the least suitable region for starting a business, dealing with construction permits, 
registering property, getting credit, and protecting investors.  Additionally, countries such 
as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Tunisia have made it difficult to start business in their respective 
countries by increasing the registration fees or minimum capital investment. Iran is the 
least suitable region for getting electricity to do any business, and Algeria is least suitable 
for paying taxes. Iraq is least suitable for trading across borders, and Syria is least 
suitable for enforcing contracts (World Bank, 2013).  
 Medium term outlook using the economic projection for 2015 onwards indicate 
that, challenges threaten the economic development of the MENA region. 
Unemployment, low and uncertain growth with unfavorable business environments, high 
regional trade barriers, and inappropriate regulatory framework pose as medium-term 
challenges (REO Update, 2013). This affects the recovery of the nations affected by the 
Arab Spring‘s uprisings. A sharp drop in the economic growth, increasing external 
deficits and diminishing FX reserves (Foreign Exchange reserves), large fiscal deficits 
and rising public deficits mainly due to political instability and stock market crashes can 
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be considered as the medium/long term economic effects of the Arab Spring uprisings 
(Masetti, Körner, Forster, and Friedman, 2013).  
 Additionally, the regional GDP is expected to increase by 2.8% in 2014 and 3.6% 
in 2016 depending on the political and social stability of the regions affected by the Arab 
Spring unrests. Low rate of international capital flows to MENA region is forecasted for 
2014, 2015, and 2016, and the capital flows for 2013 is estimated at 1.5% of GDP (The 
World Bank, 2014). The following table highlights the international capital flows to 
MENA region in comparison with other developing countries. The World Bank Databank 
forecasts the GDP at market prices (2010) and current account balances/ GDP percentage 
for countries in MENA region. The following tables indicate the same data (See Table 
3.2. GDP at market prices (2010) and current account balances/ GDP percentage for 
countries in MENA region). 
           GDP for Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen is projected 
to show minimal increase till 2016. While the GDP for Iran, Libya, and Syria is estimated 
at -1.5%, -6%, and -22.5% respectively, slight increase is projected till 2016. Current 
account balances for Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and 
Yemen showcase fluctuating and/or decreasing trend. While the value fluctuates for Iraq 
and Libya, it projects a possibility of slight increase from 2014. Unfortunately, the value 
does not reflect great growth in the MENA region. 
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The Paradigm Change: The Proper Political, Economic, and Social (PES) Mix  
 A paradigm change in the MENA region is observed. A different PES mix is 
observed in regions affected by the uprisings. In order to understand the PES mix in the 
MENA region, general and regional perspective. From a general perspective, regions in 
which the Arab Spring has culminated, regions in which the uprising reached its zenith 
and regions in which the Arab Spring is still progressing, can be analyzed. In regions 
where the Arab Spring has culminated, the PES mix reflects uncertainty, and in regions 
where the Arab Spring is progressing or reached its zenith, chaos and unrest is reflected 
(Perry, 2013).  
 While the political aspects of the Arab Spring tend towards uprooting corrupt 
regimes, the participants of the Arab Spring still aim for achieving democracy. Given the 
rise of religious parties and civil wars, the chaos and unrest created during the Arab 
Spring is yet to reach stability across most States in the MENA region (Perry, 2013). The 
countries face delayed economic recovery. ―Political turmoil was hurting much needed 
private investments‖ (Reuters, 2013), and the budget deficit in Egypt was expected to rise 
by 10-12 percent of GDP in 2013 (Reuters, 2013). A general slowdown in the economy 
affected by the political and social instability is visible in the States post the Arab Spring. 
The regions in which the uprisings are still progressing or are just in their beginning 
stages, a commotion and general chaos is visible. Mass movements of people and rise in 
number of refugee population, slowdown in tourism rates, call for international 
assistance, civil wars, riots, and rise in geopolitical instability is evident across the 
MENA region (Chatham House, 2011). High instability is evident in these States. A 
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comparison of the three statuses unduly reflects the paradigm change/trend calloused by 
the chaotic condition. 
           The PES mix in the MENA region can also be analyzed from a regional 
perspective. The cases of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria can be 
analyzed given their ability to create chaotic revolutions since the inception of the 
revolutionized contort called Arab Spring. In Tunisia, new constitution has won place and 
three-year state of emergency has been reflected. Women rights have been upheld in the 
constitution to attain gender equality. However, radical militants threaten Tunisia, and 
unemployment and high cost of living threaten the socio-economic balance of the State. 
Tourism has declined considerably and the economy is still under a volatility and 
instability. In Egypt, military rule is prevalent and Muslim Brotherhood is declared as a 
terrorist organization. The economic situation is highly unstable, given the presence of 
high unemployment and low tourism. Use of excessive security forces has killed 
thousands of people and the social security of the State is under high scrutiny. Women‘s 
rights have lacked administration and women continue to suffer physical and mental 
abuse by security forces. Yemen‘s PES mix also reflects poverty, civil wars, water 
shortage, society militarization, and illiteracy. Severe sectarian, regional and economic 
problems are present in the State. Bahrain‘s dependency on finance has led to severe 
economic problems, given the rise of unrests. Bahrain‘s status as financial hub is affected 
and pressure on State budget is increasing drastically. Sectarianism is emerging as a 
barrier to women‘s rights in Bahrain. Libya and Syria reflect serious PES demise. Armed 
protestors have seized oil ports in Libya and political infighting has created severe civil 
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unrest in the State. Tribal rivalry projects unprecedented violence and gender inequality 
is still prevalent in the region. In Syria about 100,000 people have been estimated to be 
dead in the violent strife called Arab Spring. Chaos is widespread; women and girls have 
been violated and exploited in Syria questioning the security establishment of the State. 
Poverty and unemployment are on the rise, and Syria‘s economy is expressing a 
downward trend (BBC, 2013; AAron, 2011).  
 Additionally, the future of the PES mix in the MENA region lies in its ability to 
receive and accept the numerous developmental activities lined by prestigious 
organizations not only from their respective home countries but also from several 
countries of the world. For instance, Agence Française de Développement (AFD) has 
actively synthesized and synchronized primary objectives for the holistic development of 
the MENA region. With promoting job growth as its first priority, AFD has claimed to 
stimulate sector budget support for recovery support plan (PAR) in Tunisia and boost 
competitive spirit of small private companies in Palestinian territories. In order to 
strengthen social and territorial cohesion, AFD aims to outline programs to support the 
Green Morocco Plan, cultural heritage, and urban development program in Lebanon. As 
its third objective, AFD intends to improve the quality of life for communities in Egypt 
and Turkey by respectively promoting a flagship project: Line 3 of the Cairo metro and 
implement the first sovereign loan for forests and climatic change, and also ensure 
constant supply of drinking water in Jordan through its Disi drinking water supply project 
(Agence Française de Développement (AFD), 2012).  
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           In a nutshell, countries of the ‗Arab Spring‘ in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen, and 
Libya came under a lot of economic problems, declining living standards, decrease in 
industrial production and exports, increase dependency on foreign aid, high inflation, 
deterioration of services, and decline in tourism sectors during the transitional stage when 
political theocrats jumped to power, and likely to require years to overcome devastating 
effects (Khan, 2013). 
SUMMARY 
           The negative implications of Arab Spring are outlined in the third chapter. Using 
primary societal indicators such as political, social, security, and interregional effects, the 
possible causatives and the implications of the Arab Spring is detailed in this chapter. 
The chapter clarifies that the Arab Spring uprisings have negatively impacted the political 
system of the States. It has empowered political Islamism, spread religious radicalism, 
reduced state secularism, and led to the emergence of semi-theocratic regimes. It has 
adversely impacted the States‘ social system by reducing the public freedom, persecuting 
minorities, reducing the rights of women, and killing the democratization vision of the 
MENA region. The uprisings have negatively impacted the security system of the States. 
They have resulted in riots, lawlessness, civil wars, internal conflicts, social 
militarization, and neighborhood interference apart from affecting the economic growth, 
FDI inflows and outflows, export and import situations. While the second chapter 
outlined the causes that invoked the Arab Spring indicating its potential importance and 
need for such uprisings, the third chapter outlines the negative implications of the Arab 
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Spring uprisings. Therefore, need exists in identifying the impact of Arab Spring on the 





 The fourth chapter of the study clarified the research methodology. The paper 
focuses on the adverse effects of Arab Spring across the MENA region and aims to 
elucidate the adverse effect of Arab Spring on the geopolitical system across the MENA 
region.    
INTRODUCTION 
 Research can be defined as ―a method of study that, through careful investigation 
of all evidences bearing on a definable problem, arrives at a solution‖ (Vyhmeister, 
2009). From the definition, it is evident that research is a scientific process that consists 
of: a well-defined problem, collection and analysis of evidences pertinent to the problem, 
and verification or extraction of solutions related to the defined problem. Thus, 
encompassed within an apparent scope, research study is guided by a philosophy or 
general principle termed as research methodology (Dawson, 2002). 
           Research methodology can be comprehended as systematic approach that supplies 
the logic for the research methods to resolve a problem or issue. It indicates the reason 
behind choosing a particular method or technique to conduct the research study (Kothari, 
2004). Research methodology determines the underlying principle of various techniques, 
and characteristic aspects such as research philosophy, approach, purpose, strategy, data 




research methodology. Research methodology needs to be reliable, valid, and within the 
ethical bounds of the research study. Considering this, each research aspect is studied in 
the following sections. 
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY  
 Research philosophy can be defined as the general assumptions and beliefs of the 
researcher, and the researcher‘s view of the world. It outlines the research approach, the 
research strategy, data collection method, analysis, and the standards for judging the 
quality of the research. Taken together, these assumptions and beliefs are termed as 
research paradigms or philosophies (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009; Rubin and 
Rubin, 2012). Research philosophies are thus influenced by positivist or naturalistic 
assumptions, and researchers can be broadly segregated into positivists or naturalists 
categories (Rubin and Rubin, 2012).  
 A basic distinction can be observed between positivists and naturalists. Positivists 
emphasize on quantitative design, and use techniques that measure and count. Contrarily, 
naturalists emphasize on qualitative design and observation, and questioning and 
description are commonly used in a naturalistic study (Rubin and Rubin, 2012). In 
naturalistic philosophy, reality is subjective and is interpreted from the researcher‘s 
understanding of the phenomenon. Thus, meanings and understanding are plural, and the 
goal is to obtain in-depth understanding of particular event, process or culture from the 
participants and researcher‘s perspective. The researcher is respectful listener or observer 
and is less authoritative, and is subjected to overlapping views. Thus, the findings may be 
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basis of proposed action and relevant understanding to the research phenomenon is 
extracted from the findings (Rubin and Rubin, 2012).  
 The aim of the study is to identify the adverse impact of Arab Spring on the geo-
political system across the MENA region. The negative impact of Arab Spring on the 
political, social, security, economic, and financial stratums of the society is gauged. 
There exists a single uniform reality, the negative impact of Arab Spring, which the 
researcher aims to measure in an in-depth manner. Considering this, the current study 
aims to identify and elucidate the negative impact of Arab Spring on the geopolitical 
system. Data collection and the implications of findings move toward clarifying the 
negative impact of Arab Spring on the geopolitical system across the MENA region. 
Qualitative measures and naturalistic philosophy are adopted to establish this relationship 
(Rubin and Rubin, 2012).  
RESEARCH APPROACH 
 Research approach can be viewed in multiple ways. It is comprehensive in nature 
and can be either dependent on the general plan of the research or on the focus of the 
research or can be viewed as the strategy to achieve the research objectives. An insight to 
each of these approaches will enable the researcher to accomplish the study in a structural 
manner.  
 Focus of the research decides the research approach and research approach can 
either be inductive or deductive in nature (Cooper and Schindler, 2008; Saunders et al, 
2009). The deductive approach is based on deductive logic, where the researcher has an 
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established theory, derives hypothesis, collects observations to test the hypothesis (Rubin 
and Babbie, 2009). Relevant hypothesis is extracted, and quantitative data is collected to 
validate the research questions. As a highly structured process, deductive approach is free 
from subjectivism and validates the theory with factual data. Thus, a general shift from 
theoretical assumptions to factual validation is observed in deductive approach. In 
deductive approach ideas are tested against hard data (Neuman, 2007).  
The inductive approach contradicts the deductive approach and inductive logic is 
applied, where the researcher ―begins with observations, seeks patterns in those 
observations, and generates tentative conclusions from those patterns‖ (Rubin and 
Babbie, 2009, p.39). Data in the inductive approach is qualitative in nature and the need 
to generalize is minimal or absent. Inductive approach demands the researcher to possess 
close understanding of the research context and the researcher is allowed to change the 
research elements as the study progresses. It guarantees flexibility to the researcher 
(Saunders et al, 2009). Inductive approach thus relies on researcher‘s perception and 
understanding of the research study and is generally subjective in nature.  
 Given the naturalistic philosophy of the current study, inductive logic is apt and 
inductive approach is applied. Since the aim of the current study is to assess the negative 
impact of the Arab Uprisings a close understanding of the phenomenon is achieved by 
analyzing the political, social, security, economic, and financial orders of the society. The 
phenomenon of Arab Uprisings is observed from these perspectives and SMT is applied 
to obtain the pattern and spread of Arab Uprisings across the MENA region. Relevant 
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conclusions are drawn and the consequences and impact of Arab Uprisings on the 
geopolitical stability is relatively assessed (Saunders et al, 2009).  
RESEARCH PURPOSE  
 Most often, research purpose is classified into three categories, exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory. While the research purpose can either be exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory, or can be a combination of descriptive and explanatory. A 
research study can thus have multiple purposes. The current study is a combination of 
descriptive and explanatory purposes, otherwise termed as descripto-explanatory studies. 
An exploratory study aims at understanding the nature of the problem which is uncertain 
and the focus is generally broad. Contrarily, in descripto-explanatory studies, the 
descriptive and explanatory purposes are combined to describe a clear picture of the 
phenomenon, provides sufficient means to extract conclusions and to explain the 
relationship between the parameters involved in the study (Saunders et al, 2009).  
The explanatory phase follows the descriptive phase and in the current study the 
general picture of the phenomenon of Arab Uprisings is present, and is subjected to 
detailed inquiry (descriptive purpose), post which, the political, social, security, 
economic, and financial aspects of the MENA region is outlined and their relationship 
with geopolitical stability is assessed under the guidelines of naturalistic philosophy 




 Research strategy is an important element that is used to collect data and test the 
hypothesis in the study. Apart from data collection and hypothesis testing, research 
strategy answers particular research questions and meets the objectives. Existing 
knowledge, amount of time, and other resources and philosophical underpinnings 
determine the research strategy. Seven basic research strategies are usually applied in the 
research studies: experiment, survey, case study, action research, grounded theory, 
ethnography, and archival research (Saunders et al, 2009).  
 While experiment strategy owes to natural sciences, case study divulges into the 
subject, even, person or setting in hand. Action research focuses on the resolutions of the 
issues and evaluating the resolutions, and grounded theory builds theory to predict and 
explain behavior of the research subject. Ethnography describes and explains the social 
world, and is very time consuming, and archival research is secondary in nature and 
makes use of the administrative records and documents to validate the research questions 
(Saunders et al, 2009).  
 ―In a case study, a particular individual, program, or event is studied in depth for 
a defined period of time.  Sometimes researchers focus on a single case, perhaps because 
its unique or exceptional qualities can promote understanding or inform practice for 
similar situations (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005: 135). Considering that the study tries to 
extract information from different countries involved in the Arab Spring, it considers 
more than one case at a single point in time. It extracts relevant literary data, which can 
be observed and developed into general patterns of association using which conclusions 
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can be extracted and research questions can be validated (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
Additionally, the why, what and how aspects of the Arab Uprisings are assessed in the 
current study, which is another important characteristic of case study strategy (Saunders 
et al, 2009). Aspects such as, ‗Why‘ the Arab Uprisings occurred, ‗what‘ are the 
consequences of the uprisings and ‗how‘ the uprisings can create geopolitical instability 
are assessed in the current study. Comprehending this, case study strategy is apt for this 
study. 
DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE AND METHODS  
Data collection is a crucial stage of the research study and it validates the 
outcomes of the research questions/objectives. Data collection techniques can either be 
quantitative or qualitative in nature. In quantitative data collection technique, data for the 
research is gathered from a large practicable sample. This design follows a linear research 
model. A theoretical position is established using the available theories and literatures. 
Post this, hypothesis is extracted and research design steps are indicated, concepts are 
measured, site for carrying out research and sample is selected and relevant instrument is 
administered. On a common basis, survey or questionnaire is used as instrument to carry 
out the study (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2003). Data analysis is conducted, and 
relevant findings and conclusions are extracted. The research validity is verified based on 
the findings‘ applicability to the study‘s research questions (Easterby-Smith et al, 2003).   
In qualitative technique, the research structure is rarely rigid. The framework may 
evolve as the research progresses and multiple methods to collect data can be employed. 
The research framework is flexible in qualitative design and usually encompasses 
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longitudinal approaches which are rarely concerned about consistency. The research 
framework does not focus on numbers and counts, and the observation or research area 
and candidates in qualitative design is limited and smaller in number (Cooper and 
Schindler, 2008). Additionally, the research is conducted in its natural settings and 
researcher‘s role in interpreting the phenomena is relatively high (Denzin and Webb, 
1994).  Given that the current study aims to assess the phenomenon of Arab Uprisings in 
its naturalistic setting and observes the events across the limited countries affected by it, 
qualitative technique and relevant data collection methods are applied.  
Data collection methods can either be primary in nature or secondary. Primary 
data is ―collected afresh and for the first time, and thus happen to be original in 
character‖ (Kothari, 2005, p.95). Collecting primary data can be time consuming and 
expensive. Thus, secondary data can be used in situations which do not require first-hand 
data. Data which is already collected to meet some other purpose‘s requirements is 
termed as secondary data. Documentary data, government publications, books, journals, 
industry, statistical reports, continuous and regular surveys and ad hoc surveys, 
newspapers, interview transcripts, and many more constitute as secondary data. Since the 
current study recounts the nature of the Arab Uprisings in its naturalistic setting, 
secondary data such as documentary data, especially written materials and multiple 





DATA ANALYSIS  
           Secondary data in the current study is subjected to iterative analysis. Data 
collected in the study is thematically analyzed using threefold analysis in lieu with the 
study‘s objectives. While the background information provides substratum to 
comprehend the causes of Arab Uprisings, the political, social, security, economic, and 
financial consequences of the Arab Uprisings is assessed using relevant secondary data. 
Arab Spring‘s impact on political Islamism, religious radicalism, state secularism, and 
semi-theocratic regimes (political), public freedom, minorities‘ rights, rights of women, 
and democratization (social), riots and lawlessness, civil wars and internal conflicts, 
social militarization and neighborhood interference (security effects), and economic 
growth, FDI inflows and outflows, export and import situations, is invariably gauged.  
The impact of Arab Spring on the geopolitical system and its extent to cause geo-
political instability is gauged through iterative secondary analysis.  Factors in the 
political, social, security, economic, and financial sectors that are crucial drivers of 
geopolitical instability are assessed in this regard, and the possible factors that would 
spread geopolitical instability across the MENA region are invariably assessed through 
secondary data analysis procedure.  
RELIABILITY   
 According to Joppe ―the extent to which results are consistent over time and an 
accurate representation of the total population under study is referred to as reliability and 
if the results of a study can be reproduced under a similar methodology, then the research 
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instrument is considered to be reliable‖ (Bashir et al, 2008, p.36). The measurements 
chosen to identify the geopolitical instability across the political, social, security, 
interregional, and economic aspects are extracted from credible literary sources. Despite 
the qualitative nature of the study, use of numerous literary resources till saturation is 
achieved for each aspect of the study, highlights that at any given point of time, these 
resources can be referred and  validated to reproduce or multiply the content of the study.  
 VALIDITY  
 Research validity refers to ―the extent to which a concept is actually represented 
by the indicators of such concepts‖ (Mills, 2010: 959). Content validity, criterion-related 
validity, and construct validity are the criteria used to test the validity of the research 
study. In order to validate the content of the study, the study‘s analysis is divided into 
sections: political, social, security, interregional, and economic aspects to identify the 
impact of Arab Spring on the geo-political system of the MENA region. Criterion-related 
validity can be defined as ―ability to predict some outcomes‖ (Kothari, 2004, p.74). The 
current study aims to validate the negative impact of Arab Spring on the geo-political 
system of the MENA region. The study eventually establishes that the Arab Uprisings 
have caused geopolitical instability across the MENA region. Construct validity can be 
defined as, ―degree to which scores on a test can be accounted for by the explanatory 
constructs of a sound theory‖ (Kothari, 2004, p.74). As mentioned in previous section, 
the measurements chosen to identify the geopolitical instability across the political, 
social, security, interregional, and economic aspects are extracted from credible literary 
sources, which can be traced from the reference section.  
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 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 
 Research ethics are moral decisions pertinent to values such as ―duty, honor, 
integrity, virtue, justice, the good life, and so on‖ (Shamoo and Resnik, 2003, p.10). An 
important area in the research study, ethical considerations in research mainly revolve 
around four crucial ethical parameters: honesty, objectivity, integrity, and confidentiality 
(Shamoo and Resnik, 2003).  
 Honesty as a value and principle is applied in this research study across all crucial 
stages: data collection, analysis, presentation of results, and while extracting conclusions. 
Each and every secondary resource used in this study is cited in the references section to 
give due credit to the researchers or authors and to avoid plagiarism disputes. The 
researcher maintains objectivity, despite the subjective analysis procedure not only while 
deciding the methodology for the study but also while analyzing the results of the study.  
 Confidentiality and integrity of the research study is maintained by following the 
research ethics. As ―a set of principles that embody or exemplify what is good or what is 
right, or allow us to identify what is bad or wrong‖ (Hammersley and Traianou, 2012, 
p.16), research ethics is an integral part of the research process.  
 
 SUMMARY 
           In the fourth chapter, research methodology is introduced. The basic distinction 
between research and research methodology and its various endeavors are identified. The 
current study focuses on the Arab Spring uprisings across the MENA region and aims to 
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elucidate the geo-political effects of the uprisings. Accordingly, naturalistic philosophy 
and inductive approach is applied. The research purpose is descripto-explanatory in 
nature and case study research strategy is employed. Qualitative data collection technique 
is apt and data is collected through secondary resources via literary articles, newspapers, 
credible journals and websites. E-search method is used to obtain secondary data. The 
collected data is analyzed using basic yet reliable and valid qualitative analysis method. 




FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 While the research objectives laid the foundation for the current study, an intricate 
analysis of the literature review paved way for identifying its impact of Arab Uprisings 
on the geopolitical system of the MENA region. An overview of the background of the 
Arab Uprisings provided basic information on the political and socioeconomic 
background of Arab Spring through valid resources. The literature review elucidated the 
Arab Uprisings using the SMT and narrated the Arab Uprisings from regional 
perspective. The third chapter reflected the economic, political, and social consequences 
of the Arab Uprisings.  
           An integration of the three chapters (Study background section, chapter two and 
chapter three) aimed to ascertain aftermaths of Arab Uprisings that has given rise to the 
notion of geopolitical instability in the region, and the possible factors that will spread 
geopolitical instability across the Arab countries in the MENA region.  
           With descripto-explanatory purpose, the discussion section aims at fulfilling the 
research objectives by analyzing the secondary sources used in the study. The following 
figure highlights the flow of the current chapter to fulfill the objectives of the study. 





DETERMINING THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, SECURITY, INTERREGIONAL, 
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS  
 The political consequences of the Arab Spring uprisings can be narrowed to 
emergence of religious political parties with radical agendas, followed by rise in the 
activities of the political radicalism along with the iron-fist rule of the popular caliph‘s 
rule. This will invariably spread religious radicalism across the MENA region, create 
instability, conflicts, and violence across the globe and plunge the MENA region to semi-
theocratic and eventually theocratic regimes, where essentialities of human identity will 
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           The social consequences of the Arab Spring uprisings can be summated as loss of 
public freedom, decline of rights of women and minorities, and death of hope for 
democracy. Loss of public freedom will prohibit the citizens from enjoying the benefits 
of expressing their views and opinions either through media or via assemblies. 
Additionally, Islamist parties and factions force their citizens to adhere to their Islamic 
rules and traditions, which prevent the individuals from enjoying the religious freedom. A 
close minded society is prevalent which hampers the essence of human rights and human 
identity and dignity.  
 The dominance of certain religious decrees will eventually force the minorities to 
take a backseat and even exploit them and force them to either convert to radicalism or be 
killed by Jihadist groups or pay tax to the dominating groups.  
           The rights of minorities are further plunged into dungeons. The plight of women is 
no different than that of the minorities, for minorities are seldom respected or viewed as 
object of respect unlike many cultures.  
            This cultural dilemma will eventually lead to the dominance of selected groups 
and male members of the society, which can eventually turn the civilized social society 
into medieval barbarian world. With the rise of sectarians and radicals, the hope for any 
democratic society will remain as a myth and political rights, civil rights, division of 
powers, and horizontal accountability (Merkel, 2004) long anticipated by the MENA 
region will be subjected to totalitarian regimes camouflaged as political parties.    
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 The security consequences of the Arab Spring uprisings can be recounted as 
continuous unrest and chaos, utter lawlessness, civil wars and rule of military juntas and 
society militarization, and neighborhood interference. Continuous unrests and disruptions 
in any society can induce the society to severe trauma and affect the psychological 
semblance of political, economic, and social mix of the State. It escalates the risk levels 
of the affected States, hamper the tourist, and FDI inflow and outflow of the State. It can 
empower the negative and violent elements of the State and create sectarian divide across 
the civil society, thereby laying the seeds for civil wars. The Arab Spring uprisings are 
sadly reduced to mere civil wars across the MENA region and this chaos has taken the 
lives of thousands of civilians apart from the involved parties. Violence is used a weapon 
by the involved parties and the general spread of violence across geographical boundaries 
signifies the plausible impact of violence and chaos across geographical borders.  
            Society is thus militarized as people are forced to take sides and neighboring 
interferences with personal agendas in the form of financial or resource aid escalates the 
violence and the aftermaths of the popular protests across various regions in the Arab and 
African World is a classic example for the same.  
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           Apart from countries several radical political parties step up to assume power to 
exercise their personal interests and the rise of Muslim Brotherhood symbolizes this. 
Funded to create and spread radical hegemony, parties such as the Brotherhood cloak 
their personal Islamic agendas with democracy and in reality function as semi-theocratic 
or theocratic regime. Founded on the radical Law, a decree degenerative principle that 
curtail the fundamental rights of human beings, the rise of such factions in the society 
eventually affect the regional and international relations of the affected Arab States. 
 On similar lines, the Arab Spring uprisings has opened opportunities for countries 
such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran exercise their hegemonic ideas on the affected 
regions. The power-politics of these countries have invariably and erroneously supported 
unwanted elements in the MENA region.  Iran‘s hegemonic ideas to control the political 
and economic stratums of the MENA region and the world have rendered it as a global 
threat. Not only has there been regional power-politics in the MENA region, but also 
politics in petrodollar hegemony.  
 Arab Spring uprisings have led to increasing anarchy of petrodollar a portion of 
which is diverted towards the spread of radical Jihadi ideas. The nations involved in such 
activities supply either money or goods and ensure the maintenance of the household of 
the people involved in spreading radical religious ideas.  
           Apart from this aspect, anarchy of petrodollar also exposes the globe to oil war 
vulnerability and ensure petrodollar hegemony across the global economy. Oil war 
vulnerability results in the use of physical forces to control the oil supplies, enhanced 
violent activities, and global wars with petroleum and its products as the cause.  
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           Along with gaining hegemony on global currency, the dependency of modern 
economy on oil and natural gas pushes the global economy control in the hands of nation 
that produce and export oil and its apparent resources. This invariably exposes the globe 
to creating fear for increase in petroleum prices and exposes the MENA and the world to 
global inflation. 
 Not only have the Arab Spring uprisings impacted the political and social aspects 
of the MENA region, uprisings have also induced severe economic and financial 
consequences for the MENA region. While the GDP fails to show any growth, FDI 
inflows and tourism have been severely impacted. Developmental activities have ceased 
to exist in the affected regions and unemployment is on the rise. Poverty has taken a new 
form and income gap between the rich and the poor is increased in the MENA region. 
The entire MENA region reflects high political and socio-economic risk.  
IDENTIFYING WHETHER ARAB SPRING HAS GIVEN RISE TO THE 
NOTION OF GEOPOLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE MENA REGION 
The findings of the study clearly indicate the decline of the Arab Spring uprisings 
across the political, social, security, interregional and financial frontiers of the States 
involved in the Arab Spring‘s wave. A clear dissatisfaction with the Arab Spring 
uprisings can be highlighted, given that Arab Spring has affected the political, social, 
economic, and interregional stability for the worse and has failed to bring about 
optimistic changes. The Arab Spring uprisings have empowered political Islamism and 
the rise in the number of Islamist parties across the MENA region symbolizes this. This 
has invariably led to the rise of religious radicalism and backed by radical parties Jihadi 
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extremists have created serious conflicts by using the political channels of the State. The 
State secularism is thus on the decline, given the slow rise of the Islamist parities and the 
imposition of the religious law not only from the religious parties, but also from Jihadi 
and radical extremists. Lack of appropriate direction to the Arab Spring uprisings and 
lack of conviction or call for democracy among the participants has led to the emergence 
of semi-theocratic regimes.  
 While the call for democracy was one of the primary causes for the uprisings of 
Arab Spring, the States across the MENA region did not witness any rise in media or 
religious freedom. The Christian minorities were mercilessly persecuted and the women 
were subjected to physical and verbal assaults, and guidelines that consider women 
inferior (Arlandson, 2005) rose during the Arab Spring uprisings. The Salafists, radical 
extremists and parties invariably questioned the need for freedom and equality rights for 
women, since the Islamic ideologies and rules of procedure of the Islamist parties and 
their electoral platform never mentioned such an aspect. The dream of a democratic 
region thus remained as a myth, despite the mass uprisings across the MENA region.  
The regional expanse of the Arab Spring uprisings can be attributed to the popular 
characteristic of SMTs: ―the process through which values, interests, and ideas get turned 
into collective action‖ (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.5) and mass mobilization. 
Symbols, rituals, and/or narratives that solidified the identities of the masses and the use 
of informal social networks enhanced the strength of the collective values and political 
and social movement ensued across the MENA region. Given the impeccable role of 
social media in escalating the Arab Spring uprisings across the MENA region and the 
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world, the use of social media, exemplars a) its ability to reflect the personal and crucial 
opinions of young citizens (freedom of expression) and b) its role and ability to create 
and channel social movements (collective social action). 
           The Arab Spring uprisings have thus collectively and negatively impacted the 
political, social, security, interregional, economic and financial systems of the MENA 
region. From the political front, Arab Spring has empowered political Islamism, spread 
religious radicalism, reduced state secularism, and led to the emergence of semi-
theocratic regimes. From a social front, it has reduced the public freedom, persecuted 
minorities, reduced the rights of women, and killed the democratization vision of the 
MENA region. From a security perspective, the uprisings have resulted in riots and 
lawlessness, civil wars and internal conflicts, social militarization and neighborhood 
interference.  
            From an interregional perspective, the uprisings have empowered Muslim 
Brotherhood and Iranian hegemony, anarchized petrodollar, created proxy wars, and have 
led to the revival of popular terrorist cells such as Al-Qaeda and fighters of paradise, 
apart from affecting the economic and financial perspectives of the States by effecting 
economic growth, FDI inflows and outflows, export and import situations in an adverse 
manner. Thus, it is clear that the Arab Spring uprisings have negatively impacted the 






HIGHLIGHTING THE POSSIBLE FACTORS THAT WOULD SPREAD 
GEOPOLITICAL INSTABILITY ACROSS THE MENA REGION        
           The political, social, security, interregional, economic, and financial consequences 
of the Arab Spring uprisings can be synonymously viewed as the possible factors that 
would spread geopolitical instability across the MENA region. The factors outlined 
below could invariably spread wide and far if the States fail to curtail the instability 
across the MENA region.  Islam plays a fairly large role in the political life across the 
MENA region, and political and legal life of the MENA region still follows the values 
and principles of Islam.  
           Thus, with the rise of Islamist parties and Islamist factions, Arab Spring uprisings 
have empowered political Islamism and reduced State secularism. This is one of the 
primary factors (political) that would spread geopolitical instability across the MENA 
region.   
  Freedom of people is still at stake and the respective governments still curtail 
media, religious, internet, elective freedom along with freedom of expression. Women 
fail to enjoy same rights as men, and minorities are mercilessly persecuted. Severe 
progress is not being made to protect the rights of women and minorities. Curtailed by 
chaos and religious fanaticism human dignity and freedom is still at stake in the MENA 
region. This acts as another important factor (social) that would spread geopolitical 
instability across the MENA region.   
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 Extremist organizations have received openness, and avenues and civil wars have 
assumed a gruesome form in the MENA region. Increasing cross-border violence and 
revival and rise of radical extremism through violent and terror spreading organizations 
have created waves of concern, and increased the vulnerability, and exposed the affected 
nations to external threats.  
        Rise of extremist activities in the MENA region coupled with chaotic personal 
agendas functions as another primary factor (security and interregional) that would 
spread geopolitical instability across the MENA region.   
 Bad state of the affected States‘ economy, rising gap between the rich and the 
poor and decrease in FDI inflows/outflows, exports, and tourism have negatively affected 
the economic equilibrium of the MENA region. Fear of worsening economic situations 
and the spread of this fear, coupled with petrodollar monopoly have created adversities 








 The popular uprisings of Arab Spring that shook the foundations of the MENA 
region revived the concept of political and social movements in the 21st century advanced 
world. Social movements have tirelessly impacted the political and socioeconomic 
aspects of the human society, and the Arab Spring proved as a definitive case for SMT 
analysis. The study highlighted the political and socioeconomic background of the Arab 
Spring uprisings, and highlighted the need for conducting a study on the movement called 
Arab Spring, by identifying the impact of Arab Spring uprisings on the geopolitical 
stability of the MENA region. While the background of the uprisings along with the 
literature review identified political and socioeconomic background of Arab Spring, need 
existed in determining the economic, political, and social consequences of the Arab 
Spring uprisings, recognizing the effect of Arab Spring founded on the strengths and 
challenges of the MENA region and ascertaining the possible factors that would spread 
geopolitical instability across the MENA region to understand: the collective behavior 
and action that represented relative dissatisfaction/deprivation and conflicts across the 
MENA region and channeled a mass movement through elucidating the concept of 




           With the use of interpretivism as the philosophy, inductive research approach, 
descripto-explanatory as the research purpose, the case of Arab Uprisings in the MENA 
region were studied using qualitative methods and research design. Valid literary articles, 
newspapers, credible journals, and websites exclusively clarified that, extremist radical 
political powers took advantage of people's uprisings for freedom and justices. While 
people protested for freedom and dignity, radical extremists abused the empowered youth 
and converted the uprisings from ‗peoples‘ revolutions‘ to Islamic awakening in order to 
establish Islamic regimes. The Arab Spring uprisings thus turned from a socio-political 
revolution to personalized radical mission.  
 The Arab Spring uprisings further replaced autocratic secular regime with 
theocratic Islamic regimes. While the Arab Spring uprisings started with a call for 
democratic and free rule, it resulted as a nightmare of religious and sectarian violence in 
the name of fighting for freedom and democracy, and then to establish Islamic semi- 
theocratic and theocratic regimes. This aspect opens door to global fear, given its 
potential to recreate closed and isolated societies across the MENA region that fail to 
discern the idea of politics or governing given the presence of long repressive and 
totalitarian rule across the MENA region. Thus, with minimal or absence of political 
awareness, citizens of the MENA region fail to participate in the politics or governing of 
the State, since theocratic regimes breed people to believe that, the business of running 
the State vests in the hand of God‘s people or leaders. Just like Muslim Brotherhood‘s 
action of convincing Egyptians with their slogan ‗Islam is the solution‘, people under 
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such religious radicals, are bound to view freedom and justice from the eyes of political 
Islamism. This eventually results in domination of extreme religious mentality.  
 Radical religious agendas considered personal freedoms and liberties as their most 
dangerous enemy and the sources of society corruption; therefore, whenever hardline 
Islamist party won elections, people used to see off their rights and personal liberties. 
Arab Spring uprisings failed to provide freedom to the society. They plied on the high 
illiteracy rates of the MENA region (nearly two-third of MENA population are 
uneducated and have no ability to read and write) who failed to discern the concepts of 
freedom, democracy, or rights, and pushed the MENA region further into low levels of 
poverty.       
           The Arab Spring uprisings resulted in declining economies and bad living 
standards, and pushed people to thinking religion and religious ideologies as solutions to 
the prevalent economic and social problems. Thus, many countries across the MENA 
region turned as subordinates to foreign political agendas at the expense of their 
independence and sovereignty, given their dependency on foreign aids.  
 Sectarian and religious tensions backed by Iran and Saudi Arabia became a timed 
fuse to full-scale war in MENA. Chaos and violence is evident in the MEAN region. 
Emergence of powerful and influencing radical organizations of regional and 
international nature (e.g. Muslim Brotherhood) that have military wings and even 
affiliated to global terrorist groups exemplifies this. Many countries in MENA have 
become practically failed states with dysfunctional governments and scanty sovereignty 
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where government cannot extent it authority and rule of law over all its lands.  The 
governance of terrorist groups has become true and more realistic where terrorist groups 
dominate territories cross borders of many countries and impose strict form of religious 
radical laws, rule of radicalism, and extremism, the current situation where northeastern 
of Syria and entire northwestern of Iraq are under the radical rule of ISIS.  
 With the rise of political and military radicalism, Christianity and other ethno-
religious indigenous minorities are more endangered and on the way of extinction due to 
discrimination, blackmailing, intimidation, forcible displacement, violence, ethnic 
cleansing, and mass murder, the case of Mosul proved this situation extremely when 
Christians were forced to common exodus. 
            Islamists came to power just to avenge their secular opponents with no economic 
or social development plans or future insight for economy or society.  Social conflict is 
highly prevalent between seculars and religious regarding the governance of the State. 
While people had no way to get rid of religious parties who seized power in the name of 
God, the only help they found was the army, something made people to prefer 
governance of juntas and military council over theocracy. In this manner, the Arab Spring 
uprisings have collectively and negatively impacted the political, social, security, 
interregional, economic, and financial systems of the MENA region. Thus, it is clearly 
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